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This thesis investigates the variation in the electoral performances of right-wing 
populist parties in the Benelux region (i.e. Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg). Despite numerous historical and political commonalities, right-wing 
populist parties have been more successful in the Netherlands and Flanders (i.e. the 
northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) than in Luxembourg and Wallonia (i.e. 
the southern, French-speaking part of Belgium). 
The thesis sets out to explore ‘conventional’ explanations, including socio-
economic indicators (i.e. demand-side factors), and institutional as well as party 
organisational features (i.e. supply-side explanations). The analysis suggests that 
demand for right-wing populist parties is relatively constant across the Benelux 
region, whereas the supply of such parties has been weaker in Wallonia and 
Luxembourg than in Flanders and the Netherlands. However, supply-side 
explanations cannot fully account for the variation in the electoral performances of 
right-wing populist parties. The research therefore focuses on the wider context in 
which party competition takes place by highlighting the role of mainstream parties 
and the media; taken together, they act as gatekeepers in the sense that they can 
facilitate or hinder access into the electoral market. By politicising issues that are 
traditionally ‘owned’ by the populist radical right (notably immigration), they can 
create favourable opportunity structures for right-wing populist parties to thrive.  
Empirical support is drawn from party manifestos as well as semi-structured 
interviews with media practitioners and politicians. In Flanders and the 
Netherlands, the decline of mainstream parties as well as changes in the media 
landscape have contributed to the radicalisation of the political discourse, which 
has created fertile ground for right-wing populist challengers. By contrast, Wallonia 
and Luxembourg have remained relatively immune to these tendencies: mainstream 
parties have (thus far) managed to hold on to their core electorates, while the media 
are generally hostile to the populist radical right. 
The thesis complements existing theoretical explanations by moving beyond the 
traditional demand- and supply-side framework. The findings suggest that the 
reactions of mainstream political parties and the media are crucial to understand the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The populist radical right has become an important political force. Despite 
noteworthy setbacks (most notably the defeats of presidential candidates Norbert 
Hofer in Austria in 2016, and Marine Le Pen in France in 2017), net support for so-
called ‘right-wing populist parties’ has increased substantially in Europe over the 
last three decades (see, for example, Rooduijn 2015). Concern about the possibility 
of a renewed ‘swing to the right’ in European politics therefore looms large among 
media commentators and mainstream politicians. For instance, an editorial 
published in The Economist in November 2015 warned of ‘stormy weather’ as 
Europe faced its ‘biggest crisis in a generation’, as ‘the mass influx of refugees is 
aggravating many of Europe’s other looming problems’ and ‘stoking populism 
everywhere’ (The Economist 2015).  
This statement echoed earlier warnings by European leaders about the rise of 
populism in the face of the crises. In 2010, for instance, the then-President of the 
European Council, Herman van Rompuy, identified populism as ‘the greatest threat 
to Europe’ (Frankfurter Allgemeine 2010). Similarly, in 2013, then-President of the 
European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, expressed deep concern ‘about the 
divisions that we see emerging: political extremes and populism tearing apart the 
political support and the social fabric that we need to deal with the crises […]’ 
(European Commission 2013). Their concern can partly be explained by the fact 
that the European ‘lurch’ to the right has been accompanied by the resurfacing of 
nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiments. For some, the advances made by right-
wing populist parties evoked memories of the political disintegration of the 1930s 
(see, for example, Huffington Post 2016). In particular disagreements about 
immigration have given rise to some of the most heated and emotionally loaded 
public debates of our times.  
The rise of the populist radical right is arguably ‘one of the few academic topics 
that one can study without having to defend the relevance of one’s choice’ (Mudde 
2007: 1). Indeed, it constitutes one of the most dramatic changes in European 
politics in the post-war era (van der Brug et al. 2005: 548). The electoral fortunes 
of right-wing populist parties have coincided with the decline of the traditional 
party families that long dominated European politics, thereby illustrating the 
‘thawing’ of European party systems that had long been declared ‘frozen’ (Lipset 
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& Rokkan 1967). 0F1 It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the phenomenon has 
been matched with a proliferation of academic studies seeking to shed light on the 
reasons behind their electoral success (e.g. Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008; 
Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Betz 1994; Eatwell 2003; Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2007; 
Norris 2005; Pytlas 2015).  
As Cas Mudde (2016: 2) has noted, ‘[t]he populist radical right is by far the best-
studied party family within political science. Since the […] early 1980s, more 
articles and books have been written on far right parties than on all other party 
families combined.’ However, the disproportionate attention that these parties have 
received (Mudde 2013) tends to obscure the fact that they have not been (equally) 
successful in all Western European countries. Indeed, there is great variation in the 
electoral performances of such parties across the continent; while right-wing 
populist parties have formed part of (or provided parliamentary support for) 
national governments in some countries including Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands, they have been virtually non-existent or 
unsuccessful in rallying support in countries such as Portugal, Ireland and 
Luxembourg.  
In other words, the development of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe 
has been a story of failure as well as success. This raises questions about the 
variation in the electoral fortunes of these parties in Western Europe. Specifically, 
why have right-wing populist parties with an anti-immigration agenda succeeded 
in garnering broad electoral support in some countries but failed to do so in others? 
This thesis seeks to answer this question by focusing specifically on the Benelux 
region (i.e. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). The Benelux countries 
provide useful comparative case studies: despite numerous commonalities, 
including a shared history, these countries have had very different experiences with 
right-wing populism. Indeed, right-wing populist parties have been more successful 
in the Netherlands and Flanders (i.e. the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) 
than in Luxembourg and Wallonia (i.e. the southern, French-speaking part of 
Belgium). Considering the fact that right-wing populist parties have emerged in all 
 
1 Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 50) argued that the party systems of the 1960s ‘reflect, with few but 
significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s’, which implies that ‘the party 
alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of 
the national electorates’. 
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neighbouring countries including Germany with the Alternative für Deutschland 
(Alternative for Germany or AfD) and France with the Rassemblement National 
(National Rally or RN – formerly known as the Front National or FN), the absence 
of a successful right-wing populist contender in Wallonia and Luxembourg is 
particularly puzzling. Why have the Netherlands and Flanders witnessed the rise of 
right-wing populist contenders, whereas comparable movements in Luxembourg 
and Wallonia have failed? 
This research question will be examined by exploring a wide range of explanatory 
variables, including socio-economic (e.g. immigration and unemployment figures), 
institutional (e.g. the electoral system), organisational (e.g. party leadership) and 
contextual (e.g. the media landscape) factors. Building on existing research, the 
electoral performance of right-wing populist parties is conceptualised as a 
marketplace, where success and failure are contingent on ‘public demand’ and 
‘party supply’ (e.g. Eatwell 2003; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Mudde 2007; Norris 
2005; van Kessel 2013). Broadly speaking, demand-side explanations highlight 
factors that create a breeding ground in which right-wing populist parties can thrive, 
notably socio-economic or political conditions that make voters more prone to 
support right-wing populist parties, while supply-side theories highlight the 
mechanisms that enable right-wing populist parties to harness demand for right-
wing populist ideas. I argue that the demand for and supply of right-wing populist 
parties are ultimately dependent on the context, which is shaped by the media- and 
party-landscapes in which these parties operate. To fully understand the electoral 
trajectories of the populist radical right, we thus need to consider contextual factors, 
i.e. ‘the political and discursive opportunity structures in which [right-wing 
populist] actors exercise their political agency’ (Pytlas 2015: 4).  
These opportunity structures can broadly be defined as a set of variables that help 
determine ‘which ideas are considered “sensible”, which constructions of reality 
are seen as “realistic”, and which claims are held as “legitimate” within a certain 
polity at a specific time’ (Koopmans & Statham 1999: 228). It is important to 
understand the unique characteristics of the electoral market, since these features 
are likely to influence both public demand and party supply. The analytical 
framework developed in Chapter 2 focuses on the factors that influence demand- 
and supply-side variables addressed by other authors. In a nutshell, I posit that, 
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while demand- and supply-side explanations provide a useful and indeed necessary 
starting point to understand the different electoral trajectories of right-wing populist 
parties, they are limited in the sense that they do not take into account the context 
in which these parties operate.  
Before going into further detail, it is essential to define the key concepts. 
Specifically, (1) what are ‘right-wing populist parties’ and (2) how do we 
conceptualise their ‘success’ and ‘failure’?  
1.1. Key Concepts 
Providing clear definitions is crucial because the strength of a theory ultimately 
hinges on the robustness of the classification system underpinning it (see Mudde 
2007: 258). This is particularly important when studying ‘essentially contested 
concepts’ such as populism (Mudde 2017a; Rooduijn 2019). It has long been 
acknowledged that there is no consensus in the literature on how to define (right-
wing) populism (see, for example, Mudde 1996). Part of the problem derives from 
the fact that scholars have used a host of different labels (including the ‘extreme 
right’, ‘far right’, ‘radical right’) to refer to the same party family (Art 2011: 10). 
Despite this lack of definitional consensus, scholars often implicitly agree on which 
parties to include (see Kitschelt 2007: 1178; Mudde 2000: 7; 2007: 58). Since this 
thesis is primarily interested in explaining the electoral performance of parties that 
are (1) situated on the right side of the political spectrum (in socio-cultural terms) 
and (2) populist, I generally use the term ‘right-wing populist parties’ when 
referring to the object of my study. 
The definition employed in this thesis draws from the works of other scholars, 
notably Cas Mudde (2004; 2007) and Benjamin Moffitt (2016). In very general 
terms, ‘right-wing populist parties’ are defined here as political parties that are 
nativist, exclusionist and radical in the sense that they reject certain features of 
liberal democracy without being anti-democratic. Furthermore, they are populist in 
their rejection of ‘appropriate’ political behaviour (i.e. they break taboos) and, 
above all, in their appeal to the pure ‘people’ in opposition to the corrupt and evil 
‘elite’. This definition clearly merits further discussion; the following chapter, 
therefore, provides a more elaborate justification of this conceptualisation. At this 
point, it is sufficient to note that the labels ‘right-wing populist’ and ‘populist 
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radical right’ are used interchangeably, whereas the ‘far right’ is used as an umbrella 
term to refer to a broader range of parties on the right-end of the political spectrum 
and includes radical (democratic) and extremist (anti-democratic) parties (Mudde 
2010: 1169; Ravndal 2017: 847).  
Having provided a brief working definition of right-wing populist parties, how can 
we conceptualise their electoral success? This thesis considers the variation in the 
electoral fortunes of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. As far as the 
Benelux countries are concerned, most (if not all) observers would agree that these 
parties have historically been more successful in the Netherlands and Flanders than 
in Wallonia and Luxembourg. Yet, generating a more formal definition of success 
proves difficult, since success is inevitably contextual and hence best defined within 
the national context.  
Even at the national level, however, there is no consensus in the literature on what 
constitutes a successful political party. As Sartori (1976: 121) noted nearly half a 
century ago, ‘there is no absolute yardstick’ to assess the strength or importance of 
a political party. This can partly be attributed to the fact that there are different 
‘dimensions’ and ‘phases’ of success. For instance, ‘success’ can refer to the results 
or influence obtained in a single (national) election, or it can indicate rising support 
levels over time. Even within these different dimensions, there is no agreement on 
what exactly constitutes success, given that it can be measured in a variety of 
different ways, such as vote share, seats in (national) parliaments, participation in 
government, or political influence on mainstream parties and/or policymaking (e.g. 
the impact they exert on shaping immigration policies). 
Despite this conceptual conundrum (or perhaps because of it), few scholars specify 
what they mean by ‘success’. 1F2 This is problematic, given that conflating different 
dimensions and/or measures of success is likely to yield erroneous conclusions. As 
Hilde Coffé (2004: 18) has noted, while one specific phenomenon may explain the 
breakthrough of a party, it may have no (or even the opposite) effect on its 
longevity. Indeed, it seems plausible that some factors account for parties’ initial 
electoral breakthrough, while others help explain their electoral persistence. 
Whilst undeniably related, breakthrough and persistence are distinct processes that 
 
2 There are a few noteworthy exceptions, including Art (2011), Coffé (2004), and Ellinas (2010). 
19 
 
may not always be explained by the same combination of factors (Mudde 2007: 
202). Therefore, some explanatory factors may be more important during the earlier 
stages of a party’s life span, while other variables become relevant at subsequent 
phases (Ellinas 2010: 15). For instance, it seems conceivable that the behaviour of 
the media can help explain earlier trajectories including initial electoral 
breakthroughs, whereas party organisation and leadership can account for a party’s 
electoral persistence (ibid). In brief, the thesis is built on the premise that once a 
party has passed a certain ‘threshold of relevance’, different factors become 
relevant when explaining its electoral persistence (see Mudde 2007: 301).  
In this thesis, I am less concerned with explaining electoral persistence (see Art 
2011) or party decline (see Pauwels 2011a). Rather, I seek to unveil the factors that 
account for a party’s initial electoral breakthrough as defined below. The 
breakthrough moment is particularly important, because it can ‘lift small parties 
from relative obscurity and turn them from backstage understudies into important 
political actors’ (Ellinas 2010: 16). This realisation has important implications for 
analysing the variation in the electoral trajectories of parties, since differentiating 
between different stages of success can allow us to assess the relative importance 
of ‘marginal’ and ‘mainstream’ parties across time more effectively. 2F3 As Bonnie 
Meguid (2005; 2008) has noted, most studies attribute the same weight to marginal 
and mainstream parties by treating them as ‘equals’. It is only reasonable to do this, 
however, once marginal parties have successfully entered the competitive space.  
Following Ellinas (2010), I posit that before marginal parties become big enough 
to matter, they are exposed to (and to some extent dependent on) the context in 
which they operate (see Chapter 2). It makes more sense, therefore, to focus on 
these ‘contextual factors’, notably the strategic choices of mainstream parties and 
the role of the media (Ellinas 2010: 16). Taken together, these contextual factors 
shape the opportunity structures available to right-wing populist parties, thereby 
determining the ‘openness’ of the electoral market. For instance, before far-right 
parties become relevant, mainstream parties could choose to ignore them, which 
 
3 Scholars have noted that populist parties have moved from the margins ‘into the mainstream’ (e.g. 
Akkerman et al. 2016). As a result, the lines between ‘mainstream’ and populist challenger parties 
have blurred. In this thesis, the term ‘mainstream parties’ is generally used to refer to the three 




may no longer be a viable option once far-right parties have passed the ‘threshold 
of relevance’ (see Sartori 1976: 121-29). Similarly, media behaviour may have a 
stronger impact on the electoral trajectories of far-right parties during the earlier 
phases of their development, because ‘exposure can push minor parties into the 
mainstream debate, give them visibility, and legitimate their claims’ (Ellinas 2010: 
18). Initial breakthrough typically endows parties with additional resources (e.g. 
media exposure and finances). This means that once a new political challenger has 
entered the electoral arena and gained relevance, it effectively alters the parameters 
of party competition. The behaviour of mainstream parties and the media, therefore, 
is likely to be more important in determining the trajectories of right-wing populist 
parties in the early stages of their life span (i.e. before their initial breakthrough), 
whereas the actions of these parties matter more after they have passed ‘the 
threshold of relevance’. In sum, ‘once Far Right parties pass the threshold of 
relevance, they are harder to combat’, and their electoral fortunes are less dependent 
on the behaviour of the tactical manoeuvring of other players, including mainstream 
parties and the media (Ellinas 2010: 18). Differentiating between different phases 
of a party’s development therefore seems a fruitful starting point when seeking to 
explain divergent electoral fortunes.  
There is no consensus, however, on what constitutes a party’s electoral 
breakthrough. According to Mudde (2007: 301), for instance, electoral 
breakthrough is quite simply defined as winning sufficient seats to enter parliament. 
This definition is arguably too broad an indicator, because it would lead us to 
conclude that the Belgian Front National was a ‘successful’ party, given that it held 
between one and two seats in the Belgian Parliament from 1991 until 2007. The 
number of seats a party receives in parliament is directly dependent on the electoral 
system in which that party operates. For instance, UKIP (the United Kingdom 
Independence Party) won nearly 4 million votes (or 12.6 percent of the vote) in the 
2015 UK general election; yet, because of the country’s first-past-the-post electoral 
system, UKIP’s electoral performance translated into a single parliamentary seat 
(out of 650) in the House of Commons – despite being the third biggest party in 
terms of vote share. Thus, if we were to conceptualise party success solely in terms 
of national parliamentary seats, UKIP could hardly be described as a ‘successful’ 
political party.  
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Since the number of parliamentary seats is not a very useful indicator of party 
success, many scholars interested in explaining the divergent electoral 
performances of far-right parties have used national vote shares as an indicator of 
success (e.g. Golder 2003; Meguid 2008; Norris 2005; van Kessel 2015; van der 
Brug et al. 2005). According to Pippa Norris (2005: 50), for instance, radical right 
parties can be considered ‘relevant’ if they achieve at least 3 percent of the mean 
share of the vote in one or more national, legislative election. By contrast, Stijn van 
Kessel (2015: 77-8) suggests that populist parties can be considered a ‘marginal’ 
phenomenon in countries in which their average vote share is below 10 percent. 3 F4 
Others (e.g. Meguid 2008; van der Brug et al. 2005) fail to specify the share of the 
vote a party needs in order to be classified as successful or ‘relevant’. 
Given that any numerical cut-off point is likely to be arbitrary and hence 
unsatisfactory, success is defined here in terms of ‘national relevance’. 4 F5 How 
should this be defined, however? As Sartori (1976: 121) mused, ‘How much 
strength makes a party relevant, and how much feebleness makes a party 
irrelevant?’ According to Sartori (1976), a party can be considered ‘relevant’ if its 
existence has an impact on party competition, ‘particularly when it alters the 
direction of the competition – by determining a switch from centripetal to 
centrifugal competition either leftward or rightward, or in both directions – of the 
governing-oriented parties’ (Sartori 1976: 123). Conversely, a party is considered 
‘irrelevant’ (or unsuccessful) if it has neither coalition potential (i.e. it is at least 
considered at some point to have the potential to help form a governmental 
majority) nor blackmail potential (i.e. whether a party’s existence affects other 
parties’ behaviour and policy platforms).  
Based on this observation, success is defined here as ‘the moment when a party’s 
[…] electoral strength increases significantly to a point where it changes the 
parameters of political competition’ (Ellinas 2010: 16). Whilst this increase in 
strength tends to be most noticeable in national elections, right-wing populist 
parties have also made important gains in local or European elections. Thus, 
‘[r]egardless of how an initial breakthrough is achieved, it marks a substantial 
 
4 In contrast to Pippa Norris, Stijn van Kessel’s work considers left- and right-wing manifestations 
of populist parties. 
5 This is a similar approach to that used by Ellinas (2010: 15), who refers to Sartori’s notion of the 
‘threshold of relevance’ (Sartori 1976: 121-29). 
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increase in party strength that crowns minor players with the perception of a 
national political relevance’ (Ellinas 2010: 16). 
Having provided some conceptual clarity, the remainder of this introduction briefly 
sums up the existing research and identifies some of the gaps in the academic 
literature (1.2); explains the research design and methodology, and introduces the 
case studies (1.3); and outlines the plan for the thesis (1.4). 
1.2. Existing Research 
Since the end of WWII, the far right is among the most studied political phenomena. 
In particular, the great variation in the electoral performances of far-right parties 
has long puzzled scholars. As a result, this question has been examined under 
different guises, for instance by focusing on (right-wing) extremist parties (Carter 
2005); populist radical right parties (Mudde 2007); anti-immigrant parties (van der 
Brug et al. 2005); right-wing populist parties (Bornschier 2012); radical right 
parties (Norris 2005; Art 2011); populist parties (van Kessel 2013); niche parties 
(Meguid 2008); or challenger parties (Hino 2012). Instead of trying to reinvent the 
academic wheel, this thesis draws on this rich body of academic research to derive 
a comprehensive analytical framework that comprises different perspectives, 
thereby deepening our understanding of the electoral trajectories of right-wing 
populist parties. 
In order to provide a brief overview of the literature, it is helpful to separate the 
existing research into three different explanatory strands: (1) demand-side 
explanations; (2) supply-side explanations; and (3), what I refer to here as 
‘contextual’ explanations. In practice, these different dimensions cannot be 
distinguished so neatly from one another; indeed, they partly overlap and are likely 
to reinforce one another (Mudde 2007: 202). For instance, political convergence 
can generate dissatisfaction with mainstream politics, thereby stoking demand for 
the populist radical right (e.g. van Kessel 2015: 20). At the same time, however, it 
can also create space for right-wing populist challengers, thereby facilitating the 
supply of such parties (e.g. Mudde 2007: 239). Nonetheless, separating the 
academic literature into different explanatory strands provides a useful starting 
point when seeking to grapple the complex reasons behind the rise of the populist 
radical right. While it is obviously reductionist to synthesise the vast scholarly 
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literature into just three categories, doing so allows us to provide a concise overview 
of the existing research on the topic. 
1.2.1. Demand-Side Explanations 
The first strand of literature can be grouped together under the heading of demand-
side explanations. Sometimes described as the ‘sociological approach’ (Norris 
2005) or the ‘socio-structural model’ (van der Brug & Fennema 2007), the demand 
side emphasises factors that help create fertile ground in which right-wing populist 
parties can thrive. In other words, demand-side explanations highlight socio-
economic or political conditions that make voters more prone to cast their ballots 
for right-wing populist parties. This strand of literature seeks to answer the question 
of why people vote for these parties. Classical demand-side explanations include 
so-called ‘grievance theories’, which hypothesise that broad structural and societal 
changes, such as immigration, European integration, economic recessions, 
globalisation, secularisation or rising unemployment rates can generate insecurity 
and fuel popular dissatisfaction with mainstream (consensus) politics (Eatwell 
2003; Ivarsflaten 2008; Mudde 2007). Essentially, scholars focusing on demand-
side explanations have argued that broader structural and societal changes fuelled 
demand for the right-wing populist parties (Betz 1994; Ignazi 1992; 2003; 
Minkenberg 2000), particularly among the so-called ‘losers of globalization’ 
(Kriesi et al. 2008). In a seminal contribution, Hans-Georg Betz (1994: 27) 
suggested that the emergence of the populist radical right can largely be seen as ‘a 
consequence of a profound transformation of the socioeconomic and sociocultural 
structure of advanced Western European democracies.’ The breakdown of social 
cleavages that had long had a stabilising effect on European politics generated 
social fragmentation and particularisation. This created opportunities (or demand) 
for new parties ‘to monopolize a new issue and thus find a niche in the new space 
of postindustrial politics’, particularly where these issues had been neglected by 
mainstream parties (Betz 1994: 35).  
 
1.2.2. Supply-Side Explanations 
It has long been acknowledged that it is reductionist to focus exclusively on 
demand-side explanations. As Mudde (2010: 1168) has noted, while ‘demand-side 
factors do help explain the success of populist radical right parties in (Western) 
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Europe, they often fail to account for significant differences between and within 
countries.’ Indeed, it seems plausible that the social conditions that allegedly give 
rise to the radical right ‘do not vary much between the different European countries 
and hence cannot account for their different fortunes’ (van der Brug & Fennema 
2007: 475).  
Towards the turn of the twenty-first century, therefore, scholars started to highlight 
the importance of supply-side variables (Eatwell 2003; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; 
Mudde 2007). Using a broad range of terms such as ‘populism’, ‘extremism’ or 
‘radicalism’, academics started to pay attention to ‘supply-side’ explanations by 
focusing on electoral systems, party leadership, and organisational capacity (e.g. 
Art 2011; Carter 2005; Givens 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Norris 2005; van der 
Brug et al. 2005; van Kessel 2015). This second strand of research considers how 
right-wing populist parties are able to harness demand for right-wing populist ideas. 
To some extent, ‘supply-side factors constitute a toolkit of political activity that 
designs a specific offer on the political market’ (Pytlas 2015: 10). More precisely, 
supply-side explanations highlight different structural conditions that allow right-
wing populist parties to gain momentum – also known as the ‘external supply side’ 
(Mudde 2007: 232), as well as the agency of the parties themselves (e.g. 
organisation or leadership) – also known as the ‘internal supply side’ (Mudde 2007: 
256). For instance, Elisabeth Carter (2005) found that supply-side factors including 
the nature of the electoral system, party competition, party ideologies as well as 
their organisational structures and leadership largely accounted for the electoral 
success of right-wing populist parties. 
Other scholars have focused more on party agency. David Art (2011), for example, 
has challenged ‘structural’ or demand-side explanations as well as institutional 
factors focused on the external supply side by studying the internal lives of the 
parties themselves, i.e. the internal supply side. According to Art (2011: 21-2), the 
success of the populist radical right partly ultimately hinges on historical legacies 
and pre-existing foundations or networks that these parties can exploit.  
1.2.3. Contextual Explanations 
This brings us to a third and final branch of research, which I have grouped under 
the heading of ‘contextual explanations’. Contextual explanations are defined here 
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as theories that consider the broader environment in which parties operate. They go 
beyond demand- and supply-side variables in that they determine the ‘openness’ or 
‘accessibility’ of the electoral market. In other words, contextual factors define the 
extent to which a polity is ‘receptible’ to right-wing populist contenders (see 
Arzheimer & Carter 2006: 422).5F6 The underlying assumption is that political parties 
do not exist in a vacuum. In order to therefore explain the asymmetrical electoral 
fortunes of right-wing populist parties, we need to take into account the broader 
political and cultural context in which they operate. With that in mind, the electoral 
breakthrough is ultimately contingent on the way in which they are received and 
perceived in a given polity. If the environment in which they operate is receptive to 
them, they are more likely to be successful. On the other hand, if they enter a public 
sphere that is relatively hostile, they are less likely to succeed (Art 2006; see also 
de Jonge 2019).  
The traditional demand- and supply-side framework is a useful (and indeed 
necessary) tool to deploy when seeking to explain the divergent electoral fortunes 
of right-wing populist parties, but it fails to take into account the political and 
cultural environment in which such parties operate. 6F7 Indeed, it underestimates the 
complexities of the electoral marketplace and undertheorises contextual factors, 
most notably the role of the media landscape and the nature of party competition. 
These two factors play a crucial role in the success and failure of populist radical 
right parties, but do not fit easily into the conventional analytical framework. Both 
mainstream parties and the media interact with demand- and supply-side variables 
without necessarily fitting into either of these two categories. 7 F8 This key insight was 
derived from my MPhil research (de Jonge 2015) and will be explored further in 
the present thesis.  
 
6 This definition is narrower than the one provided by Arzheimer & Carter (2006: 422), where 
‘contextual variables’ simply refer to political opportunity structures, i.e. institutional or supply-side 
factors. 
7 To be sure, there are numerous studies that focus on contextual factors without necessarily 
recognising or labelling them as such, for instance by highlighting the role of the media (e.g. Aalberg 
et al. 2017; Art 2006; Berning et al. 2018; Bos et al. 2011; Damstra et al. 2019; Ellinas 2010; 
Mazzoleni 2003; Rooduijn 2014; and Walgrave & De Swert 2004), or by stressing the importance 
of party competition (e.g. Bale et al. 2010; Downs 2001; Goodwin 2011; Heinze 2018; Hino 2012; 
Meguid 2008; Pytlas 2015). 
8 It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that some scholars have conceptualised the media (implicitly 
or explicitly) as a demand-side explanation (e.g. Walgrave & De Swert 2004), while others see it as 
a supply-side variable (e.g. Eatwell 2003; Mudde 2007). 
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More precisely, mainstream parties and the media can act as ‘buffers’ by either 
absorbing or dampening demand, or they can act as ‘drivers’ or ‘catalysts’ by 
stoking demand for right-wing populism. Turning to the supply side, the media can 
facilitate the ‘supply’ of right-wing populist parties by offering them a platform 
through which they can spread their views, whereas mainstream parties can create 
or occupy the space of right-wing populist parties. Taken together, mainstream 
parties and the media can play an influential role in the success and failure of the 
populist radical right. Their behaviour towards the populist radical right is crucial 
in obstructing or encouraging the electoral breakthrough of these movements. For 
instance, their decision to stigmatise, isolate, mimic or challenge the populist 
radical right can help fuel or dampen demand for these parties.  
There is no doubt that these different strands of research have enhanced our 
understanding of the electoral performances of the populist radical right, thereby 
making a very valuable contribution to the literature. Yet, there is an important 
research gap, namely the interaction and relationship between these different 
explanatory trajectories has not been studied extensively enough (see, however, 
Bornschier 2012; van der Brug & Fennema 2007; van Kessel 2013; 2015). Rather, 
demand- and supply-side explanations are often separated and even sometimes 
portrayed as competing theories. However, as van der Brug and Fennema (2007: 
482) have observed, ‘[any] valid explanation of variations in electoral fortunes of 
radical-right parties needs to integrate demand and supply-side factors.’ Most 
existing scholarly work on the rise of right-wing populist parties is limited to a 
narrow range of aspects, for example by focusing solely on either demand- or 
supply-side explanations, or by isolating the role of the media.  
This thesis argues for a more ‘holistic’ or integrated approach. Specifically, I 
combine insights derived from these different strands of research into a single 
analytical framework. The aim is to show how the different variables interact, 
thereby shedding light on the mechanisms at play. This approach is based on the 
idea that richer insights can be derived by integrating contextual factors (notably 
the role mainstream parties and the media) into a broader theoretical framework 
that focuses on demand- and supply-side explanations. The main contribution of 
this integrative approach is that it offers an opportunity to systematically examine 
different underlying factors that might account for the success or failure of right-
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wing populist parties in a given country. By approaching the topic from different 
angles, the overarching goal is to generate a multi-faceted picture that can 
supplement existing explanations. 
1.2.4. Research Gaps 
The thesis addresses four empirical research gaps. First, most existing studies are 
concerned with the larger Western European states. As Mudde (2016: 4) has 
observed, ‘[n]ot unlike other topics in comparative politics, the study of populist 
radical right parties is primarily focused on the big states of Western Europe.’ 
Indeed, many comparative studies seeking to explain divergence in the electoral 
fortunes of right-wing populist parties tend to concentrate on at least one of the 
three biggest European states, i.e. the United Kingdom, France and Germany (e.g. 
Art 2006; Bornschier 2012; van Kessel 2013), while considerably less attention has 
been paid to smaller states (see however Coffé 2005; Pauwels 2014). Specifically, 
while much has been written on the rise of populism in the Netherlands (and to 
some extent Flanders), the cases of Wallonia and Luxembourg remain 
un(der)examined. 
Second, the vast majority of studies focus primarily on populist success stories, 
while the absence, decline, and failure of these parties remain understudied and 
hence ill-understood (see Arzheimer 2018: 159; de Lange & Mudde 2005: 481; 
Pauwels 2011a). As Mudde (2007: 201) has noted, ‘only very little attention has 
been paid to the electoral failure of populist radical right parties, even though these 
cases are (far) more numerous.’ Indeed, there appears to be a lack of ‘negative’ case 
studies. To be sure, some scholars have attempted to explain the puzzling absence 
of a right-wing populist contender in Ireland (McDonnell 2008; O’Malley 2008; 
O’Malley & FitzGibbon 2015). Similar single-case studies have been conducted on 
Finland (Kestilä 2006), Germany (Backes & Mudde 2000), Sweden (Rydgren 
2002), Spain (Alonso & Rovira Kaltwasser 2015), and Portugal (Quintas da Silva 
2018).8F9 Furthermore, Teun Pauwels (2011a) has sought to explain the decline of 
the Flemish Interest Party (Vlaams Belang or VB) since 2007, and Hilde Coffé 
(2005) has conducted a sociological study on the differences in extreme-right voting 
 
9 The first four studies were conducted before the breakthrough of the Finns Party 
(Perussuomalaiset, previously known as the ‘True Finns’), the Sweden Democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna or SD), the German AfD, and Vox in Spain. 
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between Flanders and Wallonia. Overall, there have been very few conscious 
attempts to systematically compare ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ cases, with Art (2011), 
Bornschier (2012), Coffé (2005) and van Kessel (2013) being the exceptions. 
Including variation on the dependent variable (i.e. adding ‘negative’ cases) is 
important. As Art (2011: 5) has noted, ‘unless the failures are examined, the success 
of radical right parties appears to be almost natural, and even theoretically 
uninteresting’. 
Third, although there is a broad scholarly consensus that the media are central to 
the rise and spread of populism (e.g. Bos et al. 2011; Mazzoleni 2003; Rooduijn 
2014a; Walgrave & De Swert 2004), the exact nature of the relationship between 
right-wing populist parties and the media remains poorly understood. Several 
studies have shown that media coverage can influence election results (e.g. 
Hopmann et al. 2010; van Spanje and de Vreese 2014). It is also widely 
acknowledged that the media are central to understanding the success of populist 
parties (e.g. Eatwell 2003; Kriesi 2014: 265; Mudde 2007: 248-53; Norris 2005: 
270). However, empirical research on this topic remains scant (Aalberg & de 
Vreese 2017: 4; Ellinas 2018: 279). While some contributions (most notably Art 
2006; Ellinas 2010) have furthered our understanding of the role of the media more 
generally, the role of the media in the success and failure of right-wing populist 
parties remains undertheorised and hence poorly understood. Specifically, there are 
few comparative studies that shed light on why some media provide space for right-
wing populist parties while others deny it (see de Jonge 2019).  
Fourth, although there is a growing body of literature on the role of mainstream 
parties in the electoral trajectories of right-wing populist parties (e.g. Bale et al. 
2010; Downs 2001; Goodwin 2011; Heinze 2018; Meguid 2008; Minkenberg 2001; 
van Spanje 2018), most of these studies focus on the reactions of mainstream 
parties to the rise of right-wing populist challengers. Simply put, when studying the 
success of the populist radical right, mainstream parties are generally treated as 
‘victims’ rather than ‘agents’. There are few empirical studies that seriously take 
into account the behaviour of mainstream parties before the rise of right-wing 
populist challengers, with Ellinas (2010) and Oudenampsen (2018) being two of 
the most noteworthy exceptions. 
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This thesis seeks to redress these gaps in three ways. First, it makes an empirical 
contribution to the existing literature by focusing on the electoral performances of 
populist radical right parties in smaller Western European polities. To my 
knowledge, this is the first comprehensive, English-language study of the electoral 
trajectories of populist radical right parties in Wallonia and Luxembourg. Second, 
the thesis starts from the premise that negative case studies are just as revealing as 
populist success stories; by integrating ‘negative’ cases, the aim of the thesis is to 
explain factors that might hamper the electoral success of right-wing populist 
parties, thereby extending our theoretical understanding of the electoral fortunes of 
the populist radical right. Third, by focusing on contextual variables, the thesis 
sheds light on the various ways in which the behaviour of the media and mainstream 
parties may hinder or facilitate the rise of the populist radical right.  
These three contributions constitute the core of the thesis. I thereby engage closely 
with the existing literature, with the aim of furthering our understanding of the 
divergent electoral performances of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. 
This is important given that there is a growing tendency in the field to neglect 
previous academic research on the topic (see Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018; 
Rooduijn 2019). As Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017: 526) have observed, 
‘[i]n their hasty response to the recent wave of populist victories, many analysts 
have ignored previous scholarship on populism.’ The remainder of this introduction 
lays out the research design and outlines the plan of the thesis. 
1.3. Research Design & Methodology 
‘In a very crucial sense, there is not methodology without logos, without 
thinking about thinking’ (Sartori 1970: 1033). 
This thesis is problem-driven (as opposed to method-driven): It starts out with ‘a 
problem in the world’, which is translated into a clearly defined research question 
(i.e. why have right-wing populist parties been more successful in Flanders and the 
Netherlands than in Wallonia and Luxembourg?), and then uses the existing 
literature to define the research task at hand with reference to its overall contribution 
to the field (Shapiro 2002: 598). 
Given the nature of the research question, a comparative case studies approach is 
most suitable. This age-old research technique, which was arguably first described 
by John Stuart Mill (1843 [1967]), such that it has become widely known as ‘Mill’s 
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methods of agreement and difference’, implies that the ‘researcher strategically 
selects cases for analysis that either exhibit contrasting outcomes despite their many 
otherwise similar characteristics or similar outcomes despite their otherwise 
contrasting characteristics’ (Slater & Ziblatt 2013: 1303). In very basic terms, the 
comparative method consists of systematically evaluating similarities and 
differences in an attempt to unravel some of the underlying features that help 
explain variation. 
This thesis rests on a ‘most similar systems’ research design, which is based on the 
assumption that ‘a number of theoretically significant differences will be found 
among similar systems and that these differences can be used in explanation’ 
(Przeworski & Teune 1982: 39). The aim is to line up cases that are ‘comparable’, 
i.e. ‘similar in a large number of important characteristics (variables) which one 
wants to treat as constants, but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned 
which one wants to relate to each other’ (Lijphart 1971: 687). In other words, cases 
are selected ‘that are as similar as possible in as many features (properties) as 
possible, thus allowing a large number of variables to be ignored (under the 
assumption that they are equal)’ (Sartori 1994: 22). In this thesis, the Benelux 
countries were selected because they manifest opposing ‘dependent variables’ (i.e. 
the electoral success of right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands and Flanders 
versus the failure of such parties in Luxembourg and Wallonia) despite many 
comparable ‘independent’- or ‘background variables’ (e.g. small consociational 
democracies; high affluence; proportional representation, and so on).  
Given that statistical analyses are less useful when studying a small number of cases 
or when faced with a lack of reliable, comparable data (see Ragin 1987), a 
qualitative approach seems most appropriate in this context.9F10 As with most small-
N studies, there is a potential risk of being confronted with multiple causal 
variables, which makes it difficult to pinpoint which factors are deterministic 
(Lieberson 1991). Furthermore, the explanations for the variation in the electoral 
fortunes in the four chosen cases may not be applicable to other cases and may 
therefore lack external validity (Slater & Ziblatt 2013). Despite these limitations, a 
 
10 There are few datasets available that contain comparable data on all four cases; while some studies 
do not provide data on Luxembourg (e.g. the European Social Survey), others do not provide 
separate data for Wallonia and Flanders (e.g. the European Values Study or Eurobarometer). 
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qualitative, comparative case study method is the most fruitful research approach 
because it allows for a detailed, in-depth exploration of the selected cases. 
Moreover, it is particularly well-suited to capture causal complexity such as 
equifinality (multiple causal paths leading to the same outcome) and conjunctural 
causation (i.e. conditions that only in combination become necessary or sufficient 
to produce a specific outcome) (Ragin 1987: 19-33; see also George & Bennett 
2005: 207). 
The aim of the case-oriented, comparative investigation is twofold. First and 
foremost, comparisons serve to generate knowledge and understanding about 
specific cases. The overarching goal is ‘to understand or interpret specific cases 
because of their intrinsic value’ (Ragin 1987: 35). Second, the comparative method 
can pave the way for further academic research by illuminating new aspects within 
the selected cases that can explain the electoral trajectories of right-wing populist 
parties and which may otherwise have been omitted. Since it can serve as a pathway 
for the production of more general theories, the case-oriented comparative approach 
can also contribute to our understanding of other cases. As Sartori (1994: 16) states, 
‘comparing is “learning” from the experience of others.’ Thus, the findings can also 
enhance our theoretical understanding about the conditions that either facilitate or 
hinder the electoral success of right-wing populist parties.  
1.3.1. Sources & Methods 
Qualitative research is generally ‘highly reflexive’ (see Srivastava & Hopwood 
2009: 77). In other words, it involves ‘a loop-like pattern of multiple rounds of 
revisiting the data as additional questions emerge, new connections are unearthed, 
and more complex formulations develop along with a deepening understanding of 
the material’ (Berkowitz 1997: 42; see also Gschwend & Schimmelfennig 2007). 
The analytical framework presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis was constructed 
using an ‘adaptive approach’, which combines inductive and deductive reasoning 
as it ‘rests on the twin employment of, and the subsequent interaction between, 
extant or prior theoretical materials and emergent data from ongoing research’ 
(Layder 1998: 166).  
After formulating the research question, I began my search for an explanation by 
using existing theoretical approaches to guide the research (notably the demand- 
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and supply-side framework mentioned earlier). As Ragin (1987: 45) has observed, 
‘initial theoretical notions serve as guides in the examination of causally relevant 
similarities and differences’, because ‘[w]ithout theoretical guides, the search for 
similarities and differences could go on forever.’ I also identified and contacted 
academic experts to discuss potential research avenues (see Annex III). Over the 
course of the research, I found that the classical demand- and supply-side 
framework was necessary but insufficient to solve the research puzzle at hand, 
mainly because it did not provide sufficient insight into the crucial role of the media 
and mainstream parties. As a result, the analytical framework that underpins this 
research was shaped and adjusted according to emergent insights obtained over the 
course of the research. 
Empirical support for this thesis was drawn from a combination of primary and 
secondary sources, notably semi-structured interviews with media practitioners 
(N=46) and party representatives (N=8); party literature, including campaign 
posters and pamphlets; reports from national media outlets; campaign speeches; 
statistical data; electoral data (e.g. PartiRep 2014); and data from the Manifesto 
Project Database (e.g. Volkens et al. 2018).10F11 The findings were complemented and 
triangulated by drawing on the secondary literature, as well as through consultations 
with academic experts and country specialists. 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were used as the primary tool for data collection. They 
are an appropriate means through which to derive comparable data, given that they 
involve asking similar questions to all interviewees. At the same time, they allow 
for the exploration of unanticipated topics and themes. The main advantage of using 
semi-structured interviews is that they allow the researcher to address a defined 
topic whilst permitting the interviewee to answer in their own terms. More 
generally, semi-structured interviews enable the researcher to explore subjective 
viewpoints and gather detailed, in-depth accounts of people’s experiences. The bulk 
of the fieldwork was conducted between September 2016 and September 2017. 
During this time, I spent two months in Luxembourg (from September until October 
2016), followed by several weeks in the Netherlands (in March 2017) and Belgium 
 
11 A full list of interviews conducted is attached in the Annex (I & II). 
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(from late March until mid-April 2017) to conduct interviews with media 
practitioners and party representatives. 11F12 
First, representatives of traditional media outlets (mainly newspapers, but also 
commercial and public service television as well as radio stations) were contacted. 
The positive response rate was very high at 90 percent. 12F13 The aim of these 
interviews was to understand the relationship between the media outlets and the 
populist radical right. Specifically, the interviews were used to shed light on (1) 
why some media outlets choose to provide space for right-wing populist parties 
whereas others deny it, and (2) how journalists justify their coverage of these 
parties. To this end, interviewees were asked about the ways in which they (and 
their media outlet) deal with right-wing populism and related topics such as 
immigration. Interviewees were also asked to compare past and present practices, 
and to reflect on specific instances. 13F14  
Second, I contacted party representatives affiliated with contemporary 
manifestations of (allegedly) right-wing populist parties, i.e. the Alternative 
Democratic Reform Party (ADR) in Luxembourg; the People’s Party (PP) in 
Wallonia; the Flemish Interest Party (VB) in Flanders; and the Freedom Party 
(PVV) in the Netherlands. The main aim of these interviews was to supplement 
existing knowledge of these parties outlined in Chapter 3, for instance by asking 
interviewees to elaborate their views on specific policy items (e.g. immigration). 
The PVV was the only party that declined my requests for interviews – an 
unfortunate but predictable consequence of the party’s overall (media) strategy (see 
Art & de Lange 2011: 1230; Vossen 2013: 178). 14F15 I thus relied on secondary 
 
12 Preference was given to face-to-face interviews given that it is easier to establish a rapport during 
such encounters. When this was not possible, interviews were conducted via telephone or Skype. 
13 I sent interview requests to fifty-one media practitioners. Interviewees were contacted via email. 
The initial email included a personal introduction; a brief overview of my research project; the 
anticipated duration of the interview; and a few suggestions for possible meeting dates. Where there 
was no reply, I usually followed up with a reminder a few weeks later. In some cases, I contacted 
the interviewees’ offices by phone to explain how crucial the interview was for my research. Three 
people did not respond, notably representatives from L’Echo (Wallonia); Sudpresse (Wallonia); and 
L’Essentiel (Luxembourg), and two people declined my interview requests: the Editor-in-Chief of 
the NRC (the Netherlands) and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Dutch Public Service 
Broadcaster (NPO). 
14 A sample questionnaire (in French) is attached at Annex IV. 
15 In June 2017, I also sent out requests for interviews to key representatives from the francophone 
Parti Socialiste (PS), including Paul Magnette, Elio Di Rupo and Frédéric Masquelin. The aim was 
to gain deeper insight into the ways in which the party has dealt with (demand for) right-wing 
populism. However, party spokespeople repeatedly declined my requests. This was likely due to the 
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accounts regarding the PVV as well as interviews the party has done with 
journalists. 
During the initial round of interviews, I employed a ‘snowballing technique’ (see, 
for example, Gusterson 2008: 98) to identify other relevant interview partners. This 
involved asking interviewees to suggest and/or put me in touch with other potential 
interviewees. I continued the interview process until reaching a ‘saturation point’ 
at which ‘no additional data are being found’ and ‘the researcher becomes 
empirically confident that a category is saturated’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967: 65). The 
interviews were held in the native languages of the interviewees (i.e. 
Luxembourgish, French and Dutch). Language barriers between the researcher and 
the interviewee can present a significant methodological challenge when 
undertaking cross-language qualitative research. By conducting the interviews in 
the native languages of the interviewees, I was able to unveil nuances that may 
otherwise be ‘lost in translation’ (e.g. different interpretations of ‘right-wing 
populism’).  
Whenever possible, interviews were digitally recorded in order to ensure an 
accurate and detailed transcription. 15F16 I transcribed the interviews in the original 
languages in which they were conducted. Recordings were complemented with 
detailed notes and observations taken during the interviews. Interviewees were fully 
informed about the research project and I verbally obtained consent to use their 
insights.16F17 Interviewees were given the opportunity to check any direct (translated) 
quotations used in the text for accuracy through a follow-up email exchange.  
The transcriptions and fieldnotes were then organised thematically and compared 
both within and across cases. Thematic data analysis involves identifying patterns 
and themes. This process ‘begins at the stage of data collection and continues 
throughout the process of transcribing, reading and re-reading, analysing and 
 
fact that my attempts to contact the party coincided with a period of internal turmoil linked to a 
series of corruption scandals (see Chapter 4). I relied instead on secondary accounts as well as Hilde 
Coffé’s PhD thesis (see Coffé 2004), which contains valuable interview data with PS officials. 
16 In some cases, recordings were impeded by the circumstances of the interview; for instance, one 
interviewee invited me for lunch in a very loud and busy office canteen. 
17 Ethical approval for this research project was granted by the Cambridge University Humanities 
and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee on 9 June 2016. I chose not to ask interviewees to 
sign written consent forms since this was likely to over-formalise the process, which may have 
alienated the participants. 
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interpreting the data’ (Evans 2018: 3). Following King and Harrocks (2010: 152ff), 
I familiarised myself thoroughly with the interview transcripts and assigned 
descriptive themes to interview passages to facilitate the comparative analysis 
employed in the thesis (see Chapter 5). 
1.3.2. Case Selection 
As discussed above, this thesis considers the electoral performances of right-wing 
populist parties in four Western European polities: Flanders and the Netherlands, 
which are used as ‘positive cases’, and Wallonia and Luxembourg, which are used 
as ‘negative’ cases. 17 F18 These four polities share numerous characteristics that justify 
a most similar systems research design. Located geographically between two of the 
largest European states (France and Germany), the so-called ‘Benelux’ or ‘Low 
Countries’ provide interesting comparative case studies as they are relatively 
homogeneous within the larger Western European context: they have a common 
history; they are all founding members of the European Union (EU); they are 
relatively small and affluent welfare states with open economies; they share 
(arguably different) traits of a ‘Germanic’ culture; they are multi-party 
representative democracies that are traditionally led by coalition governments; and 
they have a longstanding history of ‘consensus politics’, hence they are often 
characterised as ‘consociational democracies’ (see, for example, Lijphart 1969; 
Vollaard et al. 2015). In addition, since the mid-twentieth century, all three 
countries have experienced relatively high immigration flows whilst maintaining 
low unemployment rates. Lastly, unlike many other European countries, none of 
the Benelux states were particularly severely affected by the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis, as none of them experienced a sharp economic shock or a serious 
political crisis (Kriesi & Pappas 2015).  
Despite these similarities, however, the Benelux have had very different 
experiences with right-wing populism; while political parties with nationalist and 
populist tendencies have emerged in all four polities, their influence and success 
have differed remarkably. Historically speaking, right-wing populist parties have 
been relatively successful in the Netherlands and Flanders, but they have failed to 
rally broad popular support in Luxembourg and Wallonia. The following 
 
18 As explained below, Belgium does not have a national party system (even for federal elections), 
which makes it possible to treat Wallonia and Flanders as two separate cases (Coffé 2008: 179). 
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paragraphs provide a brief overview of these three countries’ experiences with 
right-wing populism. 18F19 Emphasis is placed on political parties since they tend to 
form the primal means of expression for (right-wing) populist movements (Mudde 
2007: 38). Indeed, as Kriesi and Pappas (2015: 6-7) note, ‘[t]he main, although not 
exclusive, organizational vehicle for populist ideology and discourse is a political 
party, and populist leaders typically create new or transform existing parties in order 
to win elections and gain power.’ Accordingly, political parties serve as the main 
unit of analysis in this thesis.  
The Netherlands  
Once known for its social tolerance, the Netherlands long seemed immune to far-
right tendencies. However, since the turn of the twenty-first century, the country 
has witnessed the rise of several right-wing populist movements including the Lijst 
Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn or LPF) and, above all, Geert Wilders’s Partij voor 
de Vrijheid (PVV), which has established itself as a lasting force in Dutch politics 
(see, for instance, van Kessel 2011). 19F20 The LPF entered parliament in 2002 after 
gaining 17 percent of the votes in the general election but imploded soon thereafter, 
following the assassination of the party’s flamboyant leader, Pim Fortuyn, by an 
animal rights activist just nine days before the elections. The PVV, which has held 
seats in the Dutch Parliament since 2006, came third in the 2010 general election, 
gaining over 15 percent of the vote (or 24 out of 150 parliamentary seats), and 
subsequently provided parliamentary support for a minority government (2010-
2012). In the early 2012 general election, the PVV’s share of votes declined to 10 
percent. With the onset of the refugee crisis, however, the PVV regained 
momentum by demanding the ‘de-Islamisation’ of Europe as well as the closure of 
national borders (PVV 2016). In the 2017 elections, the PVV became the second 
largest party, winning 13 percent of the votes and 20 seats.  
 
 
19 For a more comprehensive overview of the cases, see Chapter 3. 
20 The Dutch general election in 2017 and the regional election in 2019 saw the emergence of new 
political groupings, including the Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie or FvD), which 
can also be characterised as a right-wing populist movement (see van Holsteyn 2018b). Given the 
novelty of the FvD, the party is not included in the analysis here. Instead, the thesis focuses primarily 




Comparable movements have been largely unsuccessful in Luxembourg. This is 
intriguing, since the Grand Duchy has historically had one of the highest numbers 
of immigrants relative to the size of the resident population in all of Europe 
(Eurostat 2019). While xenophobic sentiments and right-wing populist movements 
have surfaced occasionally, they have never been able to gain ground electorally 
(see Blau 2005; Spirinelli 2012). Accordingly, in the past, Luxembourg was lauded 
as ‘an immigration success story’ (Fetzer 2011) and ‘the most successful immigrant 
nation in Europe and perhaps the entire world’ (Parsons & Smeeding 2007: 5). 
Although Luxembourg does not have an electorally significant far-right equivalent 
to the French FN or the Austrian FPÖ, the Luxembourgish Alternativ Demokratesch 
Reformpartei (Alternative Democratic Reform Party or ADR) can be located on the 
right end of the Grand Duchy’s political spectrum and is sometimes referred to as 
a ‘soft version of right-wing populism’ (Blau 2005: 89). While the party describes 
itself as ‘a populist party that is neither right nor left’ (Dumont et al. 2011: 1059), 
the ADR is undoubtedly the political party in Luxembourg most critical of 
immigration (Fetzer 2011: 15), as demonstrated by the party’s promotion of 
restrictive citizenship laws (ADR 2013b), their advocacy of immigrants’ greater use 
of the Luxembourgish language (ADR 2014), and their opposition to granting non-
national residents the right to vote in legislative elections (ADR 2015c). 
Belgium  
Belgium is a particularly interesting case because there are important regional 
differences with regards to the electoral performance of right-wing populist parties. 
The Belgian state is organised into three different territorial regions (Flanders; 
Wallonia; and Brussels), comprising three different language communities: the 
Flemings (i.e. a Dutch-speaking community); the Walloons (i.e. a French-speaking 
community); as well as a German-speaking community.20F21 The Belgian party 
systems (plural, to reflect the different systems in the various territories) and the 
media reflect the linguistic divisions of the country; parties generally compete in 
 
21 In addition to the Flemings and the Walloons, there is a relatively small German-speaking 
community of some 60,000 people located in eastern Wallonia. Although the Brussels region is 
located on Flemish territory, it is officially a bilingual region (Deschouwer 2012: 50-55). Given the 
small size as well as the linguistic and political complexities of these two polities, the German-
speaking community and the Brussels region are not analysed in this thesis. 
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only one of the language communities (with the exception of the complex case of 
the bilingual Brussels region), while the media landscape is composed of a 
monolingual French-speaking media system alongside a Dutch-speaking one (De 
Cleen & Van Aelst 2017: 99; De Winter et al. 2006: 938). As Deschouwer (2012: 
136-7) has noted, ‘[l]ooking at election results from a national or statewide 
perspective is […] not the usual way for Belgium. Political parties themselves and 
the media always present and discuss results within each language group only.’ 
Since the country does not have a national party system (even for federal elections), 
it is possible to treat Wallonia and Flanders as two separate cases (Art 2011: 25; 
Coffé 2008: 179). While far-right parties have historically been very successful in 
Flanders, most notably with the Vlaams Belang (VB, formerly known as the Vlaams 
Blok), they have failed to become a relevant electoral force in Wallonia (see Coffé 
2005).21F22  
Indeed, Flanders was home to one of the strongest and earliest manifestations of a 
new generation of far-right parties in post-war Europe (Art 2008). In its various 
incarnations, the VB has held seats in the federal parliament since 1981. Founded 
in 1978 as an elitist, nationalist and regionalist (pro-independence) party, the VB 
started to gravitate towards the populist radical right in the 1990s and early 2000s 
(De Cleen & Van Aelst 2017: 99; Pauwels 2011a: 61). The country made 
international headlines on 24 November 1991, when the Vlaams Blok garnered over 
10 percent of the Flemish vote. That election day, which became widely known as 
‘Black Sunday’ (since the rise of a far-right party was viewed negatively by the 
media), marked the beginning of a continuous electoral rise that peaked in 2004, 
when the VB won 24 percent of the vote in the Flemish parliamentary elections 
(Deschouwer 2012: 96). 22F23 In the 2007 federal elections, the VB witnessed its first 
setback, when its vote share shrank to 19 percent (although this was still an increase 
in terms of federal percentage), and support for the party subsequently ebbed further 
(Pauwels 2011a). In the 2014 federal elections, the VB’s vote share fell to just under 
 
22 In 2004, the Vlaams Blok changed its name to Vlaams Belang after having made several changes 
in its party programme. This was a response to a court ruling that found the Blok guilty of violating 
the law against racism (see Erk 2005). 
23 The colour black was also associated with Nazi-collaborators (Art 2008: 427). 
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8 percent. Despite the VB’s decline, it remains safe to say that ‘[r]ight-wing 
populism is very much a Flemish affair’ (Deschouwer 2012: 96). 23F24  
Although comparable movements to the VB have surfaced occasionally in Wallonia 
with parties such as the Belgian Front National (FNb) and the Parti Populaire 
(People’s Party or PP) (see Pauwels 2014: 43), the Walloon region has remained 
relatively ‘immune’ to right-wing populist tendencies. Founded in 1985, the FNb’s 
share of (federal) votes peaked at 2.3 percent in the 1995 general election 
(Deschouwer 2012: 133), and the party was dissolved in 2012. The PP, which was 
founded in 2009, assumed the place of the FNb. In 2016, the PP’s leader, Mischaël 
Modrikamen, gained prominence as a vocal supporter of Donald Trump and an 
outspoken critic of (Muslim) immigration after appearing on the American far-right 
news network Breitbart (see Breitbart News 2016). In 2018, Modrikamen made 
international headlines after joining Donald Trump’s former White House Chief 
Strategist, Steve Bannon, in founding The Movement, a Brussels-based far-right 
organisation aimed at promoting right-wing populist groups in Europe (see The 
Guardian 2018). Despite arguably being much better organised and more 
professional than the FNb, the PP has not (yet) managed to break through 
electorally; in the 2014 federal elections, the party won 1.5 percent of the votes 
(compared to 1.3 percent and in 2010). 
1.4. Outline of the Thesis 
The following chapter (Chapter 2) elaborates on the various concepts touched upon 
in this introduction. Specifically, it presents the theoretical argument that underpins 
the thesis by introducing a multi-faceted framework for analysis. The chapter sets 
out to generate a clear working definition of right-wing populist parties. It then 
surveys existing theories to explain the electoral success of right-wing populist 
parties by systematically differentiating between demand- and supply-side 
explanations and merging them into a comprehensive, multi-faceted analytical 
framework that is transferable to different cases. The final part focuses on 
contextual factors (i.e. the role of mainstream parties and the media) and highlights 
the ways in which they impact voter demand and party supply. 
 
24 In line with existing scholarly views (e.g. Pauwels 2014: 42-3; van Holsteyn 2018a: 479), the 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance or N-VA) is not included in the analysis due to its 
elitist character (despite having adopted some of the VB’s rhetoric). 
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Chapter 3 provides an overview of the history of the far right in the Benelux 
countries, and surveys conventional explanations for the variation in the success 
and failure of right-wing populist parties. The aim of the chapter is to show that 
although classical demand- and supply-side explanations provide a useful starting 
point to solving the research puzzle, they fail to paint the full picture. In order to 
fully understand the asymmetrical electoral trajectories of populist radical right in 
the Benelux, it is necessary to take into account to the context, notably mainstream 
parties and the media landscape, which shape the opportunity structures available 
to right-wing populist parties. 
The next two chapters therefore focus on contextual explanations. Chapter 4 sheds 
light on the nature of party competition and the role of mainstream parties in the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Drawing on mainstream party manifestos 
collected by the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2018) and secondary sources 
(including the existing literature on depillarisation and cleavages), the chapter 
argues that the failure of traditional parties to adapt to changing electorates helped 
pave the way for the emergence of right-wing populist challengers in the 
Netherlands and Flanders. By contrast, in Luxembourg and Wallonia, mainstream 
parties have acted as ‘buffers’ on public demand and party supply.  
Chapter 5 considers the various ways in which the media choose to deal with right-
wing populist parties in the Benelux region. Using insights gained from interviews 
with media practitioners, the chapter shows that, in the absence of a credible right-
wing populist challenger, media practitioners in Luxembourg and Wallonia adhere 
to strict demarcation, whereas the strategies of Dutch and Flemish media 
practitioners have evolved over time and become gradually more accommodating. 
The conclusion (Chapter 6) returns to the initial research question and summarises 
the main findings. It does so by reiterating the factors that help explain the variation 
in the electoral performances of the populist radical right in each of the Benelux 
polities. It also discusses the wider implications of the findings by tentatively 
‘testing’ the theoretical framework on other cases and points to potential avenues 




Chapter 2: Towards a Framework for Analysis 
There is great concern among media commentators and mainstream politicians over 
a ‘verrechtsing’ (right-turn) trend in European politics (see, for example, Mudde 
2013). Accordingly, the ‘rise of the right’ has attracted substantial scholarly 
attention. In the early 1990s, experts already noted an ‘explosion’ of far-right 
(extremist) parties across Western Europe (Husbands 1992b). By 2003, one scholar 
concluded ‘that the renaissance of right-wing extremism has become a more or less 
Europe-wide phenomenon […]’ (Rensmann 2003: 95). While the European shift 
toward the right since the 1980s is relatively uncontested, there is noteworthy 
disagreement on how to define it. Indeed, as shown below, there is widespread 
confusion in the literature on labelling and characterising this ‘new party family’. 24F25 
Furthermore, the reasons behind the asymmetrical electoral performances of right-
wing populist parties in Europe remain poorly understood.  
Specifically, scholarly attempts to explain demand for and supply of right-wing 
populist parties have generated contradictory findings. For instance, Knigge (1998) 
maintained that the success of right-wing populist parties was linked to high or 
rising levels of immigration (see also Lubbers et al. 2002), while Golder (2003) 
(using different variables and datasets) found no such correlation (see also Art 
2006: 149ff; Mudde 2007: 210ff). Turning to the supply-side, Betz (1994) as well 
as Kitschelt and McGann (1995) have argued that the political convergence of 
mainstream parties can be conducive to the success of right-wing populist parties, 
as it creates space for ‘niche’ parties on the fringes of the political spectrum. In 
contrast, Ignazi (1992: 20; 2003) found that polarisation is conducive to the rise of 
right-wing populist parties because it may lead to a bidding match between more 
centrist and radical right-wing parties, which can stretch the political spectrum 
rightwards, thereby generating opportunities for populist contenders (see also 
Mudde 2007: 238ff).  
These seemingly contradictory findings can partly be explained by the use of 
different methodologies, datasets and/or definitions of electoral success. Above all, 
however, they must be attributed to the fact that conventional demand- and supply-
 
25 Mudde (2007: 1) has noted that the Greens and the populist radical right are the only new party 
families that have been able to establish themselves alongside traditional European party families 
(i.e. Christian democrats, conservatives, liberals and socialists) since the end of WWII. 
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side explanations fail to sufficiently take into account contextual factors. It seems 
perfectly plausible that immigration figures or political convergence alone cannot 
account for the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Instead, they may 
only be conducive to success under certain conditions. For instance, concerns over 
immigration can become politically salient when the media stir up public anxieties 
about the erosion of national identities, and/or when mainstream parties contribute 
to the politicisation of identity-related topics whilst simultaneously failing to 
address some of the underlying issues that result from rising immigrant flows. 
Therefore, it makes sense to take a closer look at the conditions under which issues 
become salient. 
Following Koopmans and Muis (2009: 644), in order to understand these 
conditions, we need to consider ‘aspects of political opportunity that can, first of 
all, change within short periods of time and, second, are visible for people.’ As we 
saw in Chapter 1, in the earlier stages of a party’s life, their opportunity structures 
are shaped by the ways in which they are received and perceived in a given polity. 
From this perspective, it makes sense to consider the strategic choices of 
mainstream parties as well as the role of the media (see Ellinas 2010), since they 
shape the broader context in which demand- and supply-side factors play out. 
Specifically, the media and mainstream parties can fuel or dampen demand for and 
supply of right-wing populist parties. 
Traditional scholarly accounts tend to focus primarily on demand- and supply-side 
explanations, while scant consideration has been given to contextual factors. 
Furthermore, these various explanatory strands have not been systematised into an 
analytical framework. This chapter presents the theoretical argument that underpins 
this thesis by introducing a framework for analysis within which right-wing populist 
parties have a clearly defined meaning. It does so by summarising the main findings 
derived from the three different strands of research outlined in Chapter 1 (i.e. 
demand- and supply side explanations as well as contextual factors) and weaving 
them into a comprehensive, multi-faceted analytical framework that is transferable 
to different cases.  
The chapter is divided into three parts. The opening section seeks to defuse the 
conceptual minefield that exists around right-wing populism by revisiting the 
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existing literature and generating a minimal definition of right-wing populist 
parties. Drawing on the plethora of scholarly work on the rise of the populist radical 
right, the second part synthesises existing theories that seek to explain the electoral 
success of right-wing populist parties by systematically separating them into 
demand- and supply-side explanations. The final part focuses on contextual factors 
(i.e. the role of mainstream parties and the media) and highlights the various ways 
in which they can impact voter demand and party supply. 
2.1. Ending the ‘War of Words’: Defining Right-Wing Populist Parties 
In the early stages of scholarly writing on the populist radical right, Mudde (1996) 
noted that there was a ‘war of words’ to define the newest wave of right-wing 
parties. This ‘war’ appears to be ongoing: whereas Mudde (2007; 2013) prefers the 
phrase ‘populist radical right parties’ (PRRPs), others employ labels, including ‘the 
extreme right’ (Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Carter 2005; Ignazi 2003; Rensmann 
2003), ‘the radical right’ (Art 2011; Rydgren 2002; Zhirkov 2014), ‘the new 
populism’ (Taggart 1995; 2000), or ‘the far right’ (Ellinas 2010; Roxburgh 2002). 
Some use broader ideological classifications, such as ‘nativism’ (Fetzer 2000), 
‘neo-nationalism’ (Eger & Valdez 2014), or simply ‘populism’ (Moffitt & Tormey 
2014; Pauwels 2014).  
These terms are often used interchangeably (Skenderovic 2009: 14). Indeed, there 
seems to be a tacit understanding that they all refer to parties such as the Austrian 
Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs or FPÖ), the Flemish Interest Party 
and the French Front National. As Kitschelt (2007: 1178) has noted, ‘[w]hile there 
is some conceptual disagreement, authors generally agree on the inclusion of the 
same electorally successful parties under their definitions.’ Similarly, Mudde 
(2000: 7) observed that, ‘we seem to know who they are even though we do not 
exactly know what they are.’ In a later work, Mudde (2007: 58) elaborated upon 
this observation: ‘Many debates on the populist radical right party family base the 
often implicit classification of individual political parties on the age-old common 
wisdom: if it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, and looks like a duck, it is a duck.’ 
This comment captures the challenges involved in generating a definition of right-
wing populist parties. It is extremely difficult to escape circularity when seeking to 
extract commonalities from a selection of parties (Stanley 2008: 101), since ‘we 
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have to decide on the basis of which post facto criteria we should use to define the 
various parties, while we need a priori criteria to select the parties that we want to 
define’ (Mudde 2007: 13). Aside from the risk of committing a tautology, there are 
several other hurdles that obstruct the formation of a definition. First, (right-wing) 
populist parties rarely self-identify as such (Freeden 2017: 9; Mudde 2007: 35; 
Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 2; van Kessel 2015: 15; Worsley 1969: 218). 25F26 
Second, unlike other party families (e.g. Social Democrats, Liberals or Greens), 
parties associated with the populist right do not necessarily work (well) together in 
transnational arenas such as the European Parliament, and they rarely share similar 
party names (e.g.: Vlaams Belang [Flemish Interest] in Belgium; Front National 
[National Front] in France; Partij voor de Vrijheid [Freedom Party] in the 
Netherlands) (de Jonge 2017; Mudde 2007: 33-6).  
Third, right-wing populist parties are by no means monolithic; indeed, there are 
important regional and national differences between parties, depending on the 
national and political context in which they operate (Taggart 2000: 76). For 
instance, the Dutch PVV supports LGBT rights and same-sex marriage, whereas 
the Austrian FPÖ staunchly opposes them. 26F27 Furthermore, right-wing populist 
parties are very much a ‘moving target’ in the sense that they are constantly 
evolving rather than forming a static entity. Indeed, especially in the early phases 
of their existence, right-wing populist parties are subject to (frequent) personnel 
changes that can affect their ideology and overall positioning on the political 
spectrum. For instance, UKIP and the German AfD started out as Eurosceptic 
parties but later transformed into radical right parties. Finally, as discussed below, 
the term ‘right-wing populism’ is composed of two very slippery concepts, namely 
the political ‘right’ and ‘populism’. As a result, it is difficult to come up with a label 
for this new ‘party family’ that perfectly captures their nature.  
For the purposes of this thesis, it is nonetheless necessary to provide a precise 
definition of ‘right-wing populist parties’. In an attempt to find ‘a middle course 
 
26 This appears to be changing; far-right politicians are increasingly assuming labels such as 
‘populist’ and even ‘racist’ by wearing them as a badge of pride (see, for example, CNN 2018). 
27 Even within a given party there can be different currents or factions that make it difficult to classify 
a party. The Belgian N-VA is a good example of a ‘borderline’ case: while Theo Francken (who 
served as Secretary of State for Asylum and Migration from 2014-2018) commonly employs a 




between crude logical mishandling on the one hand, and logical perfectionism (and 
paralysis) on the other hand’ (Sartori 1970: 1033), this chapter aims at constructing 
a working definition by outlining a set of core features that are shared by all twenty-
first century right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. As shown below, 
despite the difficulties described earlier, it is possible to generate a ‘minimal 
definition’ of right-wing populist parties. 27F28 
Here, the minimal definition of right-wing populist parties is taken as political 
parties that follow a rightist ideology and employ a populist style, where the 
‘rightist’ element denotes a strong sense of nationalism, a tendency towards 
authoritarianism and a rejection of some features of liberal democracy, while the 
‘populist’ element signifies a reliance on an anti-elitist discourse as well as a 
rejection of ‘appropriate’ behaviour. This definition draws from the works of Cas 
Mudde (2004; 2007) and Benjamin Moffit (2016). At this point, it is important to 
emphasise that this definition is grounded in the ideational approach (Mudde & 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 5; Mudde 2017a: 30-31), which presumes that populism 
(however ‘thin’ it may appear) is ultimately based on a set of ideas (see Mudde & 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 150). 28F29  
Both constitutive elements of this definition require further scrutiny. Thus, the 
following two subsections seek to explain (1) why these parties can primarily be 
described as a right-wing phenomenon, and (2) what exactly makes these parties 
populist. 
2.1.1. On the ‘Right’ Track? 
The concept of ‘right’ on the political spectrum is used in many different contexts. 
Generally, the political right is associated with socially conservative parties that 
prefer to maintain the status quo. This is misleading; as mentioned earlier, some 
right-wing populist parties are socially progressive (for instance by advocating 
LGBT rights). In modern times, however, the political right has also come to 
 
28 There are several examples of ‘minimum definitions’ on related contested concepts such as 
fascism (Eatwell 1996); populist radical right parties (Mudde 2007); and populism (Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2013; Rooduijn 2014b). 
29 While Mudde (2007) conceptualises populism as a (thin-centred) ideology, Moffitt (2016) prefers 
to define it as a political style (see also Moffitt & Tormey 2014). Despite their disagreement on 
whether or not populism is an ideology, both scholars subscribe to what has become known as the 
‘ideational approach’ to populism (see Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), which holds that 
populism draws on a set of ideas, notably the opposition between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. 
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designate a preference for neoliberal socio-economic programmes (i.e. free trade, 
self-regulating markets and limited state interference in the economy). While earlier 
scholarly works argued that pro-market economic policies formed part of the 
‘winning formula’ of the electoral success of right-wing populist parties (Kitschelt 
& McGann 1995), this theory has been widely contested (e.g. Carter 2005; 
Ivarsflaten 2005; Mudde 2007; see also Inglehart & Norris 2016). In fact, there is 
little empirical evidence that right-wing populist parties promote pro-market 
economic programmes; many (e.g. the French RN) are inherently distrustful of 
global markets and publicly advocate protectionist policies and state-sponsored 
social welfare programmes (Mudde 2007: 123-5; see also Otjes et al. 2018). This is 
intriguing because the latter policy approach is typically associated with the ‘left’ 
side of the (economic) political spectrum (see Downs 1957). 
In reality, political conflicts are often carried out along multiple lines of contestation 
(Schattschneider 1960). In recent years, a post-materialist, socio-cultural dimension 
has become increasingly salient (see Chapter 4). This new dimension can be 
conceptualised as ranging from Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) views 
promoting cultural pluralism on the left, to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist 
(TAN) positions advocating cultural homogeneity and protectionism on the right 
(Hooghe et al. 2002). 29 F30 The main reasons why right-wing populist parties are 
generally located on the right end of this political spectrum is that (1) they are 
nativist, and (2) they have a tendency towards authoritarianism.  
The first core ideological feature that unites right-wing populist parties across 
Europe is a strong sense of nationalism, and alongside that, a proclivity to 
exclusionism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). 30F31 Given that there are 
(theoretically) liberal manifestations of nationalism, scholars have come to prefer 
the term ‘nativism’ (e.g. Mudde 2007; Rooduijn 2019). This term was 
predominantly used in the American literature and can be defined as a xenophobic 
 
30 In a similar vein, Bornschier (2010: 421) has conceptualised this new divide in terms of a conflict 
between libertarian-universalistic values on the left, and traditional-communitarian values on the 
right (see also Kriesi et al. 2008). 
31 This strong proclivity to exclusionism differentiates right-wing populist parties from more 
inclusionary ‘left-wing’ populist parties such as SYRIZA in Greece or Podemos in Spain. This feature 
also separates right-wing populism from traditional conservatism; while both political currents 
embrace law and order (as explained below), right-wing populist parties are eager to highlight 
cultural differences to construct clear ‘us-versus-them’ distinctions (Skenderovic 2008: 22). 
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form of nationalism, ‘which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by 
members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons 
and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state’ (Mudde 
2007: 19). Nativism is broader than racism, as it can include more factors than just 
race (e.g. religious or cultural aspects) but excludes more liberal forms of 
nationalism. Meanwhile, as explained below, when applied to right-wing populist 
parties, the term highlights the importance of xenophobia and the opposition to 
immigration, without reducing them to single-issue parties. 
As Mudde (2007: 26) has observed, the political ‘right’ reflects ‘the belief in a 
natural order with inequalities.’ In the early 1990s, Husbands (1992b: 268) already 
identified a ‘commitment to some sort of ethnic exclusionism – a hostility to 
foreigners, immigrants, Third-World asylum-seekers, and similar outgroups’ as a 
common denominator of all European far right parties. After the turn of the twenty-
first century, scholars singled out immigration as ‘the mighty irritant that stirs up 
right-wing protest from Austria to California, and even Australia’ (Merkl 2003: 27). 
Indeed, the dual forces of nativism and exclusionism often translate into an anti-
immigration agenda, which continues to be a key characteristic of all (successful) 
right-wing populist parties in Western Europe (Ivarsflaten 2008). Since the mid-
1980s, non-European immigrants and asylum seekers have become the arch-enemy 
of the populist right, and ‘Muslims have been targeted most consistently and 
vehemently in the propaganda of populist radical right parties’ (Mudde 2007: 70). 
Because immigrants and asylum seekers generally do not hold national citizenship, 
‘they constitute an outgroup par excellence: they are weak, vulnerable, and 
powerless’ (Knigge 1998: 258). 
Since most right-wing populist parties have an anti-immigration agenda, some 
scholars have resorted to calling them ‘anti-immigrant parties’ (e.g. Fennema 1997; 
Gibson 2002). However, this label is problematic because it reduces the populist 
radical right to single-issue parties, i.e. parties that emphasise one problem only 
without addressing any other issues. Empirical evidence suggests that most right-
wing populist parties have broad programmes that cover more than immigration 
(Eatwell 2003: 49). Although immigration reform is a major focus, many right-
wing populist parties also have clear stances on other topics, including nationalism, 
employment, social welfare, European integration and/or regional independence. 
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As Mudde (1992: 190) has noted, ‘immigration has at best been the main issue of 
some [right-wing populist] parties in certain periods of time.’ Thus, simply 
labelling right-wing populist parties as ‘anti-immigrant’ parties would be overly 
reductionist.  
Besides nativism, the second core ideological feature that all right-wing populist 
parties have in common is their tendency towards authoritarianism, which is ‘the 
belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be 
punished severely’ (Mudde 2007: 23). This belief is exemplified by their advocacy 
for stricter border controls as well as a strong emphasis on security and law and 
order. As Perliger and Pedahzur (2018: 674) have observed, ‘[c]ontemporary 
European authoritarianism is rooted mostly in secular ideas’ insofar as ‘it demands 
full subordination of every part of society to the authority of the state or leader and 
seeks to reinforce the notion of “law and order” in its strictest sense.’ 
Parties that are both nativist and authoritarian can be considered ‘radical right’ 
(Mudde 2007: 24). This is the third core characteristic of the right-wing populist 
party family. Although ‘radicalism’ has come to be associated with the right, it 
originated from the left of the political spectrum. While the term can have different 
meanings in different contexts, it implies an ‘anti-system’ or ‘anti-establishment’ 
element (Mudde 2007: 24-5). Radicalism does not imply a rejection of all 
democratic principles; instead, the term denotes a critique of the constitutional order 
(Skenderovic 2009: 14; see also Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008: 3; Mudde 2007: 
25). This is what differentiates right-wing populist from right-wing extremist 
parties; unlike right-wing extremists, right-wing populists reject certain features of 
liberal democracy (notably political pluralism and the protection of minority 
rights). However, they are not anti-democratic, nor do they typically resort to 
militant (let alone violent) forms of protest (Skenderovic 2008: 22). As Fennema 
(1997: 482) has noted, the ‘extreme-right’ as a political ideology stands ‘in 
polemical opposition to the democratic creed.’ However, many contemporary right-
wing populist parties simply do not fit this mould; they do not advocate a one-party 
system and seem to respect basic democratic principles (Roxburgh 2002: 33; 
Mudde 2007: 25). Stated differently, radicalism generally accepts procedural 
democracy, while extremism does not (Mudde 2010: 1168). The ‘far right’ is used 
here as an umbrella term to denote all parties on the right end of the political 
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spectrum, including radical (democratic) and extremist (non-democratic) ones 
(Mudde 2010: 1169; Ravndal 2017: 847). 
Thus, the ‘rightist’ element in the populist right-wing party family is composed of 
three core characteristics: nativism, authoritarianism and radicalism. Having 
examined the meaning of the term ‘right’, we now turn to ‘populism’. 
2.1.2. Populism: An Essentially Contested Concept 
In one of the first comprehensive works on populism published in the late 1960s, 
scholars noted that ‘[t]here can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of 
populism. But no one is quite clear just what it is. As a doctrine or as a movement, 
it is elusive and protean. It bobs up everywhere but in many contradictory shapes’ 
(Ionescu & Gellner 1969: 1; emphasis in original). This observation still holds true 
in the twenty-first century. While some sort of a consensus appears to be emerging 
around the ideational approach (Hawkins et al. 2012; Rooduijn 2019: 363), 
populism remains an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 
2017: 2). As Margaret Canovan (1981: 3) has suggested, ‘the term is exceptionally 
vague and refers in different contexts to a bewildering variety of phenomena.’ 
Given the lack of a consensus on a definition, ‘[i]t has become almost a cliché to 
start writing on populism by lamenting the lack of clarity about the concept and 
casting doubts about its usefulness for political analysis’ (Panizza 2005: 1; see also 
Moffitt 2016: 11; Moffitt & Tormey 2014: 382). 
According to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012: 1), ‘populism’ is ‘[o]ne of the 
most used and abused terms inside and outside of academia.’ Indeed, in media and 
academia alike, the term has been (mis)used to denote a host of different phenomena 
and actors at different time periods and in different parts of the world. For instance, 
political commentators have attached the populist label to the radical Occupy Wall 
Street movement as well as the reactionary American Tea Party faction (see 
Aslanidis 2016: 94-5; Urbinati 2014: 129-30). Likewise, despite having arguably 
very little in common, politicians from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Barak Obama 
have been described as ‘populist’, which has led scholars to conclude that the term 
has been ‘thrown around with abandon’ in the (British print) media (Bale et al. 
2011). In sum, ‘populism’ has become a popular buzzword to designate any type of 
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movement that ‘challenge[s] the entrenched values, rules and institutions of 
democratic orthodoxy’ (Mény & Surel 2002: 3).  
The vague usage of the term in public debate can partly be ascribed to the fact that 
it is commonly employed to describe either an emotional and overly simplistic 
political discourse, also known as ‘the politics of the Stammtisch (the pub)’, or an 
opportunistic political rhetoric that is meant to please voters (Mudde 2004: 542-3). 
Since ‘populism’ is often equated with political opportunism or demagogy, it 
generally carries a negative connotation (Stanley 2008: 101). As a result, the 
‘populist’ label is generally ‘reserved for the political “enemy”’ (Bale et al. 2011: 
127) and attached to ‘any kind of appeal to the people, mild rebukes of elites, 
crowd-pleasing measures, and “catch-all” politics’ (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2015: 
4).  
The pejorative, inconsistent and normative use of the term in the public sphere is 
perhaps unsurprising given the long quest for definitional consensus in the 
academic literature. For instance, scholars have used the term to describe a late-
nineteenth century radical peasant movement in the United States that sought to 
reform the political system and gave rise to the American People’s Party in an 
attempt to combat capitalism (see Canovan 1981: 17-30; Goodwyn 1976; 
Hofstadter 1969; Taggart 2000: 27-37; see also Jäger 2018). The concept has also 
been attributed to the so-called narodniki movement, which was formed by a small 
group of urban elites in nineteenth-century Russia in a (failed) attempt to incite a 
peasant revolt (see Canovan 1981: 59-83; Walicki 1969; Taggart 2000: 46-58). In 
the mid-twentieth century, the term ‘populism’ was used to characterise a new form 
of political mobilisation in Latin America, which emerged with charismatic leaders 
like Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, Getulio Vargas in Brazil and, above all, Juan 
Domingo Perón in Argentina (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 3; Roxborough 
1984; Woods 2014: 6). The ‘populist’ label has also been attached to authoritarian 
regimes in the Global South, ‘where elections effectively “rubber-stamped” 
dictators with the semblance of popular legitimacy’ (Mény & Surel 2002: 2; see 
also Saul 1969). Towards the end of the twentieth century ‘populism jumped onto 
the scene’ in Western Europe (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 4), when the term 
was associated with the emergence of a new wave of nativist, right-wing parties 
with an anti-immigration agenda.  
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These different manifestations of ‘populism’ raise the question as to whether they 
have ‘any underlying unity,’ or whether ‘one name cover[s] a multitude of 
unconnected tendencies’ (Ionescu & Gellner 1969: 1). The broad usage of the term 
in the literature suggests that ‘populism’ has undergone considerable ‘conceptual 
stretching’ (i.e. the distortion of a concept that can occur when trying to apply it to 
different contexts) (Sartori 1970; see also van Kessel 2014). This has led some 
scholars to conclude that the concept has lost its analytical utility. For instance, 
Mény and Surel (2002: 2) maintain that ‘[w]ith this extension, both the concept and 
the word lost most of their heuristic utility […].’ Others have argued that it is futile 
to try to generate a universal definition of populism because these different 
manifestations of the phenomenon are related only in name (see Canovan 1981; 
Ionescu & Gellner 1969: Roxborough 1984). As Mény and Surel (2002: 2) assert,  
[t]his eclectic collection of situations, phenomena and data have led many 
observers and analysts to believe that there is no such thing as ‘populism’, 
but, rather, a mix of extremely heterogeneous situations which can be 
analysed according to type, but which cannot be reduced to any form of 
comprehensive unity. 
Despite the fact that ‘[t]he holy grail of a definition of populism is elusive’ (Taggart 
2000: 66), experts continue to strive for greater conceptual clarity. Since the turn of 
the twenty-first century, the academic debate on populism has continued to thrive 
(see Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017: 10-11; Rooduijn 2019). Scholars have variously 
sought to characterise populism as: a style (e.g. Jagers & Walgrave 2007; Moffitt 
2016; Moffitt & Tormey 2014); a strategy (e.g. Weyland 2001); a rhetoric (e.g. Betz 
2002); a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2016); a moralistic imagination (Müller 2016); 
and a (thin-centred) ideology (e.g. Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008, 2015; Mudde 
2004, 2007; Stanley 2008). 31F32  
While these different classifications point to disagreement about ‘the genus’ of 
populism, they are not (necessarily) contradictory; indeed, many of them would 
subscribe to the ‘ideational approach’ (see Mudde 2017a; Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2018: 1669). It seems plausible to assume that populism can manifest 
itself in different ways. As van Kessel (2014: 8) has noted,  
[f]rom an empirical perspective, the fact that there are different 
interpretations concerning the manifestation of populism is not necessarily 
 
32 For an overview of the different approaches, see Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017: 2-5). 
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problematic, as long as there is a consensus about the concept’s attributes. 
It seems reasonable to argue that populism can occur in various forms (e.g. 
style, strategy and ideology) and that its expression is not confined to a 
delineated set of political actors. 
Different conceptualisations of populism can thus be seen as complementary rather 
than contradictory (Kriesi & Pappas 2015: 6). Moreover, there is some consensus 
in the literature on one core attribute of populism. As Rooduijn (2019: 363) has 
observed, nowadays, ‘scholars agree with each other much more strongly than 
before on how the term should be defined.’ What unites most (if not all) definitions 
of populism is the emphasis on the centrality of ‘the people’. According to Mény 
and Surel (2002:11-12), for instance, populists ‘emphasise the role of the people 
and its fundamental position, not only within society, but also in the structure and 
functioning of the political system as a whole.’ Similarly, Woods (2014: 10) has 
observed that, ‘[f]or populists, the people are paramount. At the most general level, 
this is the bedrock of the populist ideology and a recurrent theme in populist rhetoric 
and claims to legitimacy.’ However, this realisation is far too broad to serve as a 
definition since the evocation of ‘the people’ appears to be a relatively pervasive 
feature of modern politics. After all, one could argue that most politicians, at some 
point, try to appeal to ‘the people’ to gain political clout. 
Cas Mudde (2007: 23) offers a more precise and widely used definition of 
populism. According to him, populism is: 
a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated 
into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the 
corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people.  
Mudde’s definition has brought greater conceptual clarity to the academic debate 
and paved the way for cross-regional comparative analysis (see, for example, 
Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). However, conceptualising populism as a (thin) 
ideology is problematic for both theoretical and practical reasons. While there is 
undeniably an ideational aspect to populism (as it clearly draws on a set of ideas, 
notably the opposition between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’), populism lacks a 
theoretical basis as there are no key texts or philosophers of populism; there is 
neither a global ‘populist movement’ nor a common genealogy (Freeden 2017; 
Moffitt & Tormey 2014: 383; Stanley 2008: 100). As a result, ‘[m]ost scholars of 
populism refrain from asserting that their concept stands on a par with liberalism, 
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socialism or any other fully developed –ism […]’ (Aslanidis 2016: 88-9). 
Furthermore, populism rarely exists in isolation; indeed, it is usually accompanied 
with a ‘host ideology’ (Pauwels 2014). For instance, political parties may be 
classified as right- or left-wing populists (Rooduijn & Akkerman 2017), but 
ideologically, they can rarely solely be described as ‘populist’ (Albetrazzi & 
McDonnell 2015: 5).  
Scholars have long noted the difficulty of delineating the ideological core of 
‘populism’ (e.g. Betz 1994: 107; Rooduijn 2019). 32F33 As Taggart (2000: 10) has 
observed, populism is highly ‘chameleonic’ in a sense that it can change appearance 
depending on the political context in which it occurs. The slippery nature of the 
concept has led scholars to define populism as a ‘thin’ ideology that ‘is diffuse in 
its lack of a programmatic centre of gravity, and open in its ability to cohabit with 
other, more comprehensive, ideologies’ (Stanley 2008: 99-100). However, this begs 
the question ‘whether a “thin ideology” can actually become so thin as to lose its 
conceptual validity and utility’ (Moffitt & Tormey 2014: 383; see also Moffitt 
2016: 19). The ‘chameleonic’ nature of the concept renders it particularly difficult 
to operationalise. Therefore, conceptualising populism as a discourse or rhetorical 
style rather than an ideology may be a fruitful alternative. While this 
conceptualisation does not negate the fact that populism has an ideational basis, it 
has important methodological advantages. As Woods (2014: 16) has suggested,  
considering populism as a discursive style lends itself to its 
operationalization as a gradational property of specific instances of political 
expression […] rather than an essential attribute of political parties or 
political leaders that can be captured by a simple populist/non-populist 
dichotomy. 
Conceptualising populism as a style implies that any political actor or message can 
assume populist tendencies. In other words, the term ‘populism’ becomes a 
‘descriptor’ (i.e. a type of rhetoric that can be employed by any actor) rather than a 
‘classifier’ (i.e. an essential, lasting feature of a given actor) (see Sikk 2009; van 
Kessel 2014). Seen in this light, populism is not conceptualised as a dichotomy (i.e. 
parties are either populist, or not). Instead, populism is a ‘matter of degree’ 
(Rooduijn & Akkerman 2017: 195), in the sense that actors can be more or less 
 
33 According to Rooduijn (2019: 364), one of the biggest challenges in contemporary populism 
research is that it is relatively easy to conflate populism with related concepts (particularly nativism). 
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populist depending on the messages that they send out (Hawkins 2009; Jagers & 
Walgrave 2007; Pauwels 2011b; Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). 
In the Western European context, the populist style is composed of two key 
features. 33F34 First, it presupposes a Manichean view of society that draws a clear 
distinction between the virtuous ‘people’ and an antagonistic ‘other’ (e.g. 
Albertazzi & McDonnell 2015; Mudde 2004; van Kessel 2015). Specifically, 
populism is defined here as ‘an anti-status quo discourse that simplifies the political 
space by symbolically dividing society between “the people” (as the “underdogs”) 
and its “other”’ (Panizza 2005: 3; emphasis in original). These two categories are 
diffuse constructs, or ‘empty signifiers’ (Laclau 2005: 40), that may be defined 
differently depending on the political context. In general, ‘the people’ is used to 
refer to some idealised, homogeneous form of society that is also known as ‘the 
heartland’ (Taggart 2000), while the ‘other’ is depicted as posing a threat to the 
sovereignty of ‘the people’ by depriving them of their identity, rights, prosperity 
and voice (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2015: 5). While it is not always obvious who 
forms part of ‘the heartland’, it is generally quite clear who is excluded from it 
(Mudde 2004: 546). 
This core characteristic highlights the populist tendency to see the world in ‘black 
and white’, which often leaves very little room for nuanced debate (Mény & Surel 
2002: 12). A key indicator of populism is ‘[a] denunciation of the elite as the 
incarnation of evil and the glorification of the people as the representation of good 
virtues, true wisdom and authenticity’ (Vossen 2010: 24). According to Mény and 
Surel (2002: 12), ‘[t]his rhetoric, based on the celebration of the good, wise, and 
simple people and the rejection of the corrupt, incompetent and interlocking elites, 
permeates the populist discourse.’ Populists’ proclivity to construct rigid ‘us-
versus-them’ distinctions exhibits itself at different levels depending on the political 
context in which they operate (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 168). For 
instance, populists often differentiate themselves from enemies within the nation 
and the state (e.g. political, economic, intellectual or media elites) (Mudde 2007: 
66-9). Populist parties that follow a rightist ideology generally also construct an 
 
34 The definition provided here is contextual in the sense that it is primarily tailored to suit the 




image of the enemy within the state but outside the nation (e.g. immigrants and 
asylum seekers) (Mudde 2007: 66-9) because they pose a perceived threat to ‘the 
heartland.’ 
The second core element of the populist style is a tendency to break taboos by 
presenting their hard-line approach as acceptable and ‘politically correct’. As 
Moffitt and Tormey (2014: 392) have observed, ‘[m]uch of populists’ appeal comes 
from their disregard for “appropriate” ways of acting in the political realm.’ Jean 
Marie Le Pen’s Front National, for instance, managed to build support ‘by 
codifying its […] xenophobic policies in easily digestible forms’ (Roxburgh 2002: 
117). The populist tendency to break taboos is overlooked by many scholars. Yet, 
it is a central element of the populist style in the sense that it sets them apart from 
their ‘mainstream’ competitors. This style is perhaps best illustrated by Filip 
Dewinter, a leading politician of the Belgian Vlaams Belang: 
We just say what people think. […] A lot of political issues and themes are 
taboo at the moment – it’s impossible to speak about the immigrant 
problems, it’s impossible to speak about the rise of crime. The politically 
correct parties don’t want to speak about these things. We just say what 
people are thinking about this sort of issues and that’s the reason our party 
is doing well. We are a non-conformist, non-traditional political party 
(quoted in Roxburgh 2002: 195-6).  
In that sense, populism can be likened to ‘an awkward dinner guest’, who ‘can 
disrupt table manners and the tacit rules of sociability by speaking loudly, 
interrupting the conversations of others, and perhaps flirting with them beyond what 
passes for acceptable cheekiness’ (Arditi 2007: 78).  
The main advantage of conceptualising populism as a modus operandi is ‘that it 
frees us from the “puzzle” of populism’s ability to appear across the political 
spectrum’ (Moffitt & Tormey 2014: 392). This allows us to define right-wing 
populist parties as political parties that follow a rightist ideology and employ a 
populist style, where ‘rightist’ denotes the rejection of certain features of the liberal 
democratic regime and ‘populist’ signifies the belief that society is split into ‘the 
virtuous people’ and a ‘corrupt elite’, as well as the rejection of the concept of 
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2.2. The Rise of Right-Wing Populist Parties: Conventional Explanations  
Having generated a working definition of right-wing populist parties, we now turn 
to consider factors that help explain their electoral performance. Scholars have 
come up with numerous different theories to account for their rise. As mentioned 
earlier, the overall aim is to synthesise the existing research into a comprehensive 
analytical framework. Perhaps the most comprehensive approach for explaining the 
success of this new ‘party family’ originated with Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony 
McGann (1995) and was later expanded by other scholars, including Roger Eatwell 
(2003), Cas Mudde (2007) and Stijn van Kessel (2015). These authors offer a multi-
dimensional analysis of the success of populist radical right parties, as they separate 
demand- from supply-side variables. A similar approach is used in this chapter. 
However, one important caveat is in order. Most scholars include factors pertaining 
to the role of the media and the behaviour of mainstream parties in this demand- 
and supply-side framework. However, I have chosen to remove these factors from 
the conventional framework; given that this thesis is built on the premise that the 
media and mainstream parties play a crucial role prior to the electoral breakthrough 
of right-wing populist parties (both in influencing voter demand and party supply), 
these factors will be considered in greater detail when discussing contextual factors 
(see section 2.3). 
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2.2.1. The Demand Side: Creating a Breeding Ground 
While it seems safe to assume that at least some demand for right-wing populist 
parties exists in all of Western Europe, it is still important to understand which 
factors contribute to generating a breeding ground for right-wing populist parties. 
In order to understand the rise of the populist radical right, it is necessary to consider 
what factors generate popular appetite for right-wing populist parties. To explain 
the intellectual reasoning behind this first strand of research, it is useful to consider 
the early literature, specifically the first two ‘waves of scholarship’ on the far right, 
which spanned from the immediate aftermath of WWII until the early 2000s 
(Mudde 2016; 2017b). Most of the early scholars writing on the post-war extreme 
right were historians studying the re-emergence of fascist movements, thereby 
emphasising the continuity between the pre- and post-war periods (see, for example, 
Eisenberg 1967; Tauber 1967). The second wave of scholars was concerned with 
newer manifestations of the ‘extreme right’, and primarily sought to explain how 
parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party and the French Front National could 
become so successful in modern Western European countries. Most of these earlier 
scholars based their studies on the (in)famous ‘normal pathology’ thesis (Scheuch 
& Klingemann 1967; see also Mudde 2010: 1168-71), which presumes that 
radicalism and extremism are fundamentally alien to Western democratic values, 
but that a small potential for these sentiments to (re)surface exists in all societies, 
and that these sentiments (and parties) will only gain traction under ‘extreme’ 
conditions. 34F35  
Since support for far-right (i.e. radical and extremist) parties was perceived to be a 
‘normal pathology’ (i.e. an expected anomaly), studies tended to focus exclusively 
on the demand side. Indeed, most studies focused solely on the socio-economic 
characteristics of the voters who were generally portrayed as the ‘losers of 
modernity’ (see, for instance, Betz 1994). The research agenda was thus driven by 
the question of why popular appetite for far-right parties persisted (Mudde 2010: 
1172). In other words, given that demand for the far right was expected to be low 
under ‘normal’ conditions, scholars sought to understand the underlying ‘extreme’ 
conditions that would help explain the ‘abnormal’ support for these parties and 
 
35 The ‘normal pathology thesis’ has been explained and contested by Mudde (2010). 
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movements, thereby treating the parties themselves as the dependent variable 
(Mudde 2017: 3). 
Existing scholarly accounts can be separated into two different levels of analysis: 
macro and micro (see Eatwell 2003; Mudde 2007). 35F36 The macro level of analysis 
addresses trends in the international environment, whereas the micro level considers 
individual motivations behind voting for the populist radical right. 
Macro-level explanations 
At the macro level of analysis, demand for populist radical right parties is often 
linked to broad, global changes, including social, economic, political and historical 
developments. Specifically, scholars have linked rising demand for the populist 
radical right with supranational trends, such as globalisation (e.g. Zaslove 2008); 
modernisation (e.g. Betz 1994; Minkenberg 2000); secularisation (e.g. Bornschier 
2010; Marzouki et al. 2016); immigration (e.g. Lubbers et al. 2002); European 
integration (e.g. Taggart 2004); and the occurrence (or ‘performance’) of crises 
more generally (see Moffitt 2015). Recognising that it is impossible to provide a 
complete overview of the literature due to space limitations, this section offers a 
concise summary of the main findings. 
The success of right-wing populism can be partly attributed to the changing 
international environment that typified the turn of the twenty-first century 
(Roxburgh 2002). The end of the twentieth century saw the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and the greater integration of the European Union, which triggered a 
resurgence of nationalist sentiments across the European continent. In Eastern 
Europe, former Soviet satellites and Yugoslav states seized the opportunity to move 
towards nationhood. Meanwhile, in Western Europe, the widening and deepening 
of the European Union ignited a fear that national identities were eroding. As 
national governments started to pool sovereignty in different policy areas, 
‘Brussels’ became increasingly remote and mistrusted. This has generated demand 
for right-wing populist parties, mainly because the populist belief in ‘[t]he 
 
36 Some scholars have included an intermediate or ‘meso’-level of analysis. This level of analysis is 
somewhat of a ‘grey area’, because it focuses on the ways in which these broad, macro-level changes 
have been addressed in the domestic political realm. Since this pertains to the role of mainstream 
political parties, it is omitted here and addressed later when discussing contextual factors. 
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singularity of the heartland is at odds with a European project that seeks to affirm 
complementary identities […]’ (Taggart 2004: 297).  
Against this backdrop, different socio-political developments, often exacerbated by 
precipitating factors, can be seen to have acted as catalysts in generating demand 
for right-wing populism (Taggart 2004). This can partly be attributed to the fact that 
the populist notion of ‘the heartland’ is often animated by ‘special circumstances’ 
such as political resentment or a (perceived) threat to ‘our way of life’ (Mudde 
2004: 547). The rising awareness of nationality brought about by the breakup of 
Soviet Union and the deeper integration of the European Union coincided with 
significant influxes of refugees fleeing from imminent, escalating conflicts. 
Between 1992 and 2001, the EU witnessed the arrival of 3.75 million asylum 
seekers (Roxburgh 2002). European governments were not ready to handle the 
refugee influx; many of the refugees were housed in deprived, urban 
neighbourhoods, which ‘had an unsettling effect on existing communities’ 
(Roxburgh 2002: 24). The (perceived) threat of mass immigration and 
Überfremdung generated a political backlash (Mudde 2007: 209). 36F37 Immigrants – 
especially those with non-European origins – were portrayed as people seeking a 
better life in Europe at the expense of Europeans, thereby posing a threat to native 
Europeans. In the media, immigrants were often blamed for rising crime rates, 
which triggered feelings of resentment among domestic populations (Roxburgh 
2002: 25). Furthermore, the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001 triggered a 
wave of anti-Muslim sentiments throughout the Western world, which, in turn, 
provided ammunition for right-wing political parties. Since many of the immigrants 
arriving in the EU were Muslim, anti-Muslim rhetoric worked to the advantage of 
right-wing populist parties. 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, European leaders have been faced with a 
new series of ‘crises’ that seem to confirm the existence of a ‘populist Zeitgeist’ 
(Mudde 2004). The 2008 global economic crisis has potentially exacerbated 
existing cleavages between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’, thereby creating fertile 
ground for populist parties to thrive (see Kriesi & Pappas 2015). As politicians and 
 
37 The term Überfremdung was conceived by Swiss elites at the turn of the twentieth century and 
roughly translates into ‘overforeignization’, which denotes a fear of being ‘subverted by foreigners’ 
(see Kury 2003; Scuto 2012: 93; Skenderovic 2009: 49). 
60 
 
parties across the continent continue to struggle with the aftermath of the financial 
and Eurozone crises, the climate of uncertainty and insecurity produced by the 2015 
‘refugee crisis’ seems to have provided new momentum for the populist radical 
right. Indeed, there seems to be a relationship between populism and crises in that 
a crisis can be a catalyst for populist sentiments, whereas populism can also trigger 
crises (Moffitt 2015). While the nature of the relationship between economic- and 
political crises on the one hand and the electoral success of right-wing populist 
parties on the other remains far from straightforward, it appears relatively 
uncontested that the sense of insecurity and antagonism generated by any sort of 
critical turning point (whether real or perceived) can help create a breeding ground 
for right-wing populist parties. 
While these broad, macro-level processes including modernisation and 
globalisation have undoubtedly helped to create a breeding ground for the populist 
radical right, they are ‘so broad and vague that they are of little use in empirical 
research’ (Mudde 2007: 298). To be sure, they can help explain the general sense 
of dissatisfaction with ‘mainstream’ politics. However, they fail to explain cross-
national and regional variation in the success and failure of right-wing populist 
parties. After all, macro-level changes have affected all countries in Western 
Europe. As Mudde (2007: 298) has observed, ‘every European country has a 
(relatively) fertile breeding ground for the populist radical right, yet, only in some 
countries do these parties also flourish in elections.’ Therefore, it makes sense to 
look at how these broad changes have affected voting behaviour at the micro-level 
of analysis. 
Micro-level explanations 
How do these broad, macro-level changes affect voting behaviour at the micro level 
of analysis? This demand-side perspective considers different theories that help 
explain why people decide to vote for right-wing populist parties. Existing research 
has paid relatively scarce attention to individual motivations for populist voting; 
indeed, we know little ‘about the mentality of populist voters or cognitive processes 
that lead people to join populist forces’ (Hawkins et al. 2017: 267). Earlier research 
often vaguely sought to explain electoral support for (right-wing) populist parties 
as a way of protesting against political elites (e.g. van der Brug et al. 2005) or the 
establishment more generally (e.g. Betz 1994). Indeed, voting for radical right-wing 
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parties was seen as a ‘vehicle for expressing discontent with the mainstream parties’ 
(Eatwell 2003: 51). The ‘protest vote theory’ was based on the idea that voters 
express their dissatisfaction with mainstream politics by casting votes for (right-
wing) populist parties because of their anti-establishment message. 
More recent scholarship has sought to disentangle the somewhat simplistic, vague 
and dismissive interpretation of populism as a form of protest by trying to analyse 
the attitudes of populist voters (e.g. Akkerman et al. 2014; Spruyt et al. 2016; 
Stanley 2011). A study conducted by Steven Van Hauwaert and Stijn van Kessel 
(2018: 86) found that ‘populist attitudes are unique and distinct from other 
behaviours such as protest or dissatisfaction’, thus indicating that support for 
populist parties ‘is more than just [a vehicle] for an uninformed and apathetic 
protest vote.’ This conclusion echoes earlier studies, which suggest that support for 
anti-immigrant parties is driven by programmatic and ideological considerations 
instead of mere protest (van der Brug et al. 2000). In light of these findings, it makes 
sense to take a closer look at the why voters support right-wing populist parties by 
using a micro level of analysis. 
Some scholars have sought to link support for (right-wing) populist parties to 
certain personality traits (Bakker et al. 2015). In an attempt to unveil the 
‘psychological roots of populist voting’, they found congruence between the 
personality of voters and the anti-establishment message of populist parties (ibid). 
Specifically, the study shows that voters who score low on ‘Agreeableness’ (i.e. 
people who are inclined to be uncooperative, egoistic, intolerant, distrustful and 
antagonistic towards others) are more likely to support populist parties. Although 
the study provides interesting insights into potential micro-explanations for support 
for populist parties, it tells us little about the causal relationship between voting 
behaviour and personality type, nor does it help explain variance in the electoral 
performance of (right-wing) populist parties across time and place, as it seems 
doubtful that the recent rise of populist parties in some countries can be attributed 
to an overall increase in ‘less agreeable’ voters. 
Given these limitations, it seems more fruitful to consider the attitudes as well as 
the social and demographic characteristics of right-wing populist voters. While 
support for right-wing populist parties cannot be linked to a specific socio-
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demographic group, scholars have found that support for populist parties is 
generally highest among people – notably men (see Norris 2005) – who feel 
deprived in one way or another (Pauwels 2014: 7). Macro-level changes in the 
international environment (e.g. immigration, globalisation, economic crises) tend 
to make people feel less secure about their lives (Mudde 2007: 223), thereby giving 
rise to a broad range of ‘grievances’. As traditional social structures such as religion 
or class are degenerating, individuals lose a sense of belonging (i.e. social 
dealignment) and may therefore become more susceptible to the attraction of 
nationalism (Eatwell 2003: 52). With rising unemployment rates, job insecurity 
increases. Studies have shown that the so-called ‘losers of the modernisation 
process’ (Modernisierungsverlierer) tend to be most inclined to vote for (right-
wing) populist parties (Kriesi et al. 2012; Mudde 2007: 203). This typically includes 
people working in certain industries that are vulnerable to foreign competition, 
small business owners and other working-class people (Arzheimer & Carter 2006: 
422; Eatwell 2003: 57). In times of economic recession, for instance, competition 
over scarce resources such as jobs and access to public services increases, which 
can contribute to a heightening sense of insecurity (Eatwell 2003: 56; Lubbers et al. 
2002). It is important to note that these grievances at the voter-level are not solely 
driven by economic factors but also by cultural processes (e.g. immigration) and 
political changes (e.g. European integration) (Kriesi 2014: 369; see also Bornschier 
2018: 222). 
In this insecure environment, voters tend to move away from moderate parties at 
the centre of the political spectrum; instead, ‘[t]hey seek salvation in the “simple 
messages” of the populist radical right, which promises a clear identity and 
protection against the changing world’ (Mudde 2007: 223). As a result, in contrast 
to mainstream contenders, populist parties on both the left and right attract voters 
that can be characterised as socially and economically vulnerable (van Kessel 
2015). Studies have shown that there are numerous similarities in the voting bases 
of right- and left-wing populist parties (see, for example, Rooduijn et al. 2017; Van 
Hauwaert & van Kessel 2018). Using survey data from nine European countries, 
Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) found that populist voters are generally more 
interested in politics but have lower levels of satisfaction with democracy (see also 
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Ellinas 2010: 25). In addition, populist voters on both sides of the political spectrum 
are similarly sceptical about the European Union (Rooduijn et al. 2017).  
Despite these parallels, however, the underlying motivations for supporting radical 
right- versus left-wing populist parties are very different (Rooduijn et al. 2017). For 
instance, voters who are more prejudiced towards immigrants are more prone to 
support right-wing populist parties, whereas less prejudiced people tend to support 
left-wing populist parties (Van Hauwaert & van Kessel 2018). It follows that they 
have different views about immigration: ‘the radical left shows marked signs of 
cosmopolitanism and the radical right clear nativism’ (Rooduijn et al. 2017: 555; 
see also Norris 2005: 181-5). Another key difference is that radical right voters tend 
to have lower levels of education than radical left voters (Rooduijn et al. 2017). 
This finding is in line with previous research, suggesting that higher levels of 
education can strengthen democratic values and lessen social intolerance 
(Arzheimer & Carter 2006: 421; Mudde 2007: 217; Pauwels 2014: 177). 
There also appears to be a relationship between demographic environment and anti-
immigrant views, as people living in areas surrounding concentrations of 
immigrants tend to be more prone to support right-wing populist parties than people 
living in areas of high immigration. This is also known as the ‘halo-effect’ (Eatwell 
2003: 50). In France, for example, support for the FN was generally higher in rural 
areas surrounding cities with high immigrant concentrations than in the 
neighbourhoods that were actually home to large numbers of immigrants 
(Roxburgh 2002: 123). In metropolitan areas where interactions with foreigners are 
frequent, popular support for right-wing populist parties tends to be lower than in 
areas where there is limited contact.  
To sum up, a perfect breeding ground for right-wing populist parties is analogous 
to different layers of soil. Changes in the international environment fill up the 
bottom of the flower pot (i.e. the macro-level of analysis), while the topsoil (i.e. the 
micro-level of analysis) is made up of individuals who vote for right-wing populist 




2.2.2. The Supply Side: Exploiting Fertile Soil 
Demand-side explanations shed light on the potential electorate of populist radical 
right parties. They tell us little, however, about why this potential translates into 
electoral success in some countries but not in others. Assuming that the breeding 
ground for right-wing populist parties is relatively similar across Western Europe, 
the demand side provides little insight in cross-national variation in the electoral 
performances of the populist radical right. Demand-side explanations highlight only 
some of the reasons for the rise of right-wing populism; a fertile breeding ground 
for right-wing populist parties does not automatically guarantee their electoral 
breakthrough. Accordingly, ‘[n]o contribution to the literature claims that the 
distribution and intensity of demand-side preferences, by itself, would explain the 
relative electoral strength of the radical right across Western Europe’ (Kitschelt 
2007: 1177). Although demand-side factors (particularly immigration) appear to be 
necessary for the rise of right-wing populist parties, they are by no means sufficient 
in accounting for their electoral success (Art 2011: 13). While demand-side 
explanations emphasise certain conditions that make countries and voters 
‘susceptible’ to right-wing populist parties, the supply side highlights factors that 
enable parties to gain political clout. Following Mudde (2007), it is helpful to 
differentiate between the ‘external supply side’, i.e. institutional conditions that 
allow right-wing populist parties to gain influence (Mudde 2007: 232), and the 
‘internal supply side’, i.e. the agency of the parties themselves (Mudde 2007: 256). 
The External Supply Side 
The external supply side considers features of the political system that can influence 
the ‘supply’ of right-wing populist parties. The arguably most important variables 
are known as political opportunity structures (POS). POS are defined here as 
‘institutional arrangements’ that facilitate the development of new (protest) 
movements (Kitschelt 1986: 58). 37F38 According to the POS theory, the institutional 
design of a country’s political system can facilitate or hinder the electoral success 
of right-wing populist parties. 
Electoral institutions matter insofar as they ‘influence the extent to which this 
demand is translated into actual votes’ (Golder 2003: 461). Proportional 
 
38 The POS theory employed here refers strictly to the institutional context (see Arzheimer 2009); 
the role of mainstream parties will be discussed below (see 2.3). 
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representation (PR) electoral systems are more ‘permissive’ than disproportional 
majoritarian systems and make it easier for new parties to gain parliamentary 
representation, thereby favouring multipartyism (Duverger 1954; see also 
Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Eatwell 2003; Roxburgh 2002). In general, countries 
with PR electoral systems (e.g. the Netherlands) are known to offer more political 
opportunity for smaller parties than countries with majoritarian electoral systems 
(e.g. France).38 F39 Furthermore, some countries have adopted additional institutional 
hurdles that make it difficult for small parties to gain influence at the national level. 
The German five-percent electoral threshold (known as the Fünf-Prozent-Hürde) is 
a case in point. Unlike institutional settings, however, these hurdles result from 
strategic choices that mainstream parties make as a way of responding to potential 
far-right competitors. These strategies will be considered in greater detail when 
discussing contextual factors (see 2.3). At this point, it is sufficient to note that 
institutional design can both hinder and facilitate the electoral breakthrough of the 
populist radical right.  
A second external supply-side variable relates to the political space available to 
right-wing populist challengers. If mainstream parties gravitate towards the centre 
of the political spectrum, there is more space at the fringes of the political spectrum 
for radical parties to emerge (Eatwell 2003; Lubbers et al. 2002; Rydgren 2005). 
According to Roxburgh (2002: 29), ‘[s]ome of the strongest far-right movements 
developed in countries with centrist coalition governments, where they presented 
themselves almost as an “antidote” to years or decades of vapid unadventurous 
rule.’ In France, for instance, the former FN-leader Jean-Marie Le Pen was able to 
advance to the second round in the 2002 presidential elections after half a decade 
of cohabitation between a conservative president and a socialist prime minister.  
The tendency to seek consensus is arguably more pronounced in so-called 
‘consociational’ democracies (see Lijphart 1969) and in eponymous consensus 
democracies.39F40 Consociational democracies are characterised by a willingness 
 
39 Even within PR electoral systems, the degree of proportionality can differ widely (Mudde 2007: 
234). 
40 While the concept of ‘consociational democracies’ has been attributed to Arend Lijphart, his work 
was influenced by other scholars working in different countries (e.g. Ake 1967; Lehmbruch 1967). 
It should also be noted that, even though they are very similar, consociational democracies are not 
exactly the same as consensus democracies. The term ‘consensus democracy’ is broader than 
‘consociational democracy’ in that it can also be used to describe societies that are not inherently 
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among political leaders to cooperate, compromise and accommodate, for instance 
by forming grand governing coalitions to overcome social cleavages. Following 
Lijphart (1969: 216), consociationalism refers to ‘government by elite cartel 
designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable 
democracy’ (see also Katz & Mair 2009). In contrast to majoritarian systems, 
consociational democracies foster inclusiveness through elite and inter-party 
cooperation, which can come at the expense of accountability (Andeweg 2000). 
Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) have tested this hypothesis empirically and found 
that support for populist parties indeed tends to be higher in consensual than in non-
consensual political systems, as centripetal forces incentivise elites from different 
parties to converge by clustering around the centre. 
At first sight, this observation seems to be confirmed by the data; countries that are 
typically considered ‘consociational democracies’ such as Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland have all witnessed the rise of right-wing populist 
challengers. However, this observation does not hold for Luxembourg or Wallonia, 
which can also be considered classical examples of consociational democracies 
with PR electoral systems (Lijphart 1969), thereby compounding our research 
puzzle. Furthermore, since institutions are relatively static, they can hardly explain 
variation in the electoral performances of parties over time (Meguid 2005: 347). 
While institutions certainly have some effect on the electoral performance of right-
wing populist parties, they do not determine electoral outcomes and thus ‘help little 
in explaining the differences in electoral success between different countries, 
parties, periods and regions’ (Mudde 2007: 234). It therefore makes sense to 
consider the agency of the parties in order to gain insight into how exactly they 
translate political opportunities into votes. 
Finally, national traditions may also have an effect on the availability of political 
space. Right-wing populist parties are more likely to thrive if they can present 
themselves in line with national political traditions. For instance, far-right parties 
have difficulties gaining traction in countries with a legacy of anti-fascism (Eatwell 
2003: 62). By contrast, they are more likely to succeed in countries that have 
maintained strong nativist subcultures after World War II; in these contexts, the 
 
segmented, whereas ‘consociational democracy’ specifically refers to societies that are deeply 
divided (Andeweg 2000). 
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ideological distance between mainstream and extremist parties is comparatively 
smaller. In other words, in countries with flourishing nativist subcultures and where 
nationalism forms part of the mainstream political culture, it is easier for right-wing 
populist parties to recruit members and reach out to the mainstream (Mudde 2007: 
302). Specifically, the positions that elites assume vis-à-vis their Nazi past can 
affect the electoral success of the (populist) radical right (Art 2006). Indeed, 
scholars have found that ‘countries in which the elites take a revisionist approach 
to their Nazi past have provided a favourable environment for the development of 
a strong nativist subculture after the war, bridging the political extreme and 
mainstream’ (Mudde 2007: 245). David Art (2011) focuses extensively on this 
external supply-side variable. He argues that pre-existing resources for right-wing 
radical parties (such as historical legacies, nationalist subcultures and fascist 
nostalgia), alongside the initial reaction of mainstream parties and civil society to 
such parties influence their subsequent success or failure. In France or Austria, for 
instance, there are large nationalist subcultures that exist in parallel to the dominant 
right-wing populist contenders, which ‘feed important facilities and competent 
personnel into the local party’ (Mudde 2007: 245; see also Mudde & van Holsteyn 
2000). 
The Internal Supply Side 
The internal supply side considers the behaviour and strategies of right-wing 
populist parties. There is widespread consensus in the literature that (right-wing) 
populist parties are more likely to succeed if they are able to present themselves as 
credible alternatives to mainstream parties (e.g. van Kessel 2015). If right-wing 
populist parties manage to mobilise voters by claiming issue ownership over certain 
issues – particularly immigration – they are more likely to succeed electorally. For 
instance, right-wing populist parties may tap into voters’ fears by using immigrants 
as scapegoats, notably by drawing simple equations between the number of 
unemployed people and the ‘excessive’ number of immigrants (Roxburgh 2002: 
15). They often do so by portraying immigrants as a direct threat to the economic 
well-being of the native population, which can translate into electoral support for 
right-wing populist parties (Eatwell 2003: 56; Fetzer 2000: 13). As Kriesi (2014: 
369) has observed, the structural conflict between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of 
globalisation is best articulated by the populist right. Thus, ‘the success of the far 
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right in recent years can largely be attributed to its exploitation of contemporary 
anxieties over such things as crime, immigration, unemployment, and remote, 
corrupt, or insensitive government’ (Roxburgh 2002: 31). 
Several factors can influence a party’s credibility, notably party organisation as well 
as party leadership. 40F41 These two features are closely linked, as charismatic leaders 
can be instrumental in both rallying public support and holding their parties together 
(Carter 2005; Eatwell 2003; Mudde 2007). As such, charismatic leaders can play 
an important role in generating credibility (van Kessel 2015). Charismatic leaders 
are particularly successful when operating in an insecure environment. When voters 
have anxieties about issues such as immigration, crime or unemployment, they are 
more susceptible to populist slogans. Effective leaders know how to tap into these 
fears to attract electoral support. However, while the electoral strategies and overall 
credibility of right-wing populist parties play an important role in their electoral 
performances, they arguably matter more for their electoral persistence than their 
electoral breakthrough per se (see Pauwels 2014: 63ff). Thus, they are only of 
secondary importance to this thesis. 
Whether or not right-wing populist parties are able to take advantage of a fertile 
ground by harnessing demand for right-wing populist ideas is dependent on 
different supply-side factors. Existing institutional structures can generate space 
and opportunities for right-wing populist parties to succeed. Whether or not a party 
is able to make use of these opportunities depends on internal supply-side variables, 
notably the credibility and overall organisational skills of the party. Taken together, 
demand- and supply-side explanations shed light on the general reasons behind the 
electoral fortunes of right-wing populist parties. However, they are too broad to 
fully account for the variation in the electoral performances of the populist radical 
right across countries and regions. Above all, these ‘classical’ explanations tell us 
little about why demand and supply might be stronger in some areas than in others. 
 
41 The definition of charisma and its role in facilitating the success of the populist radical right is 
contested (see Mudde 2007: 262). Charisma is not considered a defining feature of populism; 
however, it appears to be a core characteristic of most (if not all) successful right-wing populist 
parties. This is not surprising, given that successful leaders are more likely to be considered 
charismatic. Therefore, explaining success through charisma (e.g. Lubbers et al. 2002) is somewhat 
tautological (see Koopmans & Muis 2009: 634; van der Brug et al. 2005: 542). 
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Therefore, it makes sense to focus on the mechanisms that fuel or dampen demand 
for and supply of right-wing populist parties.  
2.3. Contextual Explanations 
There are two factors that have received limited attention thus far: mainstream 
parties and the media. Taken together, they form part of the wider context in which 
right-wing populist parties operate. I posit that the electoral fortunes of right-wing 
populist parties are largely dependent on the behaviour of mainstream parties and 
the media (Ellinas 2010). Taken together, they can act as ‘gatekeepers’ who can 
create opportunity structures that enable right-wing populist parties to enter the 
electoral arena (Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018). Specifically, they play a crucial role in 
fuelling or dampening demand, thereby facilitating or hindering the electoral 
success of the populist radical right. In line with Art (2006), I argue that their 
reaction to the populist radical right is instrumental in obstructing or facilitating the 
electoral breakthrough of these parties. 
Scholars generally agree that mainstream parties and the media play an important 
role in the rise of right-wing populist parties. However, these factors are rarely 
systematically incorporated into any theoretical framework. When they are, there is 
often a failure to fully capture their importance. Mudde (2007: 237-53) for instance, 
conceptualises both variables as ‘external supply-side explanations’, thereby 
implying that they have less influence on voter demand. However, it is reductionist 
to consider them solely as supply-side factors; as shown below, mainstream party 
positioning and media portrayal can also impact public demand. In other words, 
mainstream parties and the media straddle classical demand- and supply-side 
explanations. Therefore, it makes sense to remove them from the conventional 
framework by instead conceptualising them separately as ‘contextual factors’. 
The media and mainstream parties help determine the nature of the public discourse, 
which can provide or foreclose opportunities for right-wing populist parties to 
mobilise support. As such, studying these contextual factors can help us understand 
why right-wing populist parties succeed ‘in making their voices heard in the public 
sphere in the first place’ (Koopmans & Muis 2009: 643). Contextual factors interact 
with both demand- and supply-side variables. Specifically, the media and 
mainstream parties can act as ‘buffers’ by dampening demand, or they can act as 
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‘catalysts’ by stoking demand for the populist radical right. Turning to the supply 
side, the media can facilitate the ‘supply’ of right-wing populist parties by offering 
them a platform to spread their views, whereas mainstream parties strategically can 
create or occupy the space of right-wing populist parties. Taken together, the media 
and mainstream parties therefore play an influential role in shaping the discursive 
opportunity structures available to right-wing populist parties, which in turn, can 
help explain their electoral trajectories. The following subsections focus on (1) 
mainstream parties and (2) the media by explaining how exactly these contextual 
factors interact with traditional demand- and supply-side explanations. 
2.3.1. Mainstream Parties 
Scholars noticed decades ago that mainstream parties play a crucial role in the 
electoral trajectories of populist radical right parties (see, for example, von Beyme 
1988: 15). Since then, studies have primarily focused on explaining how the 
behaviour of mainstream parties can affect the electoral space available for right-
wing populist parties (e.g. Bale et al. 2010; Downs 2001; Heinze 2018; Meguid 
2008; van Spanje 2018). As mentioned earlier, political convergence in general and 
consensual politics in particular can be conducive to the rise of (right-wing) 
populism. In many countries, right-wing populist parties gained electoral support 
after decades of consensus-seeking ‘grand coalition’ governments. In most cases, 
these grand coalitions were only possible because parties agreed to a lowest 
common denominator, which left delicate issues unaddressed. The ‘mushy coalition 
policies’ (Roxburgh 2002: 124) that these centrist governments produced generated 
a political backlash, as they made voters feel that they were not being offered a real 
choice (see Mudde 2007: 210). This created distrust and political dissatisfaction, 
thereby generating fertile breeding ground (i.e. demand) for right-wing populist 
parties. This suggests that it is reductionist to conceptualise the role of mainstream 
parties solely as a supply-side factor. 
The rise of right-wing political parties has been linked to various related trends 
involving mainstream political parties including: political convergence (Kitschelt 
& McGann 1995); cartelisation (Katz & Mair 2009); polarisation (Ignazi 1992; 
2003); the emergence of new cleavage structures (Bornschier 2010); and partisan 
dealignment (Dalton et al. 2002). Indeed, the broad, macro-level changes described 
earlier (i.e. modernisation and globalisation) have had a noticeable impact on party 
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competition, as they were accompanied by widespread social changes including 
secularisation and class dealignment, which, in turn, helped pave the way for 
political dealignment. In addition, over the past decades, many European countries 
have witnessed different types of domestic political crises related to corruption, 
economic recessions or political legitimacy, which has contributed to a growing 
sense of dissatisfaction with mainstream politics (Pauwels 2014). 
As a result, attendance at political gatherings plummeted, party membership 
declined drastically, and voter turnouts dropped to all-time lows (Eatwell 2003: 51; 
Knigge 1998: 258; Mair 2006; 2013). The growing disenchantment with 
mainstream politics has been attributed to the cartelisation of the European party 
system (Katz & Mair 1995; 2009). The so-called ‘cartel party thesis’ suggests that 
the role of political parties has shifted over the years from being representatives of 
civil society to playing a governmental role, to an extent that nearly all parties (even 
those in opposition) can be seen as ‘governing’ parties. According to Katz and Mair 
(2009: 759), the cartelisation of the party system ‘has clearly contributed to the rise 
of populist anti-party-system parties that appeal directly to public perceptions that 
the mainstream parties are indifferent to the desires of ordinary citizens.’ 
Specifically, the erosion of parties’ representative function has contributed to a 
sense of alienation between voters and political parties (Kriesi 2014), thereby 
generating demand for (right-wing) populist parties, as they seek to present 
themselves as the ‘true voice of the people’. 
The rise of ‘challenger parties’, or ‘niche parties’, can partly be seen as a response 
to the disenchantment with mainstream politics. Scholars have shown that the 
emergence of these new parties had a distinct impact on existing patterns of political 
competition. New parties tended to emphasise issues that went beyond traditional 
socio-economic cleavages (see Wagner 2012). The politicisation of new issues 
brought about by the emergence of right-wing populist challengers incentivised 
mainstream parties to shift their agendas, for instance by cosying up to the 
challengers and toughing their stances on immigration or multiculturalism (e.g. 
Abou-Chadi 2016; Han 2015; Pytlas 2015; van Spanje 2010). However, when 
mainstream parties copy the issues of right-wing populist parties, they are likely to 
increase the salience of these new issues, thereby (inadvertently) tilling the field for 
the populist radical right. This has contributed to ‘the creation of a new axis of 
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political contestation that supplements partisan competition over materialist issues’ 
(Ellinas 2010: 26). It is therefore reasonable to assume that the behaviour of 
mainstream parties can play an important role in the electoral trajectories of right-
wing populist parties (see also Abou-Chadi & Krause 2018). 
The existing literature on the success and failure of (populist) challenger parties 
tends to ascribe a relatively passive role to mainstream parties (Meguid 2005: 347). 
Indeed, mainstream parties are often seen as ‘victims’ who are suffering the 
consequences of the success of right-wing populist parties. This thesis, in contrast, 
treats mainstream parties as agents that play an active role in altering traditional 
political cleavage structures and bringing about related shifts in voting patterns (see 
also Bale 2003). More generally, ‘the behavior of mainstream parties influences the 
electoral fortunes of […] new, niche party actors’ (Meguid 2005: 347). Rather than 
being static entities, mainstream parties react to and interact with changes in the 
political environment. Their behaviour can pre-empt the rise of the populist radical 
right or, indeed, facilitate it (Bornschier 2018: 212). 
When new (niche) parties emerge on the political horizon, ‘[e]stablished parties 
must decide whether to recognize and respond to the issue introduced by the niche 
party’ (Meguid 2005: 349). Following Downs (2001: 26), mainstream parties are 
faced with ‘a fundamental choice’ when confronted with the presence of a right-
wing populist challenger: they can (1) disengage or (2) engage. In essence, 
disengagement strategies are a way of excluding right-wing populist challengers 
and their policy concerns from the political process and public office, whereas 
engagement strategies involve including them (Goodwin 2011: 23).  
Prior to outlining these strategies, two important caveats are in order. First, while 
Downs’s arguments refer primarily to the reactions of mainstream parties after 
radical right-wing populist parties have entered national assemblies, I posit that his 
theories are also applicable to the time leading up to the electoral breakthrough of 
such parties. Second, these strategies are to be understood as ‘ideal types’; in reality, 
they are often conflated or altered over time, which makes it difficult to distinguish 
them from one another (Heinze 2018: 290; see also Bale 2003: 68; Goodwin 2011: 
23). The following subsections outline the different ways in which established 
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parties can theoretically disengage or engage with (issues of) the populist radical 
right. 
Disengagement Strategies 
Disengagement or ‘dismissive strategies’ (Meguid 2005: 349) can take two 
different forms: (a) disregard and (b) isolation. When faced with the emergence of 
right-wing populist parties, established parties may simply choose to ignore them 
(along with the issues they have brought up), in the hope that the challengers will 
wither away (Downs 2001: 26; Goodwin 2011: 23). Similarly, established parties 
may choose to defuse the salience of new political issues, for instance by trying to 
focus the agenda on other topics in the hope that other mainstream parties will 
follow (Bale et al. 2010: 413).  
A second disengagement or exclusion strategy consists of political isolation through 
what Minkenberg (2001) has referred to as ‘demarcation’ (or Abgrenzung in 
German). This disengagement strategy goes beyond mere disregard, in that it aims 
at totally isolating the populist radical right. In other words, mainstream parties may 
opt to stigmatise challengers by demonising them and treating them as pariahs. For 
instance, mainstream parties can erect legal or institutional barriers (e.g. electoral 
thresholds) aimed at keeping the populist radical right out of office (Downs 2001: 
27). Similarly, mainstream parties may come to an explicit or implicit agreement to 
exclude certain (usually extremist) parties from participating in coalitions, for 
instance by forming a political cordon sanitaire. Technically, a cordon sanitaire is 
a guarded line put in place to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. In this case, 
it is a measure designed to prevent the spread of (right-wing) extremism. A related 
form of political isolation is to create coalitions as a way of ‘blocking the populist 
radical right from power’; as Downs (2001: 27) puts it, ‘[g]rand coalitions produce 
the immediate payoff of forming a clear democratic front in opposition to 
extremism.’ 
Engagement Strategies 
Conversely, mainstream parties can choose to engage with right-wing populist 
challengers by recognising and adopting (some of) the issues that they bring to the 
fore. Again, following Meguid (2005; 2008), there are two ways of engaging with 
new niche parties: through (a) divergence (also known as adversarial strategies) and 
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(b) convergence (also known as accommodative strategies). 41F42 Essentially, the main 
adversarial strategy consists of mainstream parties choosing to hold their positions 
by ‘sticking to their guns’ and maintaining their own party lines (Bale et al. 2010). 
This strategy involves offering a clear alternative to voters. It is very similar to the 
demarcation approach described above; however, in this case, right-wing populist 
parties are not treated as pariahs.  
Mainstream parties may also opt to accommodate right-wing populist parties in 
order to draw voters away from them (Meguid 2005: 348). There are two different 
‘degrees’ of accommodating the populist radical right: (a) co-optation and (b) 
collaboration. Established parties can try to co-opt or copy right-wing populist 
parties by adopting some of their issues (Downs 2001: 21), for instance by taking a 
tougher stance on immigration (see van Spanje 2010). The logic underlying this 
strategy is, ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’ (Bale et al. 2010: 413); by decreasing 
the political space towards the populist radical right, mainstream parties hope to 
win (back) voters that may otherwise choose the far right (see Bornschier 2018: 
227).  
Using the examples of Austria and Greece, Ellinas (2010) has shown that many 
centre-right parties in Europe started incorporating issues related to national 
identity into their party programmes from the early 1980s onwards. In an attempt 
to address public demand for cultural protectionism, mainstream parties pushed 
issues pertaining to national identity into the public sphere. This set in motion a 
process of intense political competition along a new political axis, thereby 
extending the political space rightward and shifting the boundaries of acceptable 
political discourse and behaviour: ‘This shift in the contours of legitimate political 
discussion allows Far Rightists to enter the mainstream debate, gain media 
attention, and publicize their views’ (Ellinas 2010: 28). This strategy can become 
an electoral liability for centre-right parties if they cannot keep the nationalist card 
on the table: ‘A number of reasons compel major parties – especially when they are 
in government – to retract the nationalist card, moderating the initial positions on 
national identity issues’ (Ellinas 2010: 29). The sequencing of events is crucial here; 
when mainstream parties retract the nationalist card after having politicised the 
 
42 In this case, convergence does not refer to mainstream parties inclining toward each other but to 
mainstream parties cosying up to the populist radical right.  
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issue, they risk losing voters because they inadvertently created favourable 
opportunity structures for far-right parties to enter the political arena (see also 
Bornschier 2012; Ignazi 2003). 
In their ‘purest’ form, accommodative strategies might involve collaborating with 
right-wing populist parties, for instance by forming a coalition with them, or by 
supporting their proposed policies (Downs 2001: 27-8). Bale (2003) has shown that, 
far from being innocent bystanders, mainstream parties have, at times, purposefully 
engineered political opportunities for right-wing populist challengers to weaken 
mainstream competitors. In some (rare) cases, mainstream parties have deliberately 
opted to strengthen the position of the populist radical right as a way of weakening 
mainstream contenders. For instance, during the 1986 French parliamentary 
elections, Socialist President François Mitterrand introduced a proportional 
electoral system to weaken the centre-right by aiming to bolster support for the 
Front National (Art 2006: 146; Mudde 2007: 235). 
As shown below, there is mixed evidence for the effectiveness of disengagement 
and engagement strategies. It makes little sense, however, to assess the effects of 
mainstream party behaviour in isolation. Prior to discussing the potential 
implications of the various strategies, the following section theorises the ways in 
which the media can choose to deal with right-wing populist parties. 
2.3.2. The Media 
Research has shown that media coverage can influence election results (e.g. Azrout 
et al. 2012; Hopmann et al. 2010; van Spanje & de Vreese 2014). It is also widely 
acknowledged that the media are central to understanding the success of populist 
parties (e.g. Eatwell 2003; Kriesi 2014: 265; Norris 2005: 270). Indeed, since the 
turn of the twenty-first century, there is a growing consensus in the literature that 
the ‘mediatisation of politics’ has contributed to the rise of populism (Kübler & 
Kriesi 2017). 42F43 Political competition increasingly consists of a battle over media 
attention that is acted out on a public stage, with the electorate taking on the role of 
an audience in a theatre (Koopmans & Muis 2009: 644).  
 
43 This thesis does not consider the role of ‘new media’. Although social media platforms may be 
more receptive to populism (Gerbaudo 2018), it is doubtful whether they can match the effects of 
the traditional media (Ellinas 2018: 277; Esser et al. 2017: 377). The role of social media is discussed 
in further detail in Chapter 6. 
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While several studies have focused specifically on the role of the media in the 
electoral success and failure of the populist radical right (e.g. Aalberg et al. 2017; 
Bos et al. 2011; Ellinas 2010), the exact relationship between the media and right-
wing populist parties remains relatively obscure and hence poorly understood. 43F44 
This section, therefore, seeks to further investigate the relationship between the 
populist radical right and the media by theorising the various ways in which 
journalists and editors might deal with right-wing populist parties (see also de Jonge 
2019). Just like mainstream parties, media practitioners can also choose between 
(1) disengagement and (2) engagement strategies. 44F45  
Disengagement Strategies 
First, media practitioners can opt to isolate right-wing populist parties. In its 
‘purest’ form, this disengagement strategy involves totally disregarding far-right 
movements and parties by ‘silencing them to death’. As Mudde (2007: 252) has 
noted, however, there are virtually no countries where right-wing populist parties 
are truly ignored by the media. Instead, journalists may choose to ostracise or 
demarcate them by treating them as pariahs (see Minkenberg 2001). For instance, 
media outlets can deny access to politicians who are associated with the populist 
radical right by means of a cordon sanitaire médiatique. The aim of a media cordon 
is not to ignore certain parties (and the issues they bring up) but to isolate them 
(Damen 2001). In other words, demarcation implies ‘differential treatment’ of 
right-wing populist parties. 
Engagement Strategies 
Second, media practitioners might choose to engage with right-wing populist 
parties. They may do so by assuming an adversarial or confrontational stance vis-
à-vis right-wing populist parties by being overtly critical towards them. This 
strategy is similar to the demarcation approach described above; however, it differs 
in the sense that right-wing populist parties are not treated as pariahs. Instead, they 
are considered ‘normal’ political contenders; hence, they are not excluded from 
 
44 Some scholars have portrayed the media (implicitly or explicitly) as a demand-side variable (e.g. 
Walgrave & De Swert 2004), while others see them as an (external) supply-side factor (e.g. Eatwell 
2003; Mudde 2007). It is likely, however, that the media interact with both voter demand and party 
supply (see Ellinas 2018) – hence, they are discussed here. 
45 Just like mainstream party responses, media strategies are also to be understood as ‘ideal types’; 
empirically, they are difficult to distinguish them from one another. 
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participating in the political process. For instance, media practitioners may seek to 
distance themselves from the populist radical right by demonising or stigmatising 
them. They may also try to ‘expose’ them by showing their ‘true face’, or they can 
try to delegitimise their policies through unfavourable news coverage of these 
parties and/or their leaders. 
Third, journalists can opt for a more accommodative strategy by offering a platform 
to spread their views. In its ‘purest’ form, this strategy implies granting direct, 
unmediated access to right-wing populist parties. In practice, it is often much 
subtler; for example, media practitioners might incorporate some of their rhetoric 
in their news coverage (i.e. populism by the media) by seeking to pay attention to 
the ‘silent majority’, or focus extensively on issues that are typically ‘owned’ by 
right-wing populist parties (i.e. populism through the media), notably issues 
pertaining to national identity immigration as well as crime-related topics (Esser et 
al. 2017). 
More generally, the media can set the public agenda by addressing issues and 
making them (politically) salient (McCombs & Shaw 1972). The media can also 
play an instrumental role in exacerbating political dissatisfaction and cultural 
cleavages, for instance by amplifying voters’ fears about immigration. In the 
aftermath of 9/11, for example, the British media played a key role in perpetuating 
the idea that asylum seekers in general, and Muslim immigrants in particular, were 
somehow linked to terrorist networks (Eatwell 2003). In particular, the ways in 
which the (tabloid) media have framed immigration has helped legitimise 
xenophobic appeals of the populist radical right (Ellinas 2018: 271). Even if the 
news coverage of right-wing populist parties is highly negative (which often is the 
case), the media may simultaneously push ‘the (salience of) key issues of the 
populist radical right’ (Mudde 2007: 253), which, in turn, may help to foster 
demand for right-wing populist parties. 
Thus, the media can play an instrumental role in rallying voters’ support and 
disseminating the populist message, which can contribute to legitimising their cause 
or ‘remove the stigma of extremism’ (Ellinas 2018: 273) by making them appear 
more socially acceptable. Particularly in the earlier phases of a party’s development, 
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the media can be an important asset in pursuit of national visibility. According to 
Ellinas (2010: 3),  
[t]he media can help small parties communicate their messages to much 
broader audiences than their organizational or financial resources would 
otherwise allow. Moreover, they can confer legitimacy and authority to 
political newcomers, and they can dispel voter doubts about their electoral 
viability. In this sense, the media control the gateway to the electoral market. 
In light of these factors, national media landscapes can either be favourable or 
unfavourable to the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Much like with 
political parties, the choices of media practitioners depend on the organisational and 
institutional context in which they operate (see Heinze 2018). As such, the choices 
behind the various media strategies are likely to be influenced by a broad range of 
factors, including the structure of the media system as well as political affiliations, 
ethical standards, and commercial interests of the different actors that make up the 
media landscape (e.g. news organizations, journalists, editors, and so on) (Ellinas 
2010: 211).  
2.4. Theoretical Expectations 
This chapter has provided a working definition of right-wing populist parties and 
highlighted various demand- and supply-side factors that help explain their 
electoral success. The chapter has also highlighted the central role of mainstream 
parties and the media; their reactions help determine the opportunity structures 





Figure 1 – Theoretical Framework: The Success of Right-Wing Populist Parties 
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There is mixed evidence for the effects of these responses on the success and failure 
of right-wing populist parties. For instance, by ignoring right-wing populist parties 
and/or the issues they raise, mainstream parties and media practitioners avoid 
legitimising them. While this response allows parties to ‘keep their hands clean’, it 
also risks confirming the populist claim that the elites are unresponsive to the 
concerns of ‘the people’, thereby adding fuel to the populist fire (Downs 2001: 26). 
Similarly, when the media consistently seek to delegitimise the populist radical 
right, they risk confirming their ‘underdog’ position (see Esser et al. 2017: 266).  
There is also mixed evidence for the effects of co-optation and collaboration 




unintended effect of boosting and/or validating the populist radical right, they may 
rather have a dampening effect (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2003; Meguid 2008). Indeed, 
accommodative strategies can have a moderating effect by forcing the populist 
radical right to tone down their rhetoric (Downs 2001: 38). This is what Heinisch 
(2003: 101) has called the ‘filtration effect’. In addition, by accommodating right-
wing populist contenders, centre-right parties may succeed in seizing some of their 
electoral support, particularly if the populist challenger has acted as a junior 
coalition partner. According to the so-called ‘black-widow-effect’, when 
collaboration is not mutually beneficial, it may lead ‘to unceremonious 
cannibalisation of a junior partner swiftly seen to have outlived its usefulness’ (Bale 
2003: 85).  
Evidence put forward by van Spanje and de Graaf (2018) indicates that engagement 
strategies are most effective when combined with non-engagement strategies. 
Drawing on evidence from nearly 300 election results in 28 Western European 
countries from 1944 to 2011, the authors show that copying (or ‘parroting’) a 
challenger party can work (i.e. it can decrease that party’s support), but only if that 
party is also systematically isolated (see also van Spanje 2018). 45F46 This suggests that 
combining different strategies might be key to their overall effectiveness.  
It is also likely that different responses work for different types of mainstream 
parties. In other words, while some strategies may prove effective for centre-right 
parties in the sense that it can help them to win (back) voters from the populist 
radical right, they may be detrimental to centre-left parties. For instance, Bale et al. 
(2010: 413) have observed that a ‘principled’ disengagement strategy (i.e. disregard 
and isolation) is particularly risky for social democratic parties because it implies 
that they openly advocate ‘tolerance of migration and multiculturalism in the face 
of contemporary, media-fuelled, concerns about terrorism, crime, welfare abuse and 
dependency.’ At the same time, while accommodative strategies (i.e. co-optation 
and collaboration) may benefit centre-right parties, they can be particularly risky 
for centre-left parties because by cosying up to the populist radical right, they are 
more likely to alienate their traditional electorates. Indeed, co-optation can 
undermine the coherence of social democratic party programmes, which may harm 
 
46 The article focuses on the effects of copying radical right as well as radical left challengers. 
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their credibility (Bale et al. 2013). This suggests that a confrontational or 
adversarial stance is the only credible option for centre-left parties. 
Finally, it seems plausible that whether mainstream party strategies work may 
depend on whether or not they are used in combination with media strategies. 
Specifically, the success of disengagement strategies seems to hinge on both the 
timing (i.e. when the cordon is initiated) and the rigidness of the cordon sanitaire. 
It appears that sequencing is key: for a cordon to be effective, it needs to be set up 
prior to the rise of a radical right party (Art 2011: 47; see also Heinze 2018). A 
cordon may be less effective when instituted after the electoral breakthrough of a 
right-wing populist contender. It is also less likely to be effective when it is set up 
at a time of political upheaval (e.g. scandals, crises, high political dissatisfaction); 
in other words, when a cordon is initiated at a time when there is a particularly high 
demand for right-wing populist tendencies, it may reinforce the ‘underdog’ position 
of such parties, which could fuel demand for their existence. 
The effectiveness of the cordon also depends on how solid it is. When a cordon is 
truly ‘watertight’ in the sense that the media universally deny access to right-wing 
populist parties and mainstream parties clearly rule out any sort of cooperation with 
the populist radical right, it is likely to be effective. Scholars have shown that right-
wing populist parties are less likely to succeed where public debates in the media 
take an adversarial stance. For instance, David Art (2006) has demonstrated how 
public debates in Austria provided a favourable environment for the resurgence of 
the far right, whereas Germany’s public sphere appeared more hostile to right-wing 
populism due to the country’s legacy of authoritarianism. In addition, it can prevent 
the recruitment of qualified personnel (Art 2011: 46). However, when a cordon is 
permissive (i.e. allowing some possibility for cooperation with radical right actors 
because they are not universally treated as pariahs), it is less likely to be effective, 
as ‘even small cracks in the cordon sanitaire can have large consequences’ (Art 
2011: 44). Once a right-wing populist challenger has gained ‘issue ownership’ of 
cultural issues (notably immigration), disengagement as well as co-optation become 
increasingly difficult (Ellinas 2010). Thus, as mentioned earlier, in particular the 
initial reaction of mainstream parties to populist challengers seems to be crucial, 
for it appears that once mainstream parties choose to engage with the populist 
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radical right, this strategy ‘cannot easily be reversed’ (Heinze 2018: 305; see also 
Bornschier 2018: 228).  
Based on these observations, we can formulate two general theoretical expectations: 
First, when the public sphere is universally hostile to the emergence of right-wing 
populist parties – in other words, when mainstream parties and the media uniformly 
and consistently demarcate right-wing populist parties as soon as they appear – 
these parties are unlikely to succeed electorally. Second, when mainstream parties 
and the media become receptive to the messages of the populist radical right by 
cooperating with them and/or politicising the issues that are traditionally ‘owned’ 
by these parties, right-wing populist parties are more likely to enter the electoral 
arena and succeed. This is particularly the case when (1) centre-right parties first 
politicise issues pertaining to immigration and national identity to attract new 
voters, but then ‘retreat’ by converging back to the centre; (2) when centre-left 
parties either ignore or accommodate the issues brought up by the populist radical 
right; and (3) when the media become receptive and/or contribute to spreading the 
populist message. 
Prior to analysing the role of mainstream parties and the media in the Benelux 
countries, the following chapter provides relevant background information on the 
history of the far right in the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Drawing on 
existing demand- and supply-side explanations, the chapter shows that the 
conventional framework is helpful but insufficient to fully understand the variation 









Chapter 3: History of the Populist Radical Right in the Benelux 
The Benelux countries have all had some experience with right-wing populist 
parties and movements. Drawing on primary and secondary sources, this chapter 
traces the history of the far right in the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Conceptually, the chapter applies the traditional demand- and supply-side 
framework to explain variations in the electoral trajectories of right-wing populist 
parties, thereby demonstrating the strengths and limitations of this model. 
As shown below, there is a breeding ground for right-wing populist parties 
throughout the Benelux region. Turning to the supply side, it appears that the supply 
of populist radical right parties has been stronger in the Netherlands and Flanders 
than in Wallonia and Luxembourg. In the Netherlands, the success of populist 
radical right movements can, to a large extent, be attributed to the leadership and 
personae of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders. In Flanders, far-right movements have 
been able to draw on an extensive support network rooted in the Flemish 
independence movement. However, demand- and supply-side explanations cannot 
fully account for the timing of the electoral breakthrough of right-wing populist 
parties in Flanders and the Netherlands. After all, the Flemish Interest Party was 
able to draw on pre-existing resources through the Flemish movement long before 
its electoral breakthrough. Similarly, Pim Fortuyn succeeded in mobilising broad 
electoral support despite the lack of a strong, nationalist subculture. The conclusion 
of this chapter therefore points to the importance of contextual factors. 
Before proceeding, one caveat is in order. While this thesis primarily seeks to 
explain political developments of the twenty-first century, this chapter deliberately 
opts for a broader timespan; after all, many of the current features of the political 
landscape are conditioned by past developments and can only be fully understood 
in that context. As Art (2008: 437) has noted, by ‘ignoring historical legacies, or 
treating them as a residual variable, one misses the underlying causes of the radical 
right’s success and failure.’ While a historical perspective is likely to be broad in 
scope, it enables us to recount the success and failure of the populist radical right 
by taking into account its full complexity. Moreover, understanding why far-right 




3.1. The Netherlands 
Once known for its social tolerance, the Netherlands long seemed immune to far-
right tendencies (Daalder 1966: 234). The historic weakness of the Dutch far right 
has been widely recognised by scholars. For instance, Paul Lucardie (1998: 111) 
remarked that ‘[a]s a nation of sailors and merchants, the Netherlands does not have 
a strong tradition of xenophobic nationalism. Extreme right-wing parties have 
always been relatively weak, lacking a strong ideological tradition as well as a solid 
social base.’ Writing at the turn of the twenty-first century, Mudde and van 
Holsteyn (2000: 159) observed that, ‘[t]he Dutch extreme right can be considered 
[…] one of the least successful representatives of the current West European 
extreme right.’ In a similar vein, the Dutch historian Henk te Velde (2010: 245) 
noted the following: 
Politics in the Netherlands has no populist tradition. There have been more 
populists than some people may think, but it always involved short-term 
movements or phases in the development of political groups. There is no 
continuous line that connects all those populists with one another. That is 
partly why Dutch politics is still so inconvenienced by populism: no has 
every really learned how to deal with it. 
Given the impressive rise of the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and Geert Wilders’s 
Freedom Party (PVV) in the first decade of the twenty-first century, ‘it is 
remarkable that contemporary Dutch radical right parties in fact do not have deep 
and long historical roots’ (van Holsteyn 2018a: 479). Indeed, until the early 2000s, 
the Netherlands formed a noteworthy exception with regards to the success of 
populist radical right movements; while far-right challengers had started to make 
noteworthy electoral gains in neighbouring Flanders, they long failed to garner 
broad public support in the Netherlands. 
The weakness of far-right parties became evident in the interwar period, when a 
number of fascist movements, such as the National Socialist Movement (Nationaal-
Socialistische Beweging or NSB), emerged but failed to gain ground (Ignazi 2003: 
162). Following the German invasion, the NSB was the only political party legally 
permitted in the Netherlands (Mudde & van Holsteyn 2000: 145). During WWII, 
the Dutch government in exile issued a decree to ban all parties and organisations 
with any links to the national-socialist party that had collaborated with the Germans 
(Mudde 2000: 117; van Holsteyn 2018a: 480). As a result, in the immediate 
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aftermath of the war, NSB collaborators were purged and fascist movements were 
outlawed (Ignazi 2003: 162). Nevertheless, attempts to rebuild right-wing extremist 
movements were not completely prevented (Mudde 2000: 117); by the 1950s, 
extreme right groupings started to form. However, they never managed to gain 
ground and failed to break through electorally. 
In the following decade, the Netherlands witnessed the creation of several populist 
(or ‘semi-populist’) groupings, notably the Poujadist-oriented Farmers’ Party 
(Boerenpartij or BP) (Daalder 1966: 234; Lucardie & Voerman 2012: 27-8). In the 
1967 general elections, the BP won nearly five percent of the popular vote, which 
translated into seven of the 150 parliamentary seats in the Tweede Kamer (i.e. the 
Dutch House of Representatives – literally ‘Second Chamber’). While the BP 
primarily backed agrarian interests, it attracted numerous far-right activists, 
including some former NSB collaborators, which harmed the party’s image. The 
different ideological strands within the BP gave rise to infighting, which led to 
splintering and the party’s eventual dissolution in the early 1980s (Ignazi 2003: 
163).  
It was not until the early 1970s that the Dutch extreme right was able to make a 
comeback with the founding of the Nederlandse Volksunie (Union of the Dutch 
people or NVU) (Mudde & van Holsteyn 2000: 146). The NVU promoted an openly 
racist and ethnocentric agenda. Specifically, it aimed at expelling ethnically diverse 
people and unifying all Dutch speakers in a ‘Great Dutch State’ (Ignazi 2003: 164). 
Over the years, the NVU moved further towards the right by adopting a national-
socialist vision (Lucardie & Voerman 2012: 30). The progressive radicalization of 
the NVU caused more ‘moderate’ party members to split. In 1980, two former NVU 
members established the misnamed Centrumpartij (CP or Centre Party) (van 
Donselaar 1993: 96). 
The CP was the first of several so-called ‘extremist centre parties’ (Lucardie 1998). 
These parties formed part of what would become known as the ‘centre movement’ 
(centrumstroming), an umbrella term used to describe the CP and its numerous 
successor parties (Mudde 2000: 120). While its name was intended to underscore 
the CP’s moderate political outlook, some party members eventually proved to have 
a radical, if not extremist agenda. Initially, the CP sought to distance itself from the 
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NVU’s extremist and blatantly racist views by advocating the ‘preservation of 
Dutch culture’ (Ignazi 2003: 164) but then proceeded to position itself against non-
European immigrants, who were blamed for all societal ills, including 
unemployment, crime and environmental issues. The party soon attracted the 
interest of Hans Janmaat, who was to become a key figure in the Dutch far-right 
scene in the following decades.  
Janmaat had an eclectic history of short-lived and failed professional and political 
careers (see van Holsteyn 1998). A political scientist by training, he joined the CP 
in May 1980 and led the party list in the 1982 general elections, in which he was 
able to win one seat in the Tweede Kamer by securing 0.8 percent of the vote. 
Despite the wave of countermobilization from the left, support for the CP continued 
to grow (Ignazi 2003: 164). However, the party was plagued by continuous 
infighting and personal rivalries. In October 1984, Janmaat was expelled by the 
party leadership because his views were deemed ‘too moderate’, but he refused to 
give up his seat in the Tweede Kamer (Lucardie 1998: 113; Mudde 2000: 121). 
Weeks later, some of Janmaat’s followers proceeded to form the Centre Democrats 
(Centrumdemocraten or CD), which in December 1984, Janmaat himself joined. 
Devoid of its figurehead, the CP suffered a particularly poor performance, garnering 
just 0.4 percent of the vote in the 1986 general election (Ignazi 2003: 165). The 
election result was followed by haemorrhaging membership and infighting, which 
eventually led to the CP’s collapse in the summer of 1986. Just one week later, the 
party was resurrected under the name of the Centre Party’86 (Centrumpartij’86 or 
CP’86). Thus, by the late 1980s, two small fringe parties, the CP’86 and Janmaat’s 
CD, were competing over the legacy of the CP (Mudde & van Holsteyn 2000: 
147).46F47 
Because of his experience and reputation, Janmaat soon acquired a lead role in the 
newly founded CD (Mudde 2000: 123). Initially, it seemed the CD was doomed to 
 
47 Janmaat’s CD was considered one of the earliest manifestations of the ‘third wave’ of extreme 
right-wing parties in Europe (Mudde & van Holsteyn 2000; see also von Beyme 1988: 10). While 
the CD was not overtly racist, it was clearly xenophobic and anti-immigrant (Lucardie & Voerman 
2012: 31-2). The party’s ideology has been described as a ‘populist form of nationalism’, which 
focused on the preservation of Dutch cultural identity and the promotion of national solidarity 
(Lucardie 1998: 117). Unlike its predecessors, the CD promoted a civic kind of nationalism rather 
than an ethnic one; in other words, the party did not define the boundaries of the nationhood by 
using ethnic criteria (Mudde 2000: 131). 
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rapid oblivion as it only managed to win 0.1 percent of the vote in the 1986 general 
election (Mudde 2000: 123). In the subsequent elections in 1989, however, the CD 
won back its parliamentary seat (which was once again taken by Janmaat) after 
garnering 0.9 percent of the vote (Ignazi 2003: 166). 47F48  
In the early 1990s, the CD was moderately successful in local elections, notably in 
the larger cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague (Ignazi 2003: 166). In 
light of these results, there was reason to believe that the far right would perform 
well in the 1994 general election. However, these expectations were unfounded; the 
CD was only able to secure three parliamentary seats (and 2.5 percent of the vote), 
while the CP’86 failed to win a single seat (Ignazi 2003:167). This result was the 
beginning of a downward spiral. In the June 1994 European elections, the Dutch far 
right was all but annihilated; the CD won just 1 percent of the vote, while CP’86 
did not even run. Following this defeat, most local representatives and party 
members decided to quit the CD (Mudde & van Hosteyn 1994). The 1998 general 
elections marked the provisional collapse of the Dutch far right. Alterations in the 
electoral rules made it more difficult for parties to collect signatures and form 
electoral lists. The CD was only able to win 0.6 percent of the vote, as a result of 
which all three CD MPs lost their seats in the Tweede Kamer (Ignazi 2003: 167). 
This marked the beginning of the end for the misnamed ‘centre movement.’ 
While far-right parties were in decline, populist groupings had been gaining 
momentum. In the 1990s, populist movements managed to secure a strong foothold 
in local politics with the emergence of small parties that were formed as a way of 
protesting against the rising levels of professionalization in municipal politics 
(Lucardie 2008: 154). These movements stood up against large-scale urban re-
development projects and advocated the preservation of the ‘Dutch quality life’ by 
introducing a new term, leefbaarheid, which roughly translates into ‘liveability’. 
The new movement adopted names such as ‘Leefbaar Rotterdam’, ‘Leefbaar 
Hilversum’ or ‘Leefbaar Utrecht’ (Lucardie & Voerman 2012: 71-8). In 1999, the 
Hilversum and Utrecht chapters decided to join forces to create a national party 
called ‘Leefbaar Nederland’ (Liveable Netherlands or LN). In June 2001, the party 
 
48 The party’s ‘comeback’ has been attributed to widespread media attention, which in turn derived 
from controversies sparked by anti-fascist attacks against Janmaat (Mudde 2000: 123-4). 
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held its first party congress, and in November that same year a new leader was 
elected: Pim Fortuyn (Lucardie 2008: 154). 
Wihelmus ‘Pim’ Fortuyn was born in 1948 into a lower middle-class Catholic 
family (Lucardie & Voerman 2012: 92). As a sociology student, he was interested 
in Marxism but soon became disillusioned with socialism, which prompted him to 
leave the Labour Party (PvdA) in 1989. In the 1990s, Fortuyn developed a 
reputation as a very outspoken and eloquent public speaker and columnist. A 
maverick politician, he was fiercely critical of the incumbent ‘purple’ government 
and held very outspoken views on immigration and immigrant integration. 48F49 He was 
particularly critical of multiculturalism and (Muslim) immigration, which he 
considered a threat to the Dutch liberal way of life. Fortuyn was provocative, 
flamboyant, openly gay and a staunch defender of freedom of speech. His lifestyle 
was known to be extremely lavish (see van Holsteyn & Irwin 2003: 44). Above all, 
he was very charismatic (Lucardie 2008: 157).  
In February 2002 (just three months before the general elections), Fortuyn was 
expelled from his party, Leefbaar Nederland, for making provocative statements in 
a Volkskrant interview, in which he argued that ‘Islam is a backward culture’ 
(Lucardie & Voerman 2012: 84; see also Wansink 2004: 17-24). His fierce criticism 
of multiculturalism and his hard line on the integration of Muslim immigrants 
contributed to both his break with LN and his growing popularity in urban areas 
(Lucardie 2008: 159). After being ousted by LN, Fortuyn proceeded to form his 
own party: the ‘List Pim Fortuyn’ (Lijst Pim Fortuyn or LPF). With the departure 
of its strongman leader, Leefbaar Nederland soon lost its relevance, while support 
for the LPF quickly rose in the polls (van Kessel 2015: 102).  
Given Fortuyn’s nativist, authoritarian and populist views, there is broad agreement 
in the literature that the LPF qualifies as a populist radical right party (see, for 
example, van Holsteyn 2018a: 483; van Kessel 2015: 102). Unlike Janmaat, 
however, Fortuyn could hardly be considered a right-wing extremist (Lucardie 
2008: 160); rather, his politics are best described as a somewhat eclectic mixture of 
 
49 The government was called ‘purple’ because it was composed of two ‘blue’ liberal parties (VVD 
and D66) and the ‘red’ Social Democrats (PvdA). 
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liberalism, nationalism, communitarianism and populism (Lucardie 2008: 158; see 
also Oudenampsen 2018: 89).  
In the run-up to the 2002 general election, opinion polls predicted a bright future 
for Fortuyn. However, on 6 May 2002 (just nine days before the general election), 
Fortuyn was shot dead on the street by an animal rights activist. Despite (and partly 
because of) his murder, the newly founded LPF went on to win 26 seats in the 
Tweede Kamer (with 17 percent of vote), ‘by far  [the] most impressive results ever 
recorded by a new party at national elections’ (van Holsteyn & Irwin 2003: 42). As 
some scholars have noted, the LPF managed to shake ‘the very foundations of the 
Dutch political system to the extent that politicians and observers began speaking 
of the “new politics”’ (van Holsteyn et al. 2003: 71). As the second biggest party, 
the LPF went on to join a coalition government with the Christian Democrats 
(CDA) and the Liberal Party (VVD). Having lost its leader, however, the LPF 
quickly succumbed to infighting. After just 87 days, the government resigned, and 
new elections were scheduled for January 2003. The LPF all but imploded; support 
for the party fell to 5.7 percent, which translated to a loss of 18 seats (down to just 
8 seats). By the 2006 elections, the LPF had disappeared, thereby making room for 
a new and more durable right-wing populist contender: Geert Wilders’s Freedom 
Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid or PVV).49F50  
Like Fortuyn, Wilders was born into a Catholic family, in 1963. While he often 
presents himself as a ‘political outsider’, he is, in fact, best described as a career 
politician. As Vossen (2011: 181) has pointed out, Wilders has worked in the Dutch 
Tweede Kamer for most of his adult life: in 1990, at the age of twenty-seven, he 
started working as a parliamentary assistant and speechwriter for the liberal VVD. 
In 1997, he was elected as a VVD representative onto the City Council of Utrecht, 
and in the 1998 general election he entered the Tweede Kamer (Lucardie & 
Voerman 2012: 152). Over the course of the years, Wilders grew increasingly 
critical of Islam, and in 2004, he broke with the VVD following a clash over 
Turkey’s EU membership (Lucardie & Voerman 2012: 155-6; see also Vossen 
2013). As he refused to give up his parliamentary seat, Wilders formed a one-man 
 
50 The LPF was officially dissolved in 2008 (de Lange & Art 2011: 1234). 
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fraction called the Wilders Group (Groep Wilders). In February 2006, he founded 
the PVV. 
Over the years, Wilders’s ideology shifted from neoconservatism towards right-
wing populism (Vossen 2011). In comparison to his predecessors, Wilders appealed 
more explicitly to the ‘ordinary people’ and adopted a more radical stance against 
Islam (ibid). For instance, Wilders often portrays Islam as a totalitarian political 
ideology rather than a religion. In line with this way of thinking, in the run-up to 
the 2017 general election, the PVV advocated the closure of all mosques and 
Islamic schools as well as the preventive incarceration of radical Muslims (PVV 
2017). Given the party’s nativist, authoritarian and populist outlook, the PVV is a 
textbook right-wing populist party.  
Unlike the LPF, Wilders’s PVV managed to become a durable force in Dutch 
politics (see de Lange & Art 2011). In the 2006 general election, the PVV won just 
under 6 percent of the popular vote. However, in 2010 the PVV became the third 
biggest party by winning 24 seats with 15.4 percent of the vote (van Kessel 2015: 
60). When early elections were called in 2012, support for the PVV declined to 10.1 
percent; however, the party was able to recover, coming in second after winning 
13.1 percent of the vote (or 20 seats) in 2017. 




Extreme Right Parties 
 
 
Populist Radical Right Parties 
 CP CD CP’86 LPF PVV 
1981 0.14 - - - - 
1982 0.83 - - - - 
1986 0.4 0.13 -   
1989 - 0.92 - - - 
1994 - 2.46 0.36 - - 
1998 - 0.61 - - - 
2002 - - - 17.0 - 
2003 - - - 5.7 - 
2006 - - - 0.2 5.86 
2010 - - - - 15.45 
2012 - - - - 10.08 




Dutch Electoral Council (Kiesraad 2019) 
Notes: - = party did not compete. 
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Thus, while populist radical right movements were unable to garner broad popular 
support in the Netherlands in the twentieth century, they have become an important 
player in Dutch politics in the twenty-first century. How can we account for the 
stunning rise of right-wing populist movements in the Netherlands since the turn of 
the century? This question has been addressed extensively in the scholarly 
literature. In the following paragraphs, I draw on demand- and supply-side factors 
to explain the initial failure of the ‘centre movement’ and the subsequent success 
of the LPF and the PVV. As shown below, while the conventional framework 
provides a useful starting point, it cannot fully explain the electoral trajectories of 
right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands. 
3.1.1. Demand-Side Explanations 
As several scholars have observed, there was clearly (some) demand for the populist 
radical right in the Netherlands before the turn of the twenty-first century (see, for 
example, Husbands 1992a; Ignazi 2003; Mudde & van Holsteyn 2000). Although 
levels of political trust were quite high at the time, voter turnout was declining while 
political cynicism was on the rise (Mudde & van Holsteyn 2000: 159-60). Perhaps 
more importantly, as shown below, xenophobic tendencies and concerns over 
immigration were clearly present in the late 1980s.  
The Dutch have traditionally been very hospitable towards immigrants, and foreign 
residents acquired voting rights in local elections as early as 1986 (Ignazi 2003: 
169).50F51 However, as demonstrated by Ignazi (2003: 170), there was a small but 
noticeable shift in public opinion in the late 1980s and early 1990s; various surveys 
revealed that many Dutch nationals harboured ‘an uncaring or strongly hostile 
attitude’ towards foreigners (ibid). For instance, one study (based on a 
representative sample of Dutch citizens) found that nearly 43 percent of the 
respondents agreed that ‘foreigners who live in the Netherlands should take on 
Dutch customs’ (Scheepers et al. 1989: 302). Another study found that half of the 
respondents were in favour of financially supporting the repatriation of immigrants 
to their home countries, while 60 percent did not see the benefit of their presence 
in the Netherlands (quoted in Husbands 1992a: 98). This public concern over 
 
51 This was well before the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which introduced the 
concept of European citizenship and thereby the right to vote and stand for municipal (and European) 
elections in accordance with certain residence requirements. 
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immigration suggests that there was, in fact, a breeding ground for the populist 
radical right, albeit a slightly less favourable one than in some other Western 
European countries (Mudde & van Holsteyn 2000: 161). Thus, while there was 
clearly some demand, ‘no party had the relevant “attractive product” available’ (van 
Holsteyn 2018a: 491). 
Demand for the populist radical right has also been tied to partisan dealignment (i.e. 
the weakening of traditional linkages and related transformations of social 
structures), which can be seen as a precondition for its emergence (Bornschier 2018: 
224). From the early 1900s until the mid-1960s, the Dutch system was stable, and 
the electorate tended to vote along traditional social and religious lines (see Lijphart 
1975). In other words, there were close ties between political elites and the masses 
through networks of ideological organisations (or subcultures), also known as 
‘pillars’ (zuilen). For instance, religious voters tended to vote for a Christian 
democratic party, whereas working-class voters would opt for the Labour Party. 
Since voters were loyal to the pillar to which they belonged, election outcomes were 
traditionally very stable and predictable, making the Netherlands a ‘prototype of a 
“frozen” party system’ (Aarts & Thomassen 2008: 203). 
From the 1960s onwards, secularisation and individualisation contributed to the 
demise of the pillar structure, a process known as ‘depillarisation’ (or ontzuiling). 
While these processes have affected most countries in the modern world, they ‘had 
a particular impact in the Netherlands’ (Lucardie 2008: 152). Specifically, the 
progressive individualisation and secularisation of society contributed to the 
erosion of the dividing lines between the pillars, which brought about a ‘thawing’ 
of the party system. The crumbling of the pillar structure generated a large number 
of free-floating voters; as they were ‘liberated’ from traditional party loyalties, they 
became ‘available’ to vote for new parties – initially the liberal D66 and Greens 
(GroenLinks) on the left, and the CP/CD on the right (Ignazi 2003: 169). By the 
turn of the twenty-first century, the Dutch party system had become increasingly 
fragmented and volatile (Lucardie 2008: 153; Mair 2008). The demise of the 
‘pillarisation’ of Dutch society is often considered a long-term cause of the rise of 
the populist radical right in the Netherlands (e.g. Ignazi 2003: 169; van Holsteyn & 
Irwin 2003: 47-8; van Kessel 2015: 108). 
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Demand-side explanations are not particularly useful, however, when seeking to 
account for the sudden electoral success of the LPF and, more recently, the PVV; 
in other words, demand-side explanations are ill-suited to account for the ‘timing’ 
of the rise of these parties. After all, depillarisation had already started in the 1960s. 
More importantly, voter demand in the Netherlands did not change drastically in 
the early 2000s (e.g. Pellikaan et al. 2007; van Holsteyn et al. 2003; van Kessel 
2013). First, as Bovens and Wille (2008) have shown, levels of political trust and 
satisfaction with the functioning of democracy remained very high towards the turn 
of the twenty-first century. Indeed, in 1998, about 80 percent of the population said 
they were (very) satisfied with the government – a number that is only rivalled by 
countries like North Korea or Cuba (Bovens & Wille 2008: 32). From 2002 
onwards, these numbers started to drop, and by 2004, only 49 percent of the 
population was satisfied with the government (ibid). However, as the authors point 
out, this trend was also present in other European countries and cannot therefore on 
its own account for the spectacular breakthrough of Pim Fortuyn. While it is not 
entirely clear what prompted this decline in public trust (see Bovens & Wille 2008: 
38), it is unlikely that this dip caused the rise of the LPF since it occurred mainly 
after the murder of Fortuyn. Instead, it is conceivable that Fortuyn’s outspoken 
criticisms and his subsequent violent death triggered a rapid decline in levels of 
trust. Furthermore, despite this noticeable decline, levels of trust in the Netherlands 
remained well above the EU average (Bovens & Wille 2008: 40). In addition, after 
2004, levels of trust and satisfaction recovered and nearly reached the record-high 
figures of the 1990s. This means that they cannot explain the success of Geert 
Wilders’s PVV (van Kessel 2015: 108).  
Second, contrary to popular belief, there was no noticeably rightwards shift among 
Dutch voters in the run-up to the electoral breakthrough of Pim Fortuyn. Using data 
based on the self-placement of voters from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, 
van Holsteyn et al. (2003: 73) have shown that there was hardly any movement in 
the electorate in terms of the left and right-wing positions between 1994 and 2002. 
Specifically, underlying attitudes and opinions of voters vis-à-vis various topics, 
including immigration did not change significantly. In a similar vein, Oosterwaal 
and Torenvlied (2010: 270) have shown that there were no major changes in 
citizens’ preferences on ethnic immigration policy between 1994 and 2006; indeed, 
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only very small shifts were noticeable. In fact, as indicated earlier, scepticism 
towards immigration gained salience in the late 1980s, suggesting that there had 
long been potential for right-wing support in the Netherlands (van Holsteyn et al. 
2003: 75; see also Adriaansen et al. 2005). In the face of this existing ‘breeding 
ground’, demand-side explanations are not particularly helpful when seeking to 
understand the electoral trajectories of the Dutch far right. Instead, the failure of the 
‘centre movement’ and the subsequent success LPF and PVV can largely be 
attributed to external and internal supply-side explanations. 
3.1.2. Supply-Side Explanations 
The External Supply Side 
External supply-side arguments only partially help to explain the initial failure and 
subsequent breakthrough of the Dutch far right. While there are no pre-existing far-
right networks to draw on, political opportunity structures in the Netherlands 
generally favour the formation of new parties. 
The Dutch far right was unable to draw upon an extant nationalist subculture. As 
Lucardie (1998: 122) has pointed out, ‘the Netherlands lack a strong historical 
tradition of nationalism or right-wing extremism’, and ‘tolerance remains a 
characteristic of this mercantile nation, even if it has been declining since 1980.’ 
As a result, unlike the Flemish far right (discussed below), Dutch extremist parties 
were unable to rely on a large, pre-existing network through which to mobilise 
supporters (Mudde & van Holsteyn 2000: 164; see also Mudde 1994). The Dutch 
tradition of tolerance as well as the absence of a nationalist subculture also helps to 
explain the social and legal ostracism that the far right initially faced, a point which 
I will return to in greater detail in the following chapters. 
Having said that, there are no significant institutional hurdles in the Netherlands 
that impede extremist parties from entering the political arena. The Dutch electoral 
system is known for its ‘extreme proportionality’ (van Kessel 2015: 107). Seats in 
the Tweede Kamer are distributed according to the number of votes candidates gain 
across the entire country; winning just 0.67 percent of the votes is enough to secure 
one of the 150 seats in the lower house (Lucardie 2008: 152). Therefore, the Dutch 
electoral system is very favourable to the formation of new, small parties. Unlike 
in countries with majoritarian electoral systems (e.g. Britain), the Dutch far right 
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does not face major institutional hurdles to mobilise voters (Mudde & van Hosteyn 
2000: 161). While this external supply-side factor in itself is not particularly useful 
when seeking to understand the failure of the ‘centre movement’, it does help 
explain the success of the LPF and the PVV, particularly because the ‘availability 
of voters’ due to partisan dealignment (see Chapter 4) enabled these parties to really 
take advantage of the favourable opportunity structures resulting from the low 
electoral threshold.  
The Internal Supply Side 
Internal supply-side explanations consider the agency and characteristics of 
populist radical right parties themselves. After all, ‘[i]rrespective of how favorable 
the breeding ground and the political opportunity structure might be to new political 
parties, they merely present political actors with a series of possibilities. In the end, 
it is still up to the populist radical right parties to profit from them’ (Mudde 2007: 
256). Looking at the organisation and structure of the parties in question is 
particularly useful in illuminating the limited electoral success of the ‘centre 
movement’ and the subsequent rise of the LPF and the PVV.  
The failure of the ‘centre movement’ is best understood as a result of the poor 
organisational skills and a lack of leadership potential. Mudde and van Holsteyn 
(2000: 162) observed at the turn of the twenty-first century that, ‘[i]f there is one 
common theme in the history of the extreme right in the Netherlands, it is that it is 
simply too weak (organizationally, electorally, ideologically) to become a real 
political force.’ This can be partially attributed to the personality of Hans Janmaat, 
who was unable to capitalise on lingering demand and (somewhat) favourable 
political opportunity structures. While Janmaat was an experienced public speaker, 
he was not particularly eloquent or charismatic, and often too emotional to mobilise 
support and persuade voters (Lucardie 1998: 116). Although there were rising 
concerns over multiculturalism and immigration, these topics were considered 
taboo. As Lucardie and Voerman (2012: 190) have noted, his nationalist agenda 
always trumped his populist appeal, and he was never able to break the taboo 
surrounding nationalism (Lucardie & Voerman 2012: 190).  
It is hardly possible to explain the rise of the LPF without considering the ‘Fortuyn 
factor’. In the words of Stijn van Kessel (2013: 183), we must take into account ‘the 
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agency of the man himself.’ Unlike Janmaat, Fortuyn was an eloquent public 
speaker, which made him particularly attractive to the Dutch media (see 
Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003). While he did not score particularly high on the 
‘sympathy scale’ (van Holsteyn & Irwin 2003), Fortuyn was extremely charismatic. 
According to Lucardie (2008: 157), there is ‘[n]o doubt Fortuyn had charisma, in 
the original quasi-religious sense as defined by Max Weber.’ Indeed, Fortuyn was 
considered much more competent than any of his predecessors (van der Brug & 
Mughan 2007). As a result, ‘[a]ny analysis dealing with populist parties in the 
Netherlands without taking into account the effects of Fortuyn’s performance is, at 
least, incomplete’ (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2007: 408). Taken together, 
Fortuyn’s skills made him an effective leader (van Kessel 2015: 114). 
However, given that Fortuyn founded the LPF just three months prior to the 2002 
general election, he had a very short time window within which to build a 
functioning party apparatus. This forced him to rely on friends to recruit candidates 
and set up an administrative centre (de Lange & Art 2011: 1236). Because of his 
premature death, the LPF was never fully institutionalised. Fortuyn’s sudden 
departure left a power vacuum, and since there was not yet a formal party structure 
in place, the LPF quickly succumbed to infighting. Indeed, ‘[t]he very day after the 
death of its founding father, the remaining members of the executive committee 
began quarrelling over his succession’ (Lucardie 2008: 162). In the words of van 
Holsteyn (2018a: 486), ‘[t]his undeveloped, unstable organizational structure was 
not strong enough to carry the weight of electoral success and the political 
responsibilities of government participation.’ Fortuyn’s successor, Mat Herben, 
was far less effective as a leader (van der Brug & Mughan 2007). These factors help 
explain why the LPF vanished just as quickly as it had appeared (de Lange & Art 
2011). 
Internal supply-side explanations can also help account for the subsequent success 
of the PVV. The implosion of the LPF left a political vacuum, which various new 
parties attempted to fill. In this ‘succession battle’, the PVV emerged victorious. 
This can, to a very large extent, be attributed to the persona of Geert Wilders. An 
experienced politician, Wilders knew what it takes to become successful. Over the 
years, he had turned into a talented and passionate professional politician (Vossen 
2010: 29). Above all, however, Wilders learned from the mistakes of the LPF in the 
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sense that he avoided many of the weak organisational features of Fortuyn’s 
movement (de Lange & Art 2011). For instance, he deliberately designed a political 
party that would not accept any members other than Wilders himself. While this 
leader-centred party model did not entirely prevent infighting (see van Kessel 2015: 
116), it did allow Wilders to maintain some degree of cohesion and unity among 
his MPs.  
Thus, conventional explanations would lead us to conclude that the success of the 
populist radical right in the Netherlands can largely be attributed to supply-side 
factors. The arrival of the LPF and the PVV marked the emergence of ‘credible’ 
populist radical right movements. However, while these explanations are helpful 
and indeed necessary to understand the electoral trajectories of the populist radical 
right in the Netherlands, they are reductionist because they attribute too much 
weight and importance to the characteristics of individual leaders. In the words of 
Pennings and Keman (2003: 51), ‘[w]hy could one “newcomer” without a well-
developed party organization gain such a smashing electoral victory?’ After all, 
voters in the Netherlands generally vote for parties rather than individuals (van 
Holsteyn & Irwin 2003: 54). In order to account fully for the rise of the populist 
radical right in the Netherlands, we therefore need to take into account the role of 
mainstream parties and the media. These factors will be addressed in the following 
chapters. Prior to doing so, however, we turn to discuss the history of the far right 
in Belgium and Luxembourg. 
3.2. Belgium 
The history of the Belgian far right is deeply rooted in regionalism; indeed, it is 
difficult to understand the success of the Flemish radical right without taking into 
account this regional dimension. Far-right groupings in Flanders grew out of the 
‘Flemish movement’, which traces its roots to the early nineteenth century. 51F52 
During this time, Flemish was considered a peasant language; French was the key 
to upward mobility and an inability to speak it resulted in marginalisation from 
different aspects of social life including the education system and the military 
(Hossay 2002: 165; van Haute 2011: 202). This generated resentment among 
Dutch-speakers, particularly among Flemish soldiers who had fought under French 
 
52 The ‘Flemish movement’ (Vlaamse Beweging) is an umbrella term used to refer to different groups 
representing Flemish interests (Art 2008: 426). 
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command during World War I. Resentment gave way to outright antagonism 
towards the French-speaking hegemony, and ultimately led to the formation of the 
Front Party or Frontpartij in 1919 (Hossay 2002: 166; Ignazi 2003: 124). As the 
first party-political formation to represent Flemish interests, the Front Party fought 
for recognition of the Dutch language in both educational and administrative 
settings (Deschouwer 2012: 90).  
Although the Flemish movement was not originally dominated by a far-right 
ideology, it shifted rightwards in the early 1930s, when the Frontpartij was 
succeeded by the fascist, pro-Nazi Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (Flemish National 
Union or VNV), which collaborated with the Germans during World War II (Art 
2008: 427; Deschouwer 2012: 90; Ignazi 2003: 124). The political consequences of 
the German occupation for the Belgian radical right were different from those that 
emerged in the Netherlands because Flemish nationalism ‘was never completely 
uprooted’ during the war; indeed, it was to become a key ideological ingredient for 
the Flemish post-war radical right (van Holsteyn 2018a: 480). 
As Deschouwer (2012: 90) has pointed out, the Flemish movement’s 
collaborationist past complicated the recreation of an organised Flemish nationalist 
party after the war. In the immediate post-war period, Nazi collaborators were 
purged, and what was left of the Flemish movement was either absorbed or 
marginalised by the mainstream Christian right (Hossay 2002: 167). The 
marginalised factions soon regrouped by forming moderate and more radical 
nationalist splinter groups, including the anti-repression party Vlaamse 
Concentratie (Flemish Aggregation or VC), and the paramilitary Vlaamse Militante 
Orde (Order of Flemish Militants or VMO) (Art 2008: 427). The VC and the VMO 
recruited Flemish war collaborators who had been stripped of their political rights 
(the so-called incivieken), and actively lobbied for their amnesty (Ignazi 2003: 126). 
Yet, their efforts remained marginal; it was not until the creation of the Catholic 
Volksunie (People’s Union or VU) in 1954 that the Flemish movement started to 
regain political momentum. 
The VU was a democratic Flemish nationalist party that fought for increased 
autonomy and eventual independence of Flanders. Like its predecessors, the VU 
also pressed for social protection for and recognition of former Nazi collaborators, 
whom they saw as well-meaning (albeit misguided) patriots whose motives were 
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entirely fuelled by their desire for Flemish independence (Art 2008: 427). As a 
result, the VU attracted members of the Flemish extreme right (Swyngedouw 1998: 
60). Thus, although ‘the party initially drew its leaders from nationalist circles that 
had not collaborated with the Nazis, [it] nevertheless soon became the party of the 
“blacks” (former collaborators)’ (Art 2008: 427).  
By the early 1970s, the VU had become the third largest party in Flanders (van 
Haute 2011: 201). In the same decade, debates about the re-ordering of the Belgian 
state resulted in the signing of the Egmont Pact, an agreement calling for the 
federalisation of Belgium. The more radical factions within the VU saw the 
agreement as too great a compromise and rebelled against the party leadership 
(Swyngedouw 1998: 60). Following the VU’s signing of the Egmont Pact, there 
was a backlash from hardliners, which prompted the departure of several prominent 
leaders. This rupture paved the way for the foundation of a more radical, regionalist 
party: the Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc or VB) (Pauwels 2011c: 219). 
The VB was one of the strongest and earliest manifestations of a new generation of 
far-right parties in post-war Europe (Art 2008: 428; Deschouwer 2012: 91). 
Founded in 1978 by VU dissidents Karel Dillen and Lode Claes, the party initially 
recruited its members from a broad range of smaller Flemish nationalist 
organisations. While it was founded as an elitist, nationalist and regionalist (pro-
independence) party, the VB started to gravitate towards the populist radical right 
in the mid-1980s (De Cleen & Van Aelst 2017: 99; Pauwels 2011a: 61). Under the 
impetus of Filip Dewinter, immigration became an increasingly important topic on 
the VB’s agenda. By 1987, ‘anti-immigrant policies have overshadowed the party’s 
nationalist views […], together with other party concerns such as criminality, public 
safety, and political corruption’ (Swyngedouw 1998: 67). Besides a strong 
emphasis on law and order (i.e. authoritarianism), the VB’s ideology can be 
characterised by nativism, as illustrated by its 1987 slogan ‘Our country first!’ and 
its 2009 slogan ‘This is our country’ (Pauwels 2011a; 2011c). Over the years, the 
VB also became increasingly populist, as demonstrated by its claim to represent 
‘the common man in the street’ (ibid). 
The VB has held seats in the federal parliament since 1981. On 24 November 1991, 
Belgium made international headlines when the VB garnered over 10 percent of the 
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Flemish vote. That election day marked the beginning of a continuous electoral rise, 
which peaked in 2004 when the VB won nearly a quarter of the vote (24 percent) 
in the Flemish parliamentary elections (Deschouwer 2012: 96). In the 2007 federal 
election, the VB witnessed its first setback when its regional vote share shrank to 
19 percent and support for the party subsequently ebbed (Pauwels 2011a). In the 
2014 federal elections, the VB’s share of the vote fell further to just under 8 percent. 
While the VB has been systematically excluded from power by means of a political 
cordon sanitaire (see Chapter 4), it has arguably been successful in influencing the 
rhetoric and programmes of other parties. In the words of VB party chairman Tom 
Van Grieken, ‘We have never held political power, but we have had a lot of 
influence.’52 F53 
The development of right-wing populist movements in Flanders contrasts starkly 
with Wallonia, which has never produced a regionalist or nationalist pro-
independence equivalent to the Flemish movement. While nationalism was the 
main driving force behind the proliferation of far-right movements in Wallonia in 
the early twentieth century, these groupings were primarily motivated by Belgian 
nationalism as opposed to Walloon independence (Ignazi 2003: 125). The interwar 
period saw the creation of various patriotic and nationalist leagues, including the 
predominantly French-speaking Rexist Party, or simply Rex, which was named 
after the Roman Catholic publishing company ‘Christus Rex’ (Latin for ‘Christ the 
King’). Founded by a former member of the Catholic party, Leon Degrelle, Rex 
became the fourth biggest party in Belgium in the 1936 general election by 
garnering 11.5 percent of the vote (Delwit 2011: 236). However, counter-
mobilisation on the Left and, above all, opposition from the Catholic Church, forced 
the Rexists into retreat; in the 1939 general election, the party was nearly 
annihilated. 
The outbreak of WWII reinvigorated the Belgian extreme right. Under the Nazi 
occupation, the remnants of Degrelle’s party collaborated with the Germans and 
even sent a special Walloon legion to support the Germans on the Eastern Front 
(Delwit 2011: 236). Just like their Flemish counterparts, Walloon collaborators 
were purged in the aftermath of the war: nearly 350,000 cases of collaboration were 
 




adjudicated, resulting in over 1000 death sentences, thereby leaving ‘deep wounds 
in Belgian society’ (Ignazi 2003: 125). Degrelle fled into exile, and extreme right 
manifestations remained very rare in Wallonia until the 1970s. 
The economic crisis of the 1970s and debates about the restructuring of the Belgian 
state created fertile ground for the formation of semi-populist and extremist 
movements, including a neo-fascist Youth Movement (Front de la Jeunesse or 
FDJ), the Poujadist-oriented Democratic Labour Union (Union Démocratique du 
Travail or UDRT), as well as the regionalist Walloon Rally (Rassemblement Wallon 
or RW). Although these eclectic movements ‘bordered on rather than belonged to 
the extreme right’, they introduced various issues that helped pave the way for the 
emergence of far-right parties in the following decades (Ignazi 2003: 127).  
The 1970s and 80s saw the creation of various right-wing extremist movements, 
notably the Party of New Forces (Parti des Forces Nouvelles or PFN) in 1975, and, 
above all, the Belgian National Front (Front National or FNb) in 1985. Founded by 
Daniel Féret, a former member of the FDJ and URDT, the FNb sought to present 
itself as a ‘respectable’ party by distancing itself from neo-fascist groupings, such 
as the PFN (Delwit 2011: 236). Modelled after its French namesake, the FNb tried 
to ride on the coat-tails of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s movement in neighbouring France. 
The party was staunchly anti-immigrant and shared many other similarities with 
both the French FN and the Flemish VB (Hossay 2002: 160). For instance, the FNb 
advocated law and order, and portrayed itself as ‘the true voice of the people’ 
(Delwit 2011: 242). Despite some moderate electoral success in the early 1990s, 
the FNb was never able to gain ground: the party’s share of (federal) votes peaked 
at 2.3 percent in the 1995 general election (Deschouwer 2012: 133). In the 
following decade, the FNb succumbed to infighting and was dissolved in 2012, after 
having been taken to court by France’s Marine Le Pen for copying her party’s name 
and logo (RTBF 2012; see also de Jonge 2017). 
Some issues on the FNb’s agenda were taken over by the Parti Populaire (People’s 
Party or PP). Founded in 2009 by Rudy Aernoudt and Mischaël Modrikamen, the 
PP was conceived as an ultra-liberal right-wing party. Aernoudt and Modrikamen 
were not entirely new to the world of politics; Aernoudt had previously acted as 
Head of Cabinet for several liberal ministers (in both Wallonia and Flanders), and 
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Modrikamen was one of the lawyers representing small shareholders against the 
Fortis Group in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. In 2010, Aernoudt left 
the PP following a personal clash with Modrikamen. The party subsequently shifted 
to the populist radical right. Sometimes referred to as the ‘Belgian Donald Trump’, 
Modrikamen gained international prominence as a vocal Trump supporter and 
outspoken critic of Muslim immigration. The PP places a strong emphasis on law 
and order and advocates the closure of Belgian borders to non-European immigrants 
(Parti Populaire 2017). The party manifesto of 2017 states that ‘[t]he Belgian is 
open to the other. But he does not want to become a minority in his own country 
[…]. The Belgian is certainly generous, and we will help real refugees […] but not 
by welcoming them to Europe because of terrorist risks and often irreconcilable 
cultural differences’ (Parti Populaire 2017: 2). The party can also be classified as 
populist, as illustrated by various claims to defend ‘the common people’ against the 
‘so-called elites’, as well as its outspoken rejection of political correctness (Parti 
Populaire 2017: 1). 
According to Modrikamen, the PP is best described as a ‘disruptive movement’ 
(mouvement de rupture) and a ‘citizens movement’. When asked to compare his 
party to similar movements elsewhere, he stressed that the party had its own DNA, 
but then proceeded to list a broad range of nationalist-conservative parties that he 
could identify with, including UKIP, the FN, the Belgian N-VA, the FPÖ, the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP), as well as the Hungarian Fidesz party, led by Viktor Orbán.53F54 
In 2017, Modrikamen set up The Movement, a platform intended to unite European 
far-right leaders. In October 2018, he made international headlines following his 
announcement to cooperate with former White House strategist Steve Bannon by 
transforming The Movement into a foundation to support likeminded right-wing 
groupings across Europe in the run-up to the 2019 European elections (POLITICO 
2018a). As a result, Modrikamen was named among the POLITICO 28, a list of 
people who are expected to be ‘shaping, shaking and stirring Europe’ in 2019 
(POLITICO 2018b). Modrikamen maintains close ties to other right-wing 
populists, including former UKIP leader Nigel Farage, and in the past, he provided 
 
54 Interview with Mischaël Modrikamen on 10 May 2017 in Brussels. 
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legal advice for the Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe (ADDE), a now-
defunct Eurosceptic group in the European Parliament. 54F55 
Although Modrikamen is relatively well-known internationally and his party is 
arguably much better organised and more professional than the FNb, the PP has not 
(yet) managed to break through electorally, despite minor successes at the local 
level. Since 2010, the PP has held one seat in the Belgian federal Parliament; in 
2010, the party won 1.3 percent of the vote, and in 2014, its vote share increased 
marginally to 1.5 percent. Thus, since the 1980s, the VB has consistently 
outperformed its Walloon counterparts (see Table 3). How do we account for this 
asymmetrical electoral performance? The following section draws on demand- and 
supply-side explanations in order to shed light on the different electoral trajectories 
of right-wing populist movements in Belgium. 
Table 3 – Far-Right Parties in Belgian Federal Elections (1978-2014) 
 Flanders Wallonia 
 Vlaams Blok / Belang Front National Belge Parti Populaire 
 Regional Federal Regional Federal Regional Federal 
1978 2.0 1.4 - - - - 
1981 1.8 1.1 - - - - 
1985 2.2 1.4 ♣ 0.1 - - 
1987 3.0 1.9 ♣ 0.1 - - 
1991 10.3 6.6 1.7 1.1 - - 
1995 12.2 7.8 5.5 2.3 - - 
1999 15.3 9.9 4.1 1.5 - - 
2003 18.2 11.6 5.6 2.0 - - 
2007 19 12 5.6 2.0 - - 
2010 12.6 7.8 1.4 0.5 3.4 1.3 




Belgian Interior Ministry (2019) 
Notes: 1) The table shows regional electoral results obtained during federal elections. Since 
Belgium has a confederal party model, these results are most relevant here. 
2) ♣ = data unavailable; - = party did not compete. 
 
3.2.1. Demand-Side Explanations 
Whilst macro-level demand-side explanations help set the scene for the rise of right-
wing populism in Western Europe, they are not particularly helpful in solving the 
Belgian puzzle; after all, these broad changes in the international environment such 





immigration rates have historically been higher in Wallonia than in Flanders (Coffé 
2005). When the VB first became successful in the early 1990s, just 4 percent of 
the Flemish population was made up of immigrants, compared to 12 percent in 
Wallonia (Hossay 2002: 161). By January 2018, the percentage of foreigners living 
in Wallonia still exceeded the percentage of foreign residents in Flanders; 11.3 
percent of the Walloon population was made up of non-nationals, compared to 9.5 
percent in Flanders (Statbel 2018a). In addition, the percentage of foreigners 
originating from countries that are particularly prone to being targeted as scapegoats 
by the far right (notably Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb countries and 
Turkey) does not vary significantly between the two regions (see Coffé 2005; 2008: 
182). Socio-economic predictors are also inadequate for explaining the variation in 
the electoral performance of the populist radical right in Belgium. Flanders 
possesses a thriving economy, with low levels of unemployment, whereas the 
francophone south is still recovering from industrial decline (Coffé 2008: 180; 
Hossay 2002: 162). According to the 2017 Labour Force Survey, the unemployment 
rate in Flanders was 4.4 percent, compared to 9.8 percent in Wallonia (Statbel 
2018b). 
At the micro-level of analysis, it appears that Walloon voters do not have a 
fundamentally different outlook on socio-economic or political topics (Billiet et al. 
2006). Past studies have shown that Walloons are not more tolerant towards 
immigrants than the Flemings (Coffé 2005). Using data from the Belgian post-
election surveys collected by ISPO (the Belgian Institute of Social and Political 
Research), Billiet et al. (2015: 100) found that regional differences in views on 
immigrants are minimal, and that Walloon voters are, in fact, generally more 
Islamophobic than the Flemings, thereby showing that the ‘stereotype of the racist 
Flemish and the tolerant Walloons has clearly been disproven.’ These findings are 
in line with previous public opinion research, which revealed that Flemish and 
Walloon voters hold very similar views on social issues and the state of democracy 
(e.g. Coffé 2005; Deschouwer et al. 2012). According to electoral panel survey data 
gathered by the PartiRep research team in the run-up to and aftermath of the 2014 
Belgian elections (European, federal and regional), 64 percent of Flemish 
respondents and 70 percent of Walloons listed topics related to the economy (i.e. 
the economy and job prospects) when asked which issues they considered most 
important in determining their vote. Just 6.2 percent of Flemish respondents chose 
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immigration, comparable to the 6.9 percent of Walloons (Deschouwer et al. 2015: 
160). Levels of trust in democracy and political institutions also seem remarkably 
similar in both regions (Henry et al. 2015). 
Demand-side explanations are thus not very useful when seeking to explain the 
asymmetrical success of right-wing populist parties in Belgium. In fact, many of 
the conventional demand-side theories would lead us to expect popular appetite for 
the populist radical right to be stronger in Wallonia than in Flanders (Hossay 2002: 
160), as the reservoir for potential far right voters is actually larger in Wallonia 
(Coffé 2005: 81). The following subsection therefore looks at supply-side 
explanations. 
3.2.2. Supply-Side Explanations 
The External Supply Side 
Given that the formal institutional setup does not vary much across regions in 
Belgium, this variable is not particularly helpful for resolving the Belgian puzzle. 
Indeed, the same voting system applies in Flanders and Wallonia, where regional 
and federal parliaments are elected based on proportional representation. However, 
since Flanders is more populous than Wallonia, the district magnitude – i.e. the 
number of legislative seats assigned to a given district – for Walloon provinces 
tends to be slightly smaller (Deschouwer 2012: 114). As a result, although the 
Belgian electoral system is known to be very proportional, the degree of 
proportionality is marginally lower for elections in Wallonia (Deschouwer 2012: 
128), which makes it more difficult for new parties to enter the political arena. 
Focusing on informal institutions is much more useful for understanding the 
variation in the electoral trajectories of the populist radical right in Belgium. In 
particular the existence of a strong, nationalist subculture enabled the Flemish far 
right to draw on pre-existing resources. David Art (2011) has shown that the VB 
benefitted tremendously from the existence of a nationalist subculture. The VB was 
able to build on a nationalist campaign that had been in the making for nearly a 
century (Hossay 2002: 164). The repression of Flemish nationalism in the 
immediate aftermath of WWII contributed to strengthening the spirit of former 
Nazi-collaborators and led to the creation of very dense social networks (Art 2011: 
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110). As a result, within the Flemish movement, nationalism was generally seen in 
a positive light, which enabled far-right groupings to gain legitimacy. 
This contrasts starkly with Wallonia, which never produced a regionalist or 
nationalist pro-independence movement equivalent of the Flemish one. According 
to Hossay (2002: 164), ‘the radical right in Francophone Belgium [has been] unable 
to exploit either a Belgian or a specifically Walloon sense of national identity.’ 
Given their status as ruling minority in Belgium, there was simply no need for 
Walloons to fight for francophone interests, ‘and in fact Belgian nationalism was a 
much stronger force in the region than [Walloon] nationalism ever was’ (Art 2008: 
429). In addition, due to the collaborationist past of the Flemish movement, 
nationalism gained a very negative reputation in Wallonia. Because the Flemish far 
right had been tainted by fascism, the Walloons distanced themselves from it. To 
some extent, nationalism in Wallonia developed as a mirror image to its Flemish 
counterpart: whereas the Flemish far right was an extension of collaborationist 
groupings, the few Walloon nationalist movements that emerged in the post-war 
era grew out of wartime resistance groups (Hossay 2002: 168). Thus, while Flemish 
nationalism became a cause of the Right, Walloon nationalism (to the extent that it 
ever really existed) was absorbed by the Left (ibid). 55F56  
In sum, ‘[i]f the Flemish radical right was consolidated in a nationalist political 
home, the radical right in Wallonia was fragmented for lack of one’ (Hossay 2002: 
170). The extent to which Belgian far-right movements could draw on pre-existing 
networks also helps explain why Flemish far-right movements were much better 
organised than their Walloon counterparts. This leads us to consider internal 
supply-side explanations. 
The Internal Supply Side 
Due to its long history, the Flemish far right was able to draw on an elaborate 
network, which allowed it to excel at organisational tasks (Art 2008; Coffé 2005). 
Indeed, the Flemish movement provided ideological as well as organisational 
coherence for the Flemish far right (Hossay 2002: 184). The VB never significantly 
suffered from factionalism – at least not to the same extent as other radical right 
parties – because its members were socialised within the same nationalist subculture 
 
56 For instance, the Rassemblement Wallon was eventually absorbed by the Parti Socialists (PS). 
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(Art 2011: 114). According to Pauwels (2011a: 68), ‘even opponents of the party 
would agree that the VB is among the best-structured populist radical right parties 
of Europe. […] The party has a well-developed youth organization, a large and 
stable membership, and many local branches all over Flanders.’ From its early days, 
the VB drew much of its support through its local branches. The party’s ‘grass 
roots’ involvement in local organisations enabled it to build support from the 
bottom up (Swyngedouw 1998: 68). As a result, unlike most other parties in Europe, 
the VB managed to increase its membership well into the twenty-first century (van 
Holsteyn 2018a: 490). 
The VB’s organisational strength can partly be attributed to the fact that the party 
has always managed to attract very capable leaders, most of whom are recruited and 
socialised through the numerous organisations linked to the Flemish movement 
(e.g. VU; VMO; Were Di…). As Swyngedouw 1998: 61) has observed, ‘[n]early 
all of the VB’s founders, officers, and elected representatives were former members 
of one or more of these organizations or were trained by them.’ Filip Dewinter is a 
case in point. From an early age, he was actively involved in various Flemish 
nationalist organisations, such as the Nationalist Student Movement 
(Nationalistische Studentenvereniging or NSV). This experience taught him to 
bring the VB’s message across and build an effective party infrastructure (see 
Mudde 2007: 264).  
This contrasts sharply with the Walloon situation, where far-right movements were 
often amateurish, violent, and lacked any sense of direction or leadership, which 
usually resulted in factionalism. The Belgian Front National is a case in point. 
Unlike the VB, the FNb never managed to set up a working party apparatus as it 
lacked both resources and ideological coherence (Delwit 2011: 238). During 
interviews with Belgian politicians, Art (2011: 64) found that the FNb was 
generally perceived as a party of ‘poor souls’ or a ‘bunch of lunatics’. Crucially, 
current and former party members interviewed at the time were similarly critical 
when describing the credibility and organisational strength of their own party (Art 
2011). 
Thus, while demand for right-wing populist parties seems relatively constant across 
Belgium, the supply of such parties has been weaker in the francophone south. Yet, 
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while the organisational argument can account for some of the success of the VB 
(notably the party’s electoral persistence), it fails to fully explain why far-right 
parties never managed to break through in Wallonia. This is for two reasons. First, 
organisational skills do not automatically translate into electoral success. One might 
argue, for instance, that the VB had strong organisational capacity long before its 
initial electoral breakthrough (Art 2008: 422). Second, in comparison to the FNb, 
the PP appears much better organised; yet, it has failed to gain political clout. 56F57 As 
shown in the following chapters, the variation in the electoral performances of the 
populist radical right in Belgium is best understood by taking into account the role 
of mainstream parties and the media. Prior to doing so, however, we now turn to 
Luxembourg. 
3.3. Luxembourg 
As in Belgium and the Netherlands, the German invasion during WWII left a lasting 
mark on the Grand Duchy. According to the Luxembourgish historian Gilbert 
Trausch (2005), the Nazi occupation constitutes by far the most painful episode in 
Luxembourg’s history. In the collective memory, extreme-right movements and 
National Socialism have become conflated, and Luxembourgish right-wing 
extremists were often exclusively associated with the so-called ‘Gielemännecher’ 
or ‘yellow men’ collaborators of the Nazi regime in the 1940s (Trausch 2005: 20-
1).57F58 However, as in other countries, extreme-right currents existed both among 
collaborators, who were attracted to fascism, as well as resistance militants, to 
whom the German invasion posed a threat to Luxembourgish identity (Blau 2005). 
In the aftermath of the war, blatant antisemitism gave way to latent fears of 
Überfremdung. These fears were primarily driven by the rapid influx of immigrants 
(see Figure 2). With its long history of migration and its highly internationalised 
labour market, Luxembourg can be characterised as an immigration country par 
excellence. Yet, while the country has been lauded as ‘an immigration success 
story’ (Fetzer 2011), it would be inappropriate to assume that Luxembourg has 
 
57 Since 2015, the party appears to have kept factionalism at bay. For an overview of departures 
from the PP, see Demelenne (2018). 
58 Because of the colour of their uniforms, the Luxembourgish population referred to the Nazi 
occupiers as Gielemännecher, which is the Luxembourgish term for yellowhammer (i.e. a small, 
yellow bird). The term literally translates into ‘small yellow men’, and later became associated with 
Luxembourgish collaborators. The collaboration long constituted a taboo topic in Luxembourg (see 
Artuso 2013; Majerus 2002). 
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always been particularly welcoming to immigrants. In fact, given the size of the 
country, the perceived threat imposed by mass immigration is a recurring theme in 
the history of the Luxembourgish far right (Blau 2005: 31). 
The industrial revolution and the growth of the steel industry in the 19th century 
transformed the southern edges of the Grand Duchy into a regional hub. Because 
the indigenous workforce was insufficient to meet the demand, employers started 
recruiting foreign workers. The first wave of immigrants hailed from Germany and 
other neighbouring countries, followed by a second wave of Italian workers during 
the early industrial period (Fetzer 2011: 5; Willems & Milmeister 2008). After 
WWII, the proportion of foreigners started to rise sharply (Fetzer 2011; Scuto 
2012). 
Figure 2 – Proportion of Foreign Population in Luxembourg 
 
Source: Statec 2018b 
 
During the 1960s, Italian immigrants were no longer able to fill the chronic labour 
shortage. As a result, the Luxembourgish government started to actively recruit 
Portuguese workers, thereby marking the beginning of the third major wave of 
immigration (Fetzer 2011: 7). 58F59 The rising number of immigrants sparked fears of 
 
59 Luxembourgish immigration officials were actively recruiting immigrants that were culturally and 
ethnically homogenous to the local population; officials felt that Italians and Portuguese workers 
would easily integrate because they were white, European and Catholic (Fetzer 2011: 8-9). It was 
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Überfremdung among small sections of the local population, which, in turn, led to 
the formation of several nationalist and far-right groupings. Many of these 
movements grew out of associations that advocated the preservation of the 
Luxembourgish language. 59F60 Founded in 1971, the Actioun Lëtzebuergesch (Action 
Luxembourgish or AL) aimed ‘to stand up for everything that is Luxembourgish – 
particularly for our language’ (quoted in Blau 2005: 519). Although the 
organisation was set up to be apolitical, it soon attracted far-right sympathisers and 
activists.  
In 1984, two AL members (Emile Schmit and Charles Malané) launched a petition 
to protest against the introduction of voting rights for foreign residents in order to 
‘protect and preserve’ the Luxembourgish language and identity from being 
‘submerged’ by Portuguese immigrants:  
Because already now [in 1984], the percentage of foreigners is at 26 percent, 
and there are already communes where non-Luxembourgers make up a 
majority. If we agreed to give political rights to those people, we would 
totally abandon the ‘steering wheel’ [gouvernail] and it would be them who 
would decide the direction. This would be the beginning of the end (quoted 
in Blau 2005: 519). 
When other committee members of the AL refused to sign the petition, Schmit and 
Malané left the group in order to found the Fédératioun Eist Land – Eis Sprooch 
(‘Federation Our Country – Our Language’ or FELES). FELES was set up with the 
aim of ‘preserving Luxembourg for the Luxembourgers’ (Blau 2005: 522). While 
FELES was neither blatantly racist nor antisemitic, the organisation clearly rejected 
multiculturalism (Spirinelli 2012: 14). Above all, FELES was staunchly opposed to 
enfranchising foreign residents. The organisation also voiced concern over the rapid 
economic and demographic growth of the country. This concern was eventually 
aligned with environmental issues. In a newspaper article, Pierre Peters, who had 
joined FELES in 1986, wrote the following: 
It is only with the help of a mass of foreigners that Luxembourg can 
maintain its economic growth. […] For Luxembourg as a nation and a 
people, the consequences are catastrophic. Our beautiful country is losing 
its beauty, our people [Vollék] is losing its quality of life and territory 
 
Kosovo and Bosnia) that immigration started to diversify (Fetzer 2011: 7; Willems & Milmeister 
2008: 67). 
60 Luxembourgish was long considered a German dialect and was only recognised as an official 




[Liewensraum]. Sooner or later, our home [Hémecht] will be degraded to a 
European metropolis, where foreigners are in charge (quoted in Blau 2005: 
540). 
Following some internal tensions within FELES, this eco-nationalism gave rise to 
two other far-right movements including the Gréng National Bewegung (Green 
National Movement, which would later become the National Movement or NB) and 
the Éislecker Fräiheetsbewegung (Oesling Freedom Movement or EFB). 60F61 The NB 
was founded in 1987 by four FELES members in the southern town of Tétange. The 
aim of the movement was to ensure that ‘voting rights are exclusively reserved for 
Luxembourgers’, because ‘Luxembourg should no longer be politically oppressed, 
and no Luxembourger should have to feel foreign in his own country’ (quoted in 
Blau 2005: 555).  
In the same year, the EFB was founded in the north of Luxembourg. The ideology 
of the EFB was identical to that of the NB; however, the EFB placed particular 
emphasis on agrarian themes (Blau 2005: 556), which were considered particularly 
relevant in the rural north of the country: ‘We are particularly committed to rescuing 
our peasantry, because without it, neither our culture nor our environment would 
stand a chance to survive. We are also opposed to any agricultural policy that 
threatens the survival of the Luxembourgish family farm’ (quoted in Blau 2005: 
557). In addition, the EFB made frequent references to the resistance movement 
during WWII, thereby implying that Luxembourg was again at great risk of 
succumbing to foreign domination due to immigration and European integration 
(Blau 2005: 564).  
The NB and the EFB sought to present themselves as alternatives to the 
establishment politicians and pressed for the increased usage of referendums by 
referring to the Swiss model (Blau 2005: 566-7). The NB also warned against the 
‘Islamisation’ of Luxembourg. According to Blau (2005: 584), the ways in which 
the NB wrote about Islam resembled articles written by Luxembourgish antisemites 
during the interwar period: ‘the NB simply replaced the word “Jew” with 
“Muslim”.’  
 
61 Oesling (or Éisleck) is the name of Luxembourg’s rural northern region. 
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Neither the EFB nor the NB managed to break through electorally. As a result, the 
EFB ceased to exist in 1991. The NB participated in the 1989 and 1994 general 
elections but was dissolved in 1995, after gaining 2.3 and 2.6 percent of the votes 
(see Blau 2005: 603ff). Since the 1990s, the Luxembourgish extreme right has been 
dominated by solitary actors, notably the former NB figurehead Pierre Peters. 61F62 
Peters, who maintained ties to the extremist and misnamed German National 
Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands or NPD), has 
repeatedly been condemned for incitement to hatred. In 2016, he was convicted for 
incitement to hatred after having distributed leaflets, which proclaimed that ‘[t]here 
is absolutely no doubt that the destruction of our country is due to the mass of 
foreigners […]. They simply need too much (housing, electricity, drinking water, 
roads, schools, infrastructure, etc.) and in return produce a lot of waste’ (quoted in 
Le Quotidien 2016). 
In the Luxembourgish partisan arena, far-right groupings have remained largely 
absent. Indeed, Luxembourg does not have an electorally significant far-right 
equivalent to the Dutch PVV or the Belgian VB. However, the Alternative 
Democratic Reform Party (Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei or ADR) can be 
located on the right end of the Grand Duchy’s political spectrum and is sometimes 
described as ‘the soft version of right-wing populism’ (Blau 2005: 89). While the 
party describes itself as ‘a populist party that is neither right nor left’ (Dumont et 
al. 2011: 1059), media commentators routinely categorise the ADR as a populist 
radical right party (e.g. Die Zeit 2015). This conceptualisation is not entirely 
accurate. First, although there is some evidence of people-centrism in the ADR’s 
discourse, there is little evidence of anti-elitism. Second, while the ADR is clearly 
nationalist, it is not openly xenophobic. Furthermore, unlike most (if not all) right-
wing populist parties, the ADR is not diametrically opposed to immigration. In the 
Luxembourgish context, such a policy position would be unthinkable given that 
over 70 percent of the workforce is composed of non-nationals, including foreign 
residents and cross-border workers (Statec 2018a). However, the ADR is 
undoubtedly the main political party in Luxembourg most critical towards 
immigration (Fetzer 2011: 15) as demonstrated by the party’s promotion of 
 
62 The Luxembourgish blogger and leftist activist Maxime Weber closely monitors contemporary 
developments in the extreme right scene in the Grand Duchy (see Weber 2018). 
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restrictive citizenship laws (ADR 2013b), its advocacy of immigrants’ greater use 
of the Luxembourgish language (ADR 2014) and its opposition to granting non-
national residents the right to vote in legislative elections (ADR 2015a). 62 F63 
According to Fernand Kartheiser, who joined the party in 2008 and has held a seat 
in parliament since 2009, the ADR is best described as ‘socially-conservative’:  
Out of the established parties in our party system, we are the ones that can 
be located furthest to the right – I think there’s no doubt about that. Although 
in a more detailed analysis, I would say that on some social questions, we 
are more left-wing than others. But in broad terms – this is a simplification 
– if I list some topics including identity, patriotism, positions on Europe and 
so on, ethical questions such as abortion, gay marriage etc. […], if you look 
at these factors, we are clearly a conservative party. Perhaps even more 
conservative in some matters than our British colleagues. 63F64 
In a follow-up email exchange in April 2019, however, Kartheiser explained that 
this characterisation was no longer accurate since the formation of Déi Konservativ 
(The Conservatives) by former ADR-member Joe Thein in March 2017. After being 
expelled from the ADR following a disciplinary procedure over a controversial 
‘Like’ on Facebook (explained below), Thein founded his own party for ‘more 
democracy and freedom for Luxembourg’ (Déi Konservativ 2019). According to 
Kartheiser, the party is more right-wing than the ADR given its nationalist and 
Eurosceptic outlook. 64F65 
When asked to compare his party to similar movements elsewhere, Kartheiser 
insisted upon having had no contact whatsoever with right-wing populist 
movements abroad. 65F66 According to his colleague and long-term ADR-MP Gast 
Gibéryen, the ADR thematises topics that other parties avoid, including the 
preservation of Luxembourg’s national language and identity, but ‘we always do so 
in a responsible manner. […] Some may call that populism – although I’m not really 
sure what that is, but you have to explain things to people so that they can 
 
63 It is notable that the website of the ADR is almost exclusively available in Luxembourgish, 
whereas most other parties (also) publish their material in German and/or French. 
64 Interview with Fernand Kartheiser on 21 September 2016 in Luxembourg City. 
65 In the general election held in October 2018, Déi Konservativ ran with a list only in the southern 
electoral district, and it obtained 0.52 percent of the vote. Given the party’s marginal position, it will 
not be discussed further in this thesis. 
66 Since 2010, the ADR is a member of the Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe 
Group or ACRE (previously known as AECR or the Alliances of European Conservatives and 
Reformists). The decision to join ACRE was partly driven by the ADR’s attempt to distance itself 
from other far-right groupings in Europe (Luxemburger Wort 2014). 
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understand them. Otherwise you cannot mobilise them. And that’s what we do with 
regards to these topics: we speak a clear language.’ 66F67 
As Fetzer (2011: 15) has observed, the ADR’s rhetoric and preferred policies are 
moderate and can hardly be compared to those of far-right parties in surrounding 
countries. Furthermore, the ADR was not conceived as a right-wing party, but only 
shifted in that direction in the early 2000s. Indeed, the party originated as the 
‘Action Committee 5/6th - Pensions for Everyone’ (Aktiounskomitee 5/6 Pensioun 
fir jiddfereen), which was founded in 1987 as a single-issue party with the aim of 
overhauling the Luxembourgish state pension system (Hirsch 1995: 418).67F68 The 
movement gained momentum when other organisations joined, such as the Free 
Luxembourgish Farmers’ Association (Fräie Lëtzerbuerger Baureverband or FLB) 
and the Free Winegrowers (Fräi Wënzer) (ADR 2012: 24). In their first appearance 
in the 1989 general election, the Action Committee came in fourth (with 7.3 percent 
of the vote), thereby winning four out of sixty seats in the Luxembourgish Chamber 
of Deputies (ADR 2012: 39). Before the 1994 elections, the party expanded its 
political agenda and changed its name to ‘Action Committee for Democracy and 
Equitable Pensions’ (Aktiounskomitee fir Demokratie a Rentegerechtegkeet or 
ADR) (Hirsch 1995: 418). The ADR’s success continued, peaking at the 1999 
elections, during which the party was able to gain seven parliamentary seats by 
winning 11.31 percent of the votes (ADR 2012: 44). 
Given that an overhaul of the pension system had been the party’s single most 
important goal, the ADR lost some of its appeal when a pension reform was 
introduced in the 1999-2004 legislative term. In 2006, the ADR underwent a period 
of reorganisation, culminating in another name change, this time from ‘Action 
Committee for Democracy and Equitable Pensions’ to ‘Alternative Democratic 
Reform Party’. Internal tensions persisted for years, most notably between the 
party’s liberal and conservative wings (Dumont et al. 2012).  
The ADR has repeatedly attracted attention with its confrontational, polemical 
stance in parliamentary debates. Although the party is not openly xenophobic, it is 
clearly nationalist, as illustrated by its activism in 2006 to replace the traditional 
 
67 Interview with Gast Gibéryen on 22 September 2016 in Luxembourg City. 
68 The Action Committee 5/6th aimed at granting all citizens access to the pension scheme of civil 
servants (Hirsch 1995). 
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red-white-blue flag with the country’s national emblem, the Red Lion (so as to 
avoid confusion with the Dutch flag), and its staunch opposition to dual citizenship 
in 2008. In its party platform for the 2004 legislative elections, the ADR agreed to 
‘modest, manageable immigration as long as it does not overexert our integration 
capacity’ (ADR 2004: 36). While the party acknowledged that, without 
immigration, ‘our country could not have become what it is today’, it also warned 
about the ‘misuse of the right to asylum by economic refugees’ and ‘so much 
diversity in such a confined space’, and therefore advocated a migration policy that 
‘preserves our national uniqueness’ by maintaining that immigrants must learn ‘our 
language, our history, our culture [and] our traditions’ to avoid the formation of 
ethno-social ghettos (ADR 2004: 35). Similarly, in its party platform for the 2013 
legislative elections, the ADR stated that, ‘Luxembourgers must not become 
second-class citizens in their own country’; while legal foreigners should be granted 
access to social entitlements, the ADR opposes the exploitation of social services 
as well as any form of ‘social tourism’ (ADR 2013a: 141).  
The ADR was also the main voice of opposition to granting voting rights to foreign 
residents (i.e. the so-called Auslännerwahlrecht) in the 2015 referendum (see 
Figure 3).68F69 Under the proposal put forward by three governing parties at the time 
(i.e. Liberals, Social Democrats and Greens), non-citizens would have become 
eligible to participate in legislative elections – provided they had resided in the 
country for at least ten years and previously participated in either communal or 
European elections (Luxemburger Wort 2015b).69F70  
 
69 While the Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) also opposed the Auslännerwahlrecht, its 
campaign slogan was comparatively ambiguous, as it did not explicitly say ‘No’ but instead urged 
voters to inform themselves before making a decision (see CSV 2015; de Jonge & Petry 2019). 
70 The governing parties suffered a serious blow in the 2015 referendum when all three government 
proposals were rejected by a landslide: 78 percent of the Luxembourgish electorate said ‘No’ to the 
Auslännerwahlrecht, 80.87 percent said ‘No’ to granting people between the age of sixteen and 
eighteen the right to participate in elections, and 69.93 percent said ‘No’ to imposing a ten-year term 





The ADR rejected the proposal, arguing that ‘the pseudo-referendum […] provokes 
xenophobia’ and that ‘[w]e don’t need a better image […]. The Auslännerwahlrecht 
would not improve our image anyways. With such an initiative, which other 
countries do not even consider, everybody would shake their heads at us’ (ADR 
2015a). During their ‘No’ campaign leading up to the 2015 referendum, the party 
relied heavily on emotional arguments by evoking feelings of Überfremdung and 
by warning voters that the introduction of the Auslännerwahlrecht could indicate 
that Luxembourgish voters might soon become a minority in their own country, 
thereby risking being outvoted by foreign residents (ADR 2015b). 70F71 
In the 2018 general election, the ADR joined forces with the Wee2050 (‘Way’ or 
‘Path’ 2050), a grassroots movement that gained national prominence in the run-up 
to the 2015 referendum. Formerly known as Nee2015 (i.e. ‘No2015’), the 
movement was launched by two Luxembourgish citizens, Fred Keup and Steve 
Kodesch, who started a website to persuade voters to say ‘No’ to the 
Auslännerwahlrecht (Keup & Kodesch, 2015; see also Petry, 2016: 65-67). Similar 
to the position of the ADR, the arguments of the Nee2015 movement were built on 
the premise that voting rights for national elections should be reserved for 
 
71 This claim was unfounded: According to a report published by Luxembourg’s official statistics 
agency, as of January 2015, a maximum of 105,000 foreign residents would meet the requirements 
to participate in legislative elections (provided they would all sign up for local elections first), 
compared to 245,092 nationals (Allegrezza et al. 2015). If foreign voters fulfilling these prerequisites 
had been allowed to participate in the 2018 legislative elections, they would have accounted for at 
most 27.6 percent of the votes (ibid). 
Source: Photograph taken by the author in Steinsel (Luxembourg) in June 2015. 
Figure 3 – Campaign Posters for the 2015 Referendum - ADR says ‘No’ (‘Nee’) 
117 
 
Luxembourgish nationals. They argued that, by extending voting rights to non-
nationals, Luxembourgers would ‘give up their own sovereignty’, which could be 
‘the beginning of the end of “our” nation’ as it would lead to ‘the increasing 
disappearance of “our” language’ (Keup & Kodesch 2015).  
The website attracted thousands of supporters via social media and eventually 
became the main voice of opposition to the Auslännerwahlrecht. Fred Keup, who 
was the spokesperson of the movement, soon became the figurehead of the ‘No 
camp’. A geography teacher by profession, Keup consistently presented himself as 
‘the voice of the ordinary Luxembourgish people’ (Woxx 2016). In the run-up to 
the 2015 referendum, he launched a social media campaign, wrote letters to 
newspapers, distributed leaflets and participated in various public debates. The 
Nee2015 movement played an influential role in the outcome of the referendum. 
After the referendum, the movement changed its name to Wee2050, and in March 
2018, the ADR announced that it would form a strategic alliance with the movement 
by reserving eight of the sixty places on its electoral list for Fred Keup and his team 
(Tageblatt 2018). The electoral campaign was dominated by nationalist themes, 
including concerns over rapid population growth and related fears over the alleged 
demise of the Luxembourgish language and identity. In the end, six members of the 
Wee2050 movement stood as candidates on the ADR list in the 2018 general 
election (Luxemburger Wort 2018a). However, none of them were elected. 
Nonetheless, the ADR managed to increase its overall vote share by 1.64 percent to 
8.28 percent total, which resulted in one additional parliamentary seat (to four seats 
total). Since the turn of the twenty-first century, electoral support for the ADR has 
fluctuated between 9.95 percent in 2004 and 6.64 percent in 2013. While the party 
has held seats in the Luxembourgish Chamber of Deputies since 1989, it has never 
held any governmental positions. Due to the party’s marginal stance as well as its 
comparatively moderate rhetoric, it seems fair to say that right-wing populist 
movements have not been very successful in the Grand Duchy. According to Fetzer 
(2011: 13), ‘[o]ne of the most striking paradoxes of immigration politics in 
Luxembourg is the country’s relatively low level of xenophobia, despite its very 
high proportion of foreign-born workers and residents.’ The following subsections 
draw on traditional demand- and supply-side explanations to account for the 
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absence of an electorally successful populist radical right movement in the Grand 
Duchy. 
3.3.1. Demand-Side Explanations 
Given the country’s unique socio-economic situation, one might assume that 
demand for the populist radical right in Luxembourg is weaker than in Belgium and 
the Netherlands. Indeed, when it comes to per capita economic output, Luxembourg 
ranks among the highest in the world. In 2017, Luxembourg’s per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) measured at purchasing power parity (PPP) was estimated 
at $103,744 (World Bank 2018). 71F72 By contrast, per capita GDP in the Netherlands 
and Belgium was less that of Luxembourg at $52,503 and $47,840 respectively 
(ibid). It is conceivable that the Grand Duchy’s wealth has acted as a buffer on 
demand, in the sense that it has dampened the impact of some of the broader global 
changes including immigration, integration and globalisation. To be sure, economic 
prosperity does not preclude the rise of the populist radical right. In fact, there are 
several examples of rich welfare states where populist radical right parties have 
fared well (e.g. Switzerland and Norway), while there are considerably less 
prosperous states that have not witnessed the rise of a right-wing populist contender 
(e.g. Spain and Portugal). As explained in the previous chapter, however, demand 
for populist radical right parties tends to be generally higher among the so-called 
‘losers of modernisation’, notably working-class voters whose jobs are more prone 
to the influence of foreign competition (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2012; Mudde 2007). 72F73 As 
shown below, the electorate in Luxembourg is not directly threatened by foreign 
competition. In addition, the working-class vote has all but disappeared from the 
Luxembourgish electorate (Poirier 2014: 210).  
In fact, the makeup of the Luxembourgish electorate is very distinct. As in most 
countries, voting rights in Luxembourg are tied to citizenship. In other words, only 
people with Luxembourgish nationality can participate in legislative elections. 
Given the high proportion of foreign residents, the Grand Duchy is confronted with 
 
72 This figure is misleading, given that nearly half the Luxembourgish workforce (45 percent) is 
composed of cross-border workers who contribute to the country’s GDP but are not taken into 
account in per capita calculations. 
73 As Rooduijn et al. (2017) have noted, even though radical right voters tend to have lower socio-
economic positions, this does not mean that they are automatically inclined to vote for the radical 
right; indeed, they might also vote for the radical left. 
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a looming ‘democratic deficit’. In 2015, only 54.5 percent of the total adult 
population had the right to vote (Allegrezza et al. 2015). In 2018, the number of 
eligible voters had decreased to 47.2 percent (233,014 voters out of 493,270 
residents aged eighteen or older). Among these eligible voters, working class voters 
are underrepresented. This has to do with the fact that the Luxembourgish 
workforce is highly internationalised; as of 2018, only 27 percent (112,360 people) 
of the total workforce (421,009 people) are Luxembourgish. This means that only 
about one third of the country’s workforce forms part of the electorate (see Figure 
4). 
Figure 4 – Composition of the Workforce in Luxembourg 
 
Source: Statec 2018a 
The ‘working class’ in the Grand Duchy is largely composed of foreign residents 
and cross-border workers, neither of whom have voting rights. According to 
preliminary findings from the latest post-electoral survey, 24 percent of the 
electorate in 2018 had a university degree, compared to 12 percent in 2013 (see 
Radio 100,7 2019). Furthermore, in 2013, nearly half of the electorate (49.9 
percent) was economically active and blue-collar workers (i.e. unqualified manual 
labour) made up 11.3 percent of the active electorate (compared to 17.3 percent of 
the total adult population), while nearly half (44.3 percent) held public (or semi-
public) sector jobs (compared to 29.4 percent of the total adult population) (Zahlen 
& Thill 2013). Thus, working class voters are underrepresented in the electorate, 








It is important to note that public sector jobs in Luxembourg are very secure and 
well-paid. However, they are difficult for non-nationals to access, which is why the 
public sector is sometimes referred to as the ‘protected sector’ (secteur protégé) 
(see Pigeron-Piroth 2010). As of 2017, about 90 percent of public sector jobs were 
taken up by Luxembourgish nationals (RTL 2017a). Although many of these jobs 
are technically open to all EU nationals, it is difficult for non-citizens to access 
them because they often require applicants to have a working knowledge of all three 
official languages (i.e. Luxembourgish, French and German). This prerequisite acts 
as a ‘filter’ (Pigeron-Piroth 2010: 28) in the sense that it disqualifies most foreign 
applicants from competing for public sector jobs, thereby creating a ‘protected 
domain’ inside the labour market. 73F74 This ‘protected domain’ includes well-paid, 
secure positions in the Luxembourgish civil service and affiliated sectors (e.g. the 
national railway company). As a result, the perceived ‘threat’ from immigrants is 
dampened, given that they generally cannot compete for high-paid and secure 
public sector jobs. 74F75 Because of this class bias in the composition of the 
Luxembourgish electorate, demand for the populist radical right is likely to be less 
pronounced. In other words, very few of the so-called ‘left-behind’ are likely to be 
eligible to vote in Luxembourgish elections. It is therefore not surprising that only 
37 percent of respondents in Luxembourg agreed that ‘[i]mmigrants take jobs away 
from the country’s citizens’, compared to 47 percent in the Netherlands and 54 
percent in Belgium (European Values Study 2008).75F76 
Moreover, levels of trust and political satisfaction are known to be relatively high 
in the Grand Duchy. As in other European countries, however, levels of trust in 
various political institutions including the government, political parties and trade 
unions have decreased in recent years (see TNS ILRES 2016: 24). In September 
2011, 76 percent of the electorate expressed trust in the government. Two years 
 
74 The language requirement also affects the education sector. According to a report published by 
the OECD (2016), children with an immigrant background perform relatively poorly in the Grand 
Duchy’s public-school system. This partly results from the fact that they struggle to come to terms 
with the country’s three languages of instruction (OECD 2016). This is likely to restrict their upward 
mobility, thereby challenging the widespread belief that Luxembourg is particularly immigrant-
friendly. 
75 The percentage of non-nationals employed in the Luxembourgish public sector has increased over 
time (Pigeron-Piroth 2010). In 2017, then Minister of Home Affairs Dan Kersch announced that he 
was considering opening the civil service more widely to foreign residents in light of a shortage of 
staff in certain areas, notably education, tax administration and information technology. 




later (September 2013), levels of trust had decreased to 51 percent. In December 
2013, 63 percent of the electorate had confidence in the newly elected ‘Gambia 
coalition’ (so-called because the colours associated with the three governing parties 
match those of the Gambian flag). Following the 2015 referendum, however, levels 
of trust plummeted: in June 2015, shortly after the referendum, just 33 percent of 
the voters had trust in the government. Following this uncharacteristic dip, levels 
of trust recovered to 54 percent in May 2018 (Luxemburger Wort 2018b). 
When viewed from a cross-national perspective, levels of trust seem higher in 
Luxembourg than in Netherlands and Belgium. 76F77 According to the 2008 European 
Values Study, 68 percent of the Luxembourgish population had ‘a great deal or 
quite a lot of confidence’ in their government, compared to 49 percent in the 
Netherlands and just 32 percent in Belgium. Similarly, 40 percent of the population 
in the Grand Duchy had ‘a great deal or quite a lot of confidence’ in political parties, 
compared to 33 percent in the Netherlands, and 21 percent in Belgium, and in terms 
of overall satisfaction with democracy, 75 percent of the Luxembourgish population 
was ‘rather or very satisfied with the way democracy is developing in their country’, 
compared to 56 percent in the Netherlands and 61 percent in Belgium (ibid). In light 
of these comparatively higher levels of trust and satisfaction with democracy, we 
might expect demand for populist radical right parties to be lower in Luxembourg 
than in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
However, when it comes to attitudes towards immigrants, a cursory examination of 
existing data shows that the Luxembourgish population is only moderately more 
xenophile (see Table 4; see also Fetzer 2011: 13-27). For instance, 35 percent of 
Luxembourgish respondents agreed that ‘[a] country’s cultural life is undermined 
by immigrants’, compared to 52 percent in Belgium and 46 percent in the 
Netherlands (European Values Study 2008). At the same time, however, 43 percent 
of the Luxembourgish respondents agree that ‘There are too many immigrants in 
their country’, compared to 57 percent in Belgium and 41percent in the Netherlands 
(ibid). Similarly, 12 percent of the respondents in Luxembourg stated that they 
 
77 The availability of comparable data is rather limited and dated: Luxembourg is not included in the 
data compiled by the Pew Research Centre, whereas the European Social Survey only provides data 
on Luxembourg for 2002 and 2004. The European Values Study (EVS), on the other hand, only 
provides comparable data on the Benelux countries for 2008. Furthermore, these databases do not 
provide separate data for Wallonia and Flanders. 
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would not like to have people of a different race as neighbours, compared to 6 
percent in Belgium and 10 percent in the Netherlands. 
Table 4 – Societal Values in the Benelux with Regards to Immigration 
Average opinion on a scale from 0 
(Disagree) to 100 (Agree) 
  
Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg 
‘Immigrants make crime problems worse’ 64 63 55 
‘For the greater good of society, it is 
better if immigrants adopt the customs of 
the country’ 
  
68 60 58 
‘Immigrants are a strain on a country’s 
welfare system’ 
  
66 55 52 
‘A country’s cultural life is undermined by 
immigrants’ 
  
52 46 35 
‘Immigrants take jobs away from a 
country’s citizens’ 
  
54 47 37 
Percentage of people...    
...that agree or agree strongly that because 
of the number of immigrants they feel 
sometimes like a stranger in their own 
country  
 
37% 26% 30% 
... that agree or agree strongly that there 
are too many immigrants in their country 
today  
 
57% 41% 43% 
...that wouldn’t like to have immigrants / 
foreign workers as neighbours  
7% 14% 13% 
...that wouldn’t like to have people of a 
different race as neighbours  
6% 10% 12% 
...that wouldn’t like to have Jews as 
neighbours   
4% 7% 13% 
... that wouldn’t like to have Muslims as 
neighbours  




European Values Study (2008) 
 
Similarly, data from the March 2018 Eurobarometer survey suggests that, although 
82 percent of the Luxembourgish respondents felt fairly or very positive about 
immigration of people from other EU member states, they were considerably less 
enthusiastic about immigration from outside the European Union (see Figure 5). 
Indeed, 48 percent of the Luxembourgish respondents stated that immigration from 
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outside the EU evoked negative feelings (compared to 56 percent in Belgium and 
35 percent in the Netherlands).  




Of course, the data presented above are merely descriptive; yet, taken together, they 
provide tentative, illustrative evidence that the Luxembourgish population is only 
slightly less concerned about immigration. Besides the fact that immigrants pose 
less of a ‘threat’ to the Luxembourgish electorate, this could have to do with the 
fact that that exposure to immigrants is more pronounced in the Grand Duchy. As 
explained in the previous chapter, frequent contact with immigrants can increase 
tolerance towards them. First, Luxembourg has a high proportion of residents with 
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population (aged fifteen or older) were first- or second-generation immigrants, 
while only 38.8 percent were born in the Grand Duchy with Luxembourgish 
citizenship to Luxembourgish parents who were also born in Luxembourg (Heinz 
et al. 2013). Using data from the 2008 European Values Study, scholars have shown 
that having a migratory background has a significant effect on positive attitudes 
toward immigrants in Luxembourg (Valentova & Berzosa 2012). Indeed, frequent 
contact with foreigners had a positive effect on people’s perception of immigrants 
in the Grand Duchy: Luxembourgish natives (i.e. nationals born in Luxembourg 
and whose parents were also born in Luxembourg) who maintained personal 
relationships with immigrants were generally more open towards immigrants than 
those with fewer contacts (Valentova & Berzosa 2012: 355). 
Second, because of Luxembourg’s small size, contact with foreigners (i.e. 
immigrants and cross-border workers) is necessarily more frequent than in 
neighbouring countries. Although all three Benelux countries are relatively small, 
Luxembourg’s territory is considerably smaller than that of the other two. 77F78 This 
might soften the impact of the ‘halo-effect’ (explained in Chapter 2). This is 
particularly the case in the urban, cosmopolitan areas of Luxembourg City. Indeed, 
Fetzer (2011: 21) has shown that hostility towards foreign-born residents is highest 
in the northern, less ethnically diverse part of the country. 78F79 Furthermore, 
Luxembourgers might be generally more aware that immigrants are the main source 
of the country’s wealth (Fetzer 2011: 17). Given that the Luxembourgish economy 
is largely run by non-nationals, Luxembourgers have no other choice but to see 
beyond the narrow confines of their national borders, which, to some extent, 
‘forces’ them to assume more ‘cosmopolitan’ views. 
Another explanation for the somewhat more limited spread of anti-immigrant 
sentiments (particularly towards EU immigrants) in Luxembourg might be due to 
the fact that the makeup of the immigrant population is relatively homogenous. 
Indeed, only about 15 percent of Luxembourg’s foreign residents are citizens of 
 
78 It takes a little over one hour to cross the entire Grand Duchy from north to south by car. 
79 There was some evidence of the ‘halo-effect’ in the 2015 referendum on the Auslännerwahlrecht. 
Although all communes ultimately rejected the government’s proposal to grant foreigners the right 
to vote, support for the Auslännerwahlrecht was highest in and around Luxembourg City, and lowest 
in rural communes located in the east and the north of the country (Gouvernement du Grand-Duché 




non-European countries, while over 85 percent of them trace their origins the other 
European countries – primarily Portugal (35 percent); France (15 percent); Italy (8 
percent); Belgium (7 percent) and Germany (5 percent) (Statec 2018c). While 
immigration flows have diversified from the late 1990s onwards, the dominant 
religion among the foreign population (as well as the native population) remains 
Roman Catholicism (Fetzer 2011: 9). According to Frank Engel, a Luxembourgish 
MEP for the Christian Democrats (CSV),  
We made the wise decision of letting in Portuguese people. Not that they’re 
any better than the Turks or us or you. But they have one major advantage: 
They’re Catholics, just like us… Whenever you take immigration examples 
that have worked out badly, you find [the immigrants] are maybe of the 
same skin color but certainly of a different religion (quoted in Fetzer 2011: 
16-7). 
The cultural and religious similarities between immigrants and residents have made 
for a relatively seamless integration into Luxembourgish society, which in turn, 
could contribute to dampening demand for the populist radical right (see also Fetzer 
2011: 17). 
Yet, the Luxembourgish electorate is not unequivocally immigrant-friendly. When 
seen in combination with declining levels of voter trust, there is at least some 
breeding ground for right-wing populist sentiments in the Grand Duchy. This 
became obvious in the run-up to the 2015 referendum on the Auslännerwahlrecht. 
As mentioned earlier, on 7 June 2015, Luxembourg held a consultative referendum 
asking voters to voice their opinion on several constitutional changes, including 
lowering the legal voting age, imposing term limits on governmental mandates, and 
extending voting rights to non-citizen residents. Given the high number of foreign 
residents, the latter question was particularly controversial (see de Jonge & Petry 
2019). The debates sparked by the ‘No’ campaign, which was led by the Nee2015 
movement and the ADR, stirred up fears of Überfremdung. The campaign proved 
highly effective, as nearly 80 percent of the electorate voted against the 
Auslännerwahlrecht. The exact motivations of the electorate are difficult to 
disentangle; while some voters may have been genuinely afraid of becoming ‘a 
minority in their own country’, others might have voted ‘No’ because they were 




Yet, the Auslännerwahlrecht referendum propelled identity politics to the centre of 
the political debate (see Chapter 4). Since the 2015 referendum, issues pertaining 
to the preservation of the Luxembourgish language have gained traction – issues 
that have traditionally been ‘owned’ by the nationalist ADR, which has long sought 
to halt the ‘Francophonisation’ of the country by raising the status of the 
Luxembourgish language. In 2016, for instance, a petition proposing to promote 
Luxembourgish as the country’s main language instead of just one of three official 
languages received a record-breaking 15,000 signatures. In response, a law on the 
promotion of the Luxembourgish language was adopted unanimously in parliament 
in 2018.  
The legacy of the 2015 referendum was also noticeable in the run-up to the 2018 
general election. As mentioned earlier, the grassroots movement that had lobbied 
against the Auslännerwahlrecht (Nee2015/Wee2050) joined forces with the ADR. 
Together, they revived the nationalist themes that had dominated the referendum 
campaign by focusing on concerns over rapid population growth and related fears 
over the alleged demise of the Luxembourgish language and identity. Although the 
ADR/Wee2050 was ultimately unable to capitalise on these themes (e.g. the ADR 
‘only’ managed to increase its vote share by 1.64 percent), many other political 
parties copied these nationalist themes. For instance, the liberal Democratic Party 
ran on the campaign slogan ‘Zukunft op Lëtzebuergesch’ (‘Future in 
Luxembourgish’), while the social-democratic LSAP opted for ‘Lëtz speak about 
politics’ (‘Lëtz’ being the first syllable of Lëtzebuergesch, which is the 
Luxembourgish term for the local language). 
Thus, there appears to be some latent demand for right-wing populist themes in the 
Grand Duchy. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that this demand is less pronounced 
than in Belgium and the Netherlands. The relative homogeneity of the immigrant 
population, the frequent contact with immigrants as well as the country’s high 
affluence appear to have dampened demand for the populist radical right in 
Luxembourg. However, these factors do not make the country immune to right-
wing populism. It is therefore useful to consider supply-side explanations. 
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3.3.2. Supply-Side Explanations 
The External Supply Side 
While the Luxembourgish electoral system is also based on proportional 
representation, it is not as permissive as the Dutch one. 79F80 This partly results from 
the variation in district sizes, as well as the seat distribution mechanism, which give 
rise to an informal electoral threshold. Despite its small size, Luxembourg is 
comprised of four constituencies: North, East, South and Centre. The number of 
parliamentary seats allocated per electoral district varies from seven (out of sixty) 
seats in the eastern district to twenty-three seats in the southern district. However, 
this distribution quota, which was introduced in the 1980s, is known to be 
anachronistic in the sense that it no longer corresponds either to the number of 
eligible voters or to the number of residents living in each district (Fehlen 2018). 
As a result, the ‘natural’ electoral threshold varies substantially per district: in the 
East, 12.5 percent of the votes are needed to acquire one seat in parliament, whereas 
only 4.2 percent are required in the South. The unequal value of votes is often 
criticised (particularly after elections) given that the seat distribution generally 
favours bigger parties in smaller electoral districts.80F81 Despite this informal electoral 
threshold, the Luxembourgish electoral system is still proportional and should 
therefore not represent a major hurdle for populist radical right parties. 
On the other hand, unlike in Flanders, far right groupings in Luxembourg cannot 
rely on the existence of a well-developed nationalist subculture as a way of 
mobilising supporters. While Luxembourgish nationalism does exist, it is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Luxembourg became a sovereign state almost ‘by 
accident’ in 1839, after Belgium gained independence from the Netherlands. Thus, 
the country became an independent state before a sense of nationalism existed 
among the population (Garcia 2014: 118). The emergence of a true sense of national 
belonging and identity developed during WWII (Trausch 2003: 201-74), as the 
German occupation forged a sense of Luxembourgish nationhood. In that sense, it 
‘represented a turning point in both nation‐ and language‐building, as language was 
 
80 One peculiarity of the Luxembourgish system is that voters can distribute personal preference 
votes to candidates, even if they run on different party lists. This practice, which is known as 
panachage favours well-known personalities, making it more difficult for political newcomers to 
enter politics. 




used as evidence to prove the existence of an authentic nation distinct from 
Germany’ (Garcia 2014: 114).  
It was not until the 1970s, however, that questions pertaining to national identity 
became politically salient. During this time, Luxembourgish society became 
exposed to a range of broad, structural changes in the international environment, 
including European integration, globalisation and the increased presence of 
immigrants (Garcia 2014: 119). These factors sparked the emergence of a 
nationalist linguistic movement. The use and promotion of Lëtzebuergesch have 
become symbols for the country’s identity. As explained earlier, the various far-
right movements that emerged in the 1970s and 80s grew out of groups and 
associations that advocated the preservation of the Luxembourgish language. Yet, 
while there is a distinct Luxembourgish national identity, there is no strong, 
underlying nationalist subculture that far-right movements could rely on to recruit 
qualified personnel and activists. 
The Internal Supply Side 
In contrast to the Netherlands and Flanders, Luxembourg has not witnessed the rise 
of a ‘credible’ right-wing populist contender. Past far-right movements in 
Luxembourg such as FELES or the NB can be characterised by a lack of charismatic 
leadership and low levels of professionalisation. Moreover, they have often been 
plagued by internal dissension. The ADR is a case in point. Personality clashes 
arose after the party had achieved a major overhaul of the pension system in the 
early 2000s. According to one ADR MP, ‘That’s when the problems arose, where 
we said: our selling point is gone. […] And that’s when the party also started facing 
internal turmoil.’ 81F82 Indeed, the loss of their raison d’être resulted in a series of 
internal disputes and a loss of parliamentary seats (ADR 2012; Dumont & Poirier 
2005). The common strife for pension equity had left the party with an eclectic mix 
of members, ranging from bank managers to construction workers. In the words of 
Gast Gibéryen, ‘the entire private sector was in it! […] Some were left-leaning, 
others more right-wing. Some were very liberal, some were for abortion, others 
were radically opposed to it. Some were in favour of a regulated economy, others 
 
82 Interview with Gast Gibéryen on 22 September 2016 in Luxembourg City. 
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wanted to liberalise it – and we kept all of this here in the party for years. And so 
the party slowly but surely had to find its way.’ 82F83 
As a result, the ADR witnessed several episodes of infighting over the past decades. 
In 2009, for instance, the party’s youth wing was dissolved after one of its members 
allegedly voiced extreme-right opinions during his campaign for municipal 
elections (Dumont et al. 2012). In 2012, the party’s stance on social issues such as 
same-sex marriage and abortion created tensions between liberal and conservative 
factions, which culminated in the resignation of the more liberal, long-time ADR 
MP Jacques-Yves Henckes (see Luxemburger Wort 2012). Later that year, Jean 
Colombera, the party’s northern MP, left the ADR for similar reasons. 83F84 In 2014, 
Liliana Miranda resigned as General Secretary and cancelled her membership, 
lamenting the party’s lack of leadership and accusing the ADR of right-wing 
extremism (see Tageblatt 2014). In 2017, the ADR ousted Joe Thein, a young local 
councillor and former chairman of the ADR-youth section, after he had ‘liked’ a 
comment on Facebook stating that the country’s Foreign Minister, Jean-Asselborn, 
should drive in a convertible through Dallas – thereby implying that he should be 
killed in a Kennedy-like assassination. 84F85 The comment had been made by a non-
ADR member on the Facebook page of ADR MP Fernand Kartheiser, who had 
posted an article on the Polish Ambassador expressing outrage about Asselborn’s 
criticism of Poland for failing to comply with the Copenhagen criteria for EU 
accession. Although Thein stated that his ‘like’ was in no way intended as a 
reference to the Kennedy assassination, senior members of the party decided to 
exclude him, particularly given that it was not the first time that he had attracted 
negative media-attention to the ADR (see RTL 2017b). For instance, in 2016, he 
had been spotted at a party congress of the German Alternative für Deutschland, 
which some media observers considered proof of the ADR’s far-right credentials 
(e.g. Tageblatt 2016). 
This section has shown that there is some lingering demand for the populist radical 
right in Luxembourg, although it is arguably expressed differently from Belgium 
and the Netherlands due to the comparative homogeneity of the immigrant 
 
83 Interview with Gast Gibéryen on 22 September 2016 in Luxembourg City. 
84 Jean Colombera went on to form his own party (the Party for Integral Democracy or PID). In the 
run-up to the 2018 general elections, the PID formed an alliance with the Pirate Party. 
85 As mentioned earlier, Joe Thein went on to form his own party in March 2017. 
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population, the country’s affluence as well as frequent interactions with 
immigrants. Similarly, the supply of populist radical right movements has been 
weaker in the Grand Duchy. Indeed, past far-right movements were poorly 
organised and lacked organisational capacity. Contemporary ‘softer’ manifestations 
of right-wing populism have suffered from chronic infighting, which may have 
impeded their electoral success. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a historical overview of the electoral trajectories of far-
right movements in the Benelux region. Drawing on conventional demand- and 
supply-side explanations, the chapter has outlined various reasons that help explain 
the variation in the electoral performances of the populist radical right in the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The chapter has shown that, even though 
demand for right-wing populism may be weaker in the Grand Duchy, it exists in all 
three Benelux countries. This is in line with previous observations. For instance, 
van der Brug and Fennema (2007: 475) have shown that the socio-economic 
conditions that supposedly favour the success of radical right movements ‘do not 
vary much between the different European countries and hence cannot account for 
their different fortunes’ (see also Mudde 2010: 1168).  
Unsurprisingly, supply-side explanations are much more helpful in accounting for 
the asymmetrical electoral trajectories of the populist radical right in the Benelux. 
Indeed, Dutch and Flemish right-wing populist movements have been much better 
organised, whereas Luxembourg and Wallonia have yet to witness the rise of a 
credible right-wing populist contender. Yet, supply-side factors are not fully able 
to account for the success of the populist radical right in the Netherlands and 
Flanders and the absence or failure of comparable movements in Wallonia and 
Luxembourg.  
First, just like Wallonia and Luxembourg, the Netherlands also lacks a strong post-
war nationalist subculture. Second, while the strong organisational capacity may 
account for some of the success of the Flemish and Dutch populist radical right 
movements (notably their electoral persistence), it fails to explain the timing of their 
electoral breakthroughs; after all, the VB had strong organisational capacity long 
before its initial electoral breakthrough (Art 2008: 422), whereas the Dutch LPF 
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managed to break through electorally despite comparatively weak organisational 
skills (de Lange & Art 2011). Third, simply suggesting that Luxembourg and 
Wallonia have not witnessed a ‘credible’ right-wing populist contender is too 
simplistic, because it attributes too much importance to the characteristics of 
individual leaders. It is also somewhat tautological; after all, a party may only be 
considered ‘credible’ once it gains electoral support. In any case, it begs the 
question as to why these polities have not witnessed the emergence of a ‘credible’ 
populist radical right movement – despite a (moderately) fertile breeding ground. 
Thus, demand- and supply-side arguments cannot fully explain the divergent 
electoral trajectories of right-wing populist parties. We therefore need to take into 
account the broader socio-political, historical and cultural context in which they 
compete. This allows us to understand how right-wing populist parties can make 
their voices heard in the in the first place (see Koopmans & Muis 2009: 643). I 
concur with David Art (2007) that the electoral success of right-wing populist 
parties ultimately hinges on the way in which they are received and perceived in 
the polity in which they emerge. The following chapters therefore address the 
importance of mainstream parties (Chapter 4) and the media (Chapter 5) for 
explanations of variance in the electoral performances of right-wing populist parties 




Chapter 4: Mainstream Parties  
Whether a fertile breeding ground for the populist radical right is translated into 
electoral success depends not only on the credibility and organisational capacity of 
these parties, but also on the behaviour of their mainstream competitors (see 
Chapter 2). Specifically, the strategic choices that mainstream parties make can 
influence the opportunity structures available to right-wing populist actors. This 
chapter analyses the ways in which mainstream parties have furthered or limited 
the spread of right-wing populism in the Benelux. 
It does so by considering the rise of the populist radical right in the Benelux region 
through the lens of party competition. The broader aim is to show that the behaviour 
of mainstream parties is central to understanding the success and failure of the 
populist radical right in individual polities. The chapter demonstrates that the 
behaviour of centre-right and centre-left parties helped pave the way for the rise of 
the populist radical right in the Netherlands and Flanders, while they narrowed the 
opportunities for right-wing populist challengers in Wallonia and Luxembourg. 
Indeed, in the Netherlands and Flanders, mainstream parties failed to keep 
traditional lines of conflict ‘frozen’. In Luxembourg and Wallonia, on the other 
hand, mainstream parties have maintained a substantial share of the vote. 
I am mainly concerned with the pre-emptive behaviour of mainstream parties. 
Hence, I focus specifically on the role of mainstream parties prior to the electoral 
breakthrough of right-wing populist parties. As explained in Chapter 1, whilst they 
are undeniably related, electoral breakthrough and electoral persistence are distinct 
processes (Coffé 2004). Therefore, it seems plausible that they can be explained by 
using different factors. As Ellinas (2010: 15) has noted, the weight attributed to the 
various explanations for the success of right-wing populist parties may depend on 
the specific stage of development they find themselves in. The behaviour of 
mainstream parties is likely to be more important before right-wing populist parties 
have crossed the threshold of relevance (Ellinas 2010: 16). Once a new political 
challenger has successfully entered the electoral arena, it changes the parameters of 
party competition, which means that the range of options available to mainstream 




The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section sketches out the nature of Dutch 
party competition. It then analyses the behaviour of centre-right and centre-left 
parties prior to the rise of the LPF. The second section analyses the differences 
between the francophone and Flemish party systems in Belgium. It shows how the 
social democratic Parti Socialiste managed to absorb demand for the populist 
radical right by maintaining the salience of socio-economic issues. The final section 
sheds light on the nature of partisan competition in the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg by discussing the state of consociational democracy. By comparing 
the electoral trajectories of mainstream parties in the Benelux, the concluding 
section shows that traditional mainstream parties have lost their dominant position 
in the Netherlands and Flanders, whereas they were able to maintain their 
stronghold in Wallonia and Luxembourg. 
4.1. Netherlands 
As shown in Chapter 3, internal supply-side explanations are helpful to explain the 
rise of the populist radical right in the Netherlands. The relatively sudden rise of the 
LPF as well as the subsequent breakthrough of the PVV are commonly attributed 
to the characteristics of their respective leaders, Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders. 
Since they can both be described as well-spoken orators, they are, to some extent, 
the antithesis of their ‘predecessor’, the far-right leader Hans Janmaat. In that sense, 
Fortuyn and Wilders were important catalysts who effectively managed to tap into 
lingering demand for the populist radical right. However, this analysis is overly 
simplistic, as it attributes too much weight to individuals and thus fails to paint a 
complete picture. While Fortuyn and Wilders were important agents, the success of 
Dutch right-wing populist movements cannot solely be attributed to the strength 
and charisma of their leaders. The key question that remains is how Pim Fortuyn 
and later Geert Wilders managed to mobilise voters with their fierce critique of 
multiculturalism. 
In order to understand their electoral success, we need to take into account the 
broader context. In the words of Simon Bornschier (2018: 214), ‘[W]e need to adopt 
a party system perspective and look both at the structuring power of older divisions 
as well as at the strategies that established parties employ with respect to the new 
cultural dimension the radical right mobilizes on.’ A party system perspective can 
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shed light on why the LPF and later the PVV were able to mobilise voters where 
the CD had failed. As demonstrated below, the behaviour and positioning of 
mainstream parties helped pave the way for the rise of the LPF and PVV.  
Scholars have attributed the rise of the populist radical right in the Netherlands to 
the programmatic convergence of Dutch mainstream parties, which created room 
and opportunities for new parties to challenge the political establishment (see, for 
example, Lucardie 2008; Pennings & Keman 2003; van Kessel 2013). Although the 
Dutch party system had started to fragment towards the end of the twentieth century, 
it was still generally dominated by the three party families that had grown out of 
the three main ‘pillars’ or social segments that long made up Dutch society, namely 
the Christian-democratic Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian-Democratic 
Appeal or CDA), the liberal-conservative Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 
(People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy or VVD), and the social-democratic 
Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party or PvdA). 85F86 Pim Fortuyn rose to fame following 
eight years of coalition governments between social democrats and liberals. These 
coalition governments were referred to as being ‘purple’ because it mixed the ‘blue’ 
liberalism of the conservative VVD and the progressive D66 (Democrats 66) with 
the ‘red’ socialism of the PvdA. The coalition generated centripetal forces that 
compelled the VVD and the PvdA to move to the centre (Lucardie 2008: 153). The 
purple coalitions made the governing parties seem indistinguishable in the eyes of 
many voters, and the programmatic and ideological convergence generated space 
on the fringes of the political spectrum for the LPF. When the subsequent implosion 
of the LPF generated a void, the space was filled by the PVV. 
While there clearly is some merit to this argument, it needs to be nuanced since it 
presumes that political competition occurred along a single-dimensional left-right 
political axis (Pellikaan et al. 2007: 284). In reality, political competition takes 
place on several fronts (Schattschneider 1960). The political space in Western 
Europe is (at least) two-dimensional, and focusing on the interplay between the 
 
86 The CDA is, in fact, a relatively new party that was formed in 1977 as a confederation uniting 
three (traditional) Christian democratic parties from different Christian denominations (representing 
different pillars), notably the Catholic People’s Party (Katholieke Volkspartij or KVP), the 
Protestant Anti-Revolutionary Party (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij or ARP), and the Protestant 
Christian Historical Union (Christelijk-Historische Unie or CHU) (see Andeweg 1999: 110). The 
formation of an interconfessional party was an attempt to halt the rapid electoral decline of Christian 
democratic parties (van Kessel & Krouwel 2011). 
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economic and cultural dimensions of competition can help us understand the 
electoral fortunes of the populist radical right (Bornschier 2018). In brief, it is 
argued here that the behaviour of Dutch centre-right parties in the 1980s and 90s 
contributed to the creation of a new, cultural line of conflict, which facilitated the 
politicisation of immigration. Following the creation of this new line of conflict, 
however, the centre-right failed to ‘deliver’ by not actually taking a tougher stance 
on immigration, moving back to the centre instead. This was partly because the 
VVD was constrained through its coalition agreement with the progressive D66 and 
social-democratic PvdA. Due to similar constraints, the centre-left also failed to 
‘freeze’ traditional lines of conflict and was unable to maintain the salience of 
economic issues. This resulted in ideological convergence on the economic and the 
cultural axes, which, in turn, generated space for a political newcomer. According 
to Pellikaan et al. (2003), the success of the LPF resulted from its ability to combine 
opposition to multicultural society on the cultural axis with a critique of the 
neoliberal economic policies of the purple government on the economic axis. 86F87  
To fully understand this line of reasoning, it is necessary to explain the evolution 
of the Dutch political landscape in the second half of the twentieth century. As in 
many Western European countries, Dutch voters were long stabilised by cleavages 
that ‘anchored’ voters by tying them to specific political parties (Mair 2008: 251). 
In the Netherlands, these cleavages were solidified into ‘pillars’ (or subcultures) 
that structured not just the political landscape, but nearly every aspect of life. The 
pillar structure was a way of organising a socially divided country composed of 
minorities. Since the late nineteenth century, Dutch society was structured around 
four minority groups: Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals (Lijphart 
1975). Each of these groups formed broad networks composed of various 
ideological organisations (e.g. associations, trade unions, newspapers etc.) that 
accompanied people from cradle to grave. 87 F88 Every pillar produced its own political 
party, and members of a particular pillar would generally vote for their own ‘pillar 
 
87 Although Fortuyn was highly critical of the economic policies of the governing parties, he 
ultimately subscribed to a neoliberal economic agenda (de Lange 2007; see also Pauwels 2014: 73). 
88 Rudy Andeweg (1999: 110-12) has noted that, in the Netherlands, the links between 
consociational parties and their traditional pillars have always been relatively weak in the sense that 
auxiliary organisations never played a key role in tying people to a specific party. In general, 
auxiliary association membership was lower in the Netherlands than in Belgium (Luther & 
Deschouwer 1999: 243). 
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party’. Similar to a Greek temple, the pillars that made up Dutch society were kept 
apart and only joined at the ‘top’ through political elites, who formed the ‘roof’ of 
the Dutch state (Andeweg 1999: 108). In order to come to political agreements, the 
great social heterogeneity was compensated through cooperation at the elite level 
(Lijphart 1975). Through the ‘politics of accommodation’, elites could offset the 
threat to stability caused by social division (see also Andeweg & Irwin 2002: 27ff). 
This power-sharing system of governance became widely known as ‘consociational 
democracy’. Consociationalism was designed to ensure political stability, and 
pillarisation long had a stabilising effect on the Dutch electorate.  
In general, established cleavage structures can limit the opportunities for political 
mobilisation based on new lines of conflict. The rigid pillarisation of Dutch society 
offered few opportunities for populists to mobilise ‘the people’ across the different 
societal subgroups. As Lucardie and Voerman (2012: 25) have pointed out, ‘[e]very 
assertion about a homogenous people seemed like a travesty in the pillarised 
Netherlands. Attempts to mobilise ‘the people’ right across the pillars against the 
elite of the pillarised parties […] were doomed to fail.’ Thus, the strength and 
salience of existing cleavages restricted the availability of ‘free floating’ voters, 
which, in turn, limited the opportunities for populist radical right parties to recruit 
voters.  
Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, however, the pillars 
started to crumble (Andeweg 1999: 108). While the erosion of traditional cleavages 
affected other countries, it had a particularly strong impact on consociational 
democracies because the societal cleavages had been institutionalised into pillars 
(Luther & Deschouwer 1999: 247). The demise of the pillars led to a decline in the 
hegemony of Christian parties that had long played a dominant role in Dutch 
politics (Lucardie 2008: 152). Depillarisation came hand in hand with (and partly 
resulted from) other broad, long-term societal transformations, including 
secularisation and individualisation. Whilst these processes also occurred in other 
European countries, they had a more profound impact on the Netherlands (ibid). 
The 1960s and 70s saw the emergence of a non-pillarised public domain, which 
was composed of movements and organisations that refused to be categorised into 
one of the existing pillars, and by the turn of the twenty-first century, the Dutch 
electorate was left largely unstructured (van Holsteyn & Irwin 2003). In the words 
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of Peter Mair (2008: 240), Dutch voters were left ‘with scarcely anything with 
which to anchor themselves into place in terms of cleavages and other social 
identities.’ How do we account for the political dealignment that resulted from the 
erosion of social cleavages? 
Existing research to explain national variations in the shifts in social and political 
cleavages can be separated into two complementary approaches: a ‘bottom-up’ and 
a ‘top-down’ approach (Rennwald & Evans 2014: 1109; see also Evans & Tilley 
2012; Evans & de Graaf 2013). 88F89 According to the ‘bottom-up’ theory, political 
conflicts are shaped by ‘structural political potentials that arise from the gradual 
evolution of social structure’ (Bornschier 2018: 212). In other words, cleavage 
structures change as a result of broad, macro-changes in the international 
environment, including modernisation, individualisation, globalisation, 
secularisation and depillarisation. In the Dutch case, it is commonly argued that 
such changes contributed to the erosion of boundaries between social classes and 
hence weakened traditional voting patterns (see van Kessel 2011). Increased levels 
of affluence and higher education have facilitated more social mobility, which has 
weakened the ‘distinctiveness’ of social classes and their accompanying pillars. As 
a result, the link between social class and party choice has weakened. In that sense, 
the success of populist radical right parties in the Netherlands can be tied to partisan 
dealignment (i.e. the weakening of traditional societal linkages and related 
transformations of social structures), which ‘freed up voters’ and thus helped pave 
the way for the LPF and later the PVV (e.g. Lucardie 2008). This bottom-up 
approach attributes a very passive role to political parties. 
By contrast, the ‘top-down’ theory suggests that the changes in social cleavage 
structures must also be attributed to the positioning of mainstream parties. In that 
sense, the ‘top-down’ approach is less concerned with purely structural accounts 
but instead focuses on the agency of mainstream parties. Political parties can help 
shape the evolution of social cleavages by providing voters with choices that allow 
for the political expression of preferences based on existing cleavages such as class 
or religion. In other words, political parties do not just respond to changing lines of 
 
89 These two approaches are not competing but rather complementary: accepting that ‘structure and 
agency are two sides of the same coin, coexisting in a dialectic relationship is a useful corrective to 
reductionist approaches that regard political elites as “great men” on the one hand or mere 
superstructure on the other […]’ (Deegan-Krause & Enyedi 2010: 687).  
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conflict but can also actively contribute to the creation of new cleavages. 89F90 
According to the ‘top-down’ approach, political actors play a central role in 
perpetuating existing cleavages (i.e. ‘freezing’ traditional lines of conflict), 
transforming them, or forming new ones altogether. This approach helps explain 
why the Dutch party system remained relatively stable until the end of the twentieth 
century – despite the forces of depillarisation. Indeed, as Pellikaan et al. (2007) 
have shown, during the period of pillarisation, political competition between parties 
was kept at a minimum. Stated differently, until the turn of the twenty-first century, 
established political parties in the Netherlands managed to ‘freeze’ political 
conflicts alongside traditional lines of conflict (explained below). As a result, 
parties attempting to introduce new lines of conflict generally failed to do so 
(Pellikaan et al. 2007: 283).  
The ideological positioning of parties is often described in spatial terms (Downs 
1957). Placing parties on a political spectrum allows us to trace their positions over 
time and describe their relations to other parties within the same party system. In a 
given space, parties’ ideological positions are traditionally described in bipolar 
terms along a linear left-right axis, where the far left describes an economy that is 
entirely in the hands of the government and the far right represents a completely 
free market economy (Downs 1957: 116). However, party systems are generally 
dominated by multiple lines of conflict. Particularly in multiparty systems, political 
conflicts are often fought on more than just one battlefront. Since it is difficult for 
parties to invest time and effort into fighting on multiple fronts simultaneously, they 
must decide for themselves ‘which battle [they] want most to win’ (Schattschneider 
1960: 67). In other words, parties must decide strategically which lines of conflict 
they choose to politicise. Therefore, established parties have a vested interested in 
‘freezing’ the existing lines of conflict, since any significant changes to the structure 
of the political landscape could have damaging consequences for them. In the words 
of Peter Mair (1997: 14), ‘[m]uch as rival cigarette manufacturers have a mutual 
interest in the promotion of smoking, however competitive they may be vis-a-vis 
 
90 Rennwald and Evans (2014) have demonstrated the importance of the ‘top-down’ approach in 
understanding differences in shifting patterns of class voting in Austria and Switzerland. By focusing 
on the strategies of social democratic parties, the authors show that, in contrast to their Swiss 
colleagues, Austrian social democrats maintained close ties to their working-class electorate, which 
resulted in weaker working-class support for the radical right. The underlying argument is that 
supply (i.e. political parties) can create demand for certain views. 
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one another as far as the marketing of their own particular brands may be concerned, 
the established parties in a party system may be seen to have a mutual interest in 
the survival of their particular conflict and their particular form of competition.’  
Pellikaan et al. (2007) have used the Schattschneider-Mair thesis (i.e. that 
established parties try to preserve the traditional lines of conflict that structure 
electoral competition) to explain the drastic rise of the LPF. The authors argue that 
the Dutch party system was long stabilised by three lines of conflict that emerged 
out of the pillarised structure of Dutch society (see Figure 6): First, an ethical (or 
denominational) line of conflict (represented in yellow in Figure 6) separating 
parties that support a moral state that restricts issues such as abortion, same sex 
marriage and euthanasia (i.e. Christian parties) from those that favour a neutral state 
(i.e. socialist and liberal parties); second, an economic line of conflict similar to the 
Downsian model described earlier (represented in the red) that separates parties that 
favour a free-market economy (i.e. liberal and Christian parties) from those that 
prefer a state-led one (i.e. socialist parties); and third, a communitarian line of 
conflict (represented in blue) that separates parties that adhere to an individualist 
conception of society (i.e. liberal parties) from those that prefer a more collectivist 
approach (i.e. socialist and Christian parties) (Pellikaan et al. 2007: 288).  
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Figure 6 – The Dutch Triangle 
 
Source: Author’s own illustration, created with graphic design support from Lys Differding. 
The figure is based on a model created by Pellikaan et al. (2003: 32). See also Pappi 
(1984). 
 
As the authors point out, the three party families originating from the pillars ‘were 
able to survive because they could manage political conflicts by unifying citizens 
along these cleavages or lines of conflict. […] Each of the three party families had 
a coherent political position on all three lines of conflict and in a joint effort these 
lines of conflict were frozen’ (Pellikaan et al. 2007: 290). Thus, when the pillars 
started to crumble, Dutch voters were still stabilised along this triangular 
construction, and new parties that entered (e.g. the liberal-progressive D66 and 
Green-Left) were forced to position themselves according to this ideological 
triangle. Under the ‘purple’ coalition government, however, old lines of conflict 
started to become redundant. First, the coalition parties ‘resolved’ ethical issues by 
legalising euthanasia and same sex marriage. The CDA decided to accept the new 
ethical status quo given that opposition would have made participation in future 
coalitions difficult. As a result, the ethical line of conflict became obsolete, and 
electoral competition was reduced to two dimensions: an economic and a 
communitarian line of conflict (Pellikaan et al. 2003: 30; Pellikaan et al. 2007: 291). 
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Second, the authors argue that the rise of Pim Fortuyn altered the content of the 
communitarian cleavage into a new, cultural line of conflict, separating supporters 
of a monocultural society from those who favour a multicultural society.  
While this analysis can generally be described as a ‘top-down’ approach in the sense 
that it ascribes the changes in social cleavage structures to the positioning of 
mainstream parties, the authors still attribute the creation of a new social cleavage 
entirely to the LPF. In other words, according to Pellikaan et al. (2007: 283), it was 
Pim Fortuyn who successfully introduced a cultural line of conflict to the Dutch 
party system. While it was Fortuyn who managed to cement this new dimension 
into the Dutch party system, I argue that mainstream parties played an active role 
in the creation of this new line of conflict. Indeed, as shown below, centre-right 
parties actively contributed to the politicisation of issues pertaining to immigration 
long before the rise of the LPF, while the centre-left failed to offer a clear 
alternative. 
4.1.1. Radicalisation of the Centre-Right 
The behaviour of mainstream parties must be seen in the context of their overall 
positioning within the Dutch party landscape. The Dutch party landscape started to 
fragment in the 1960s (Mair 2008). As shown in Figure 7, Christian democratic 
parties in particular consistently started to lose support. Faced with declining voter 
loyalties, mainstream parties strategically sought to re-position themselves to the 




Figure 7 – Support for Mainstream Parties in the Netherlands 
 
Source: Kiesraad (2019) 
Notes:  As explained earlier, the CDA was formed in 1977; for earlier years, the graph depicts 
the aggregate of support levels for the predecessor parties: KVP, ARP and CHU. 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, from the 1990s onwards, issues related to immigration 
had started to gain salience among small portions of the Dutch electorate (Aarts & 
Thomassen 2008). Dutch centre-right parties sought to appeal to these voters by 
adopting a more restrictive stance on issues relating to immigration and integration. 
In other words, they tried to minimise losses in their voter base by politicising issues 
related to immigration and integration.  
There is ample empirical evidence to suggest that this ‘rightwards shift’ of the 
centre occurred not in response to but before the rise of a successful far-right 
challenger. For instance, applying qualitative methods, van Kersbergen and 
Krouwel (2008) have analysed the discourse of Dutch mainstream parties over time 
and found that, from the early 1990s onwards, centre-right parties shifted towards 
more hard-line and restrictive immigration policies. Their analysis suggests that the 
Christian-democratic CDA and, above all, the liberal-conservative VVD 
consciously and strategically politicised the ‘foreigner issue’ for electoral gain (van 
Kersbergen & Krouwel 2008: 401). Similarly, by means of systematic, quantitative 
content analysis of party programmes, van Heerden et al. (2014) have shown that 
Dutch mainstream parties actively contributed to the politicisation of immigration 
in the early 1990s. Specifically, their analysis suggests that Dutch parties changed 












monoculturalist discourse instead of the previously dominant multiculturalist 
discourse (van Heerden et al. 2014: 128). This shift entailed that parties ceased to 
mobilise voters on traditional socio-economic topics by emphasising issues relating 
to cultural integration. Drawing on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project 
(CMP) project, Rooduijn (2017) comes to a similar conclusion. In an article 
published on the Dutch political science website Stuk Rood Vlees, Rooduijn uses 
CMP data to trace the positive and negative attention that Dutch mainstream parties 
devote to issues such as patriotism, nationalism, multiculturalism, law and order, 
and security. 90F91 The analysis indicates that the Dutch mainstream parties, VVD, 
CDA and PvdA, consistently shifted rightwards on socio-cultural positions between 
the 1960s and the early 2000s (Rooduijn 2017). Thus, it was not so much the 
emergence of Pim Fortuyn, but rather the politicisation of immigration and related 
topics brought about by the positioning of mainstream parties that laid the 
foundation for a new, cultural line of conflict.  
This general rightwards shift helped pave the way for the rise of the populist radical 
right in the sense that it altered the nature of the public debate. Up until the 1990s, 
issues concerning immigration including asylum as well as the integration of ethnic 
minorities had been kept out of the political debate in the Netherlands because they 
were generally associated with the extreme right (Aarts and Thomassen 2008: 217). 
As a result, in the decades preceding the 1990s, Dutch civil society, mainstream 
parties and media practitioners (see Chapter 5) showed zero tolerance for the 
intolerant. 
Indeed, during the 1980s and 1990s, Hans Janmaat’s extremist ‘centre parties’ were 
met with severe political ostracism and social resistance (see, for example, de 
Vetten 2016). The wartime experience had given rise to an ‘extremely hostile legal, 
public and political attitude’ towards the radical right (van Holsteyn 2018a: 480). 
In the decades after the war, there was a general determination among the Dutch 
population that Nazism and fascism should never be allowed to return (Mudde & 
van Holsteyn 2000: 146). It was mainly because of this systematic societal and legal 
 
91 The CMP approach is based on sentence-by-sentence coding of party’s election manifestos (e.g. 
Volkens et al. 2018). It aims at measuring the salience of issues as well as the overall positions 
parties assume vis-à-vis those issues. The CMP approach has been criticised for various 
shortcomings, including flaws in the theoretical underpinnings of the coding scheme, coding 
reliability and document selection. For an overview, see Gemenis (2017). 
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ostracism that initiatives to form far-right movements never really materialised (van 
Donselaar 1993); the adverse public sentiment made it difficult for far-right 
sympathisers to meet and organise. After winning a seat in the Dutch parliament for 
the first time (with 0.8 percent of the vote), Janmaat entered the Tweede Kamer in 
September 1982 ‘amid cries of protest’ (Lucardie 1998: 112; see also Brants & 
Hogendoorn 1983: 132). All over the country, antifascist committees emerged 
(Lucardie 1998: 112). Virtually all other parties represented in the Dutch parliament 
at the time proceeded to boycott the CP, for example by leaving the room when 
Janmaat approached the microphone (van Donselaar 1995: 50). In a similar fashion, 
Janmaat’s Centre Democrats ‘were denounced and boycotted since their foundation 
in 1984 by all other politicians, including those of the mainstream right-wing VVD’ 
(van Spanje & van der Brug 2009: 363). According to Ignazi (2003: 166-7), the 
success of the CD ‘provoked an uproar from anti-fascist and anti-racist 
organizations, and steadfast ostracism inside the elective assemblies (e.g. the 
systematic exclusion from committees and limitation to the minimum of services 
normally provided by the institutions to parties and representatives).’  
The subsequently formed CP’86 was also faced with severe ostracism; in response 
to the party’s success in the 1990 municipal elections, hundreds of people took to 
the streets in cities such as Amsterdam and The Hague to protest against the 
installation of far-right local councillors (Husbands 1992a: 113). In 1997, Janmaat 
was convicted for incitement of racial discrimination after announcing that he 
would ‘abolish the multicultural society as soon as we have the opportunity and the 
power’ (van Kersbergen & Krouwel 2008: 404) – a claim that would hardly be 
considered radical in today’s context. Thus, the ‘centre movement’ was generally 
not considered a political opponent, but an enemy (de Vetten 2016: 279). 
Throughout his political career, Janmaat was consistently faced with protest 
(including serious physical attacks) and political exclusion. In the words of Ignazi 
(2003: 172), ‘[p]robably in no other country has the counter-mobilization against 
the extreme right proved so vigorous as in the Netherlands, both on the streets 
(including many violent events) and inside the institutions.’ 
Over the course of the 1990s, however, the nature of the public discourse in the 
Netherlands started to shift. This was partly because centre-right parties adopted 
more ‘radical’ positions. Under the leadership of Frits Bolkestein (1990-98), the 
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liberal VVD placed immigration on the centre of the political agenda. Indeed, 
influential figures within the VVD (notably Bolkestein, but also others such as 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali) introduced a new, conservative-liberal ideology in the Dutch 
political discourse (Oudenampsen 2018). This ideology consisted of a mixture of a 
conservative outlook on social and cultural affairs, neoliberal economic views and 
a realist foreign policy agenda (Vossen 2011: 181). It also introduced a mild degree 
of Euroscepticism. As Baukje Prins (2002: 367) showed, in the early 1990s, 
Bolkestein started defending the values and achievements of European civilisation 
by juxtaposing them to Islam, thus challenging the dominant discourse by making 
it ‘crystal-clear to Muslims living in the Netherlands that any kind of bargaining 
about the principles of Western liberalism was out of the question.’ Evidence of this 
shift can be found in several of Bolkestein’s speeches and writings. For instance, in 
1991, he gave a revealing and commonly-cited speech entitled ‘The Collapse of the 
Soviet Union’ at a meeting of the Liberal International in Luzern, in which he 
warned about the growing influence of Islam. Referring to the looming presence of 
nearly 400,000 Turkish and Moroccan residents in the Netherlands, Bolkestein 
worried that this would exceed the Dutch ‘absorption capacity’: 
The unsettled situation in Eastern Europe ripples over into Western Europe. 
Germany in particular has taken a vast number of refugees from the East. 
The pressure in The Netherlands from people who want to settle here is also 
growing inexorably. Prominent among recent immigrants in The 
Netherlands are people from Morocco and Turkey. […] It is an influx such 
as we have never before had to absorb (Bolkestein 1991b) 
Bolkestein then moved on to speak about integration policy, highlighting the need 
for cultural assimilation: 
What should government policy be towards these people who come from a 
different culture and of whom many speak little or no Dutch? Our official 
policy used to be: ‘Integration without prejudice to everyone’s own identity. 
It is now recognised that this slogan was a bit too easy. If everyone’s cultural 
identity is allowed to persist unimpaired, integration will suffer. And 
integration there must be, because the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants 
are here to stay. […] If integration is officially declared government policy, 
which cultural values must prevail: those of the non-Muslim majority or 
those of the Muslim minority? Here we must go back to our roots. 
Liberalism has produced some fundamental political principles, such as: the 
separation of church and state, the freedom of expression, tolerance and 
non-discrimination. We maintain that these principles hold good not only in 
Europe and North America but all over the world. Liberalism claims 
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universal value and worth for these principles. That is the political version. 
Here there can be no compromise […] (Bolkestein 1991b). 
A few days after the Lucerne conference, Bolkestein (1991a) published an op-ed in 
the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant, in which he argued that the integration of 
minorities must be tackled ‘with guts’ (or courage). While Bolkestein’s comments 
may not seem very significant in today’s context, they marked a noticeable shift 
from the Dutch multicultural consensus at the time. In a nutshell, Bolkestein’s 
words implied that Dutch culture was at risk of being ‘compromised’ by the 
influences of foreign (i.e. Muslim) beliefs, and that the minority must therefore 
abide by the rules of the native (i.e. Dutch) majority. By bringing these issues onto 
the agenda, Bolkestein urged Dutch elites to preserve Western values and take 
complaints regarding (Muslim) immigration seriously (Prins 2002: 368; see also 
Lucardie 1998: 121). 91 F92  
Beyond this new ideology, Bolkestein also introduced a new, more confrontational 
political style (Prins 2002). According to Vossen (2017: 8), ‘Bolkestein stood out 
for his aggressive debating style, untypical by Dutch standards, in that he was 
aiming for conflict rather than compromise.’ By openly criticising multiculturalism 
and the progressive cultural relativism enshrined in Dutch minority policies, 
Bolkestein was among the first in the Netherlands to break the taboo on immigration 
(Vossen 2011: 181). When Bolkestein started a debate on immigration and 
integration, he could not simply be marginalised because he was the leader of an 
established centre-right party (Aarts and Thomassen 2008: 217). The politicisation 
of immigration by the centre-right inadvertently generated favourable discursive 
opportunity structures for the populist radical right. When seen from this 
perspective, it becomes obvious that Fortuyn effectively radicalised a type of 
political discourse that had already become widely accepted and respectable by the 
time he arrived on the political scene (Prins 2002; Oudenampson 2018). As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, prior to starting his own party, Geert Wilders was long 
active as a member of the liberal VVD. In many ways, Wilders emulated 
Bolkestein, who had become a role model to him (Vossen 2017: 141), while 
Wilders became something of a ‘sorcerer’s apprentice’ to Bolkestein (Fennema 
 
92 As Oudenampsen (2018) has shown, this ‘new right’ ideology was rooted in Anglo-American 
neoliberalism and neoconservatism. 
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2010). Wilders successfully appropriated the immigration issue and made it his 
own. As the following chapter will show, this rightwards shift was also reflected in 
the media.  
Several scholars have argued that mainstream parties failed to react to growing 
concerns amongst the electorate over immigration, and that this generated 
favourable opportunity structures for the populist radical right (e.g. van der Brug et 
al. 2005; van Kessel 2015: 109). This is misleading because it fails to take into 
account the behaviour of mainstream parties prior to the rise of the populist radical 
right. I therefore concur with Tim Bale (2008: 320) who observed that: 
[T]he now familiar notion that there was a more or less bipartisan (and 
ultimately counterproductive) ‘conspiracy of silence’ on the part of the 
mainstream that created ‘a political space’ for the anti-immigrant extreme 
[…] is, notwithstanding its status as common wisdom, highly problematic. 
It did not require, for instance, a far-right threat to bring about the almost 
pan-European “immigration stop” in the early 1970s. 
As mentioned earlier, Dutch mainstream parties had adopted a more restrictive 
stance on immigration before the rise of the LPF (e.g. van Heerden et al. 2014). In 
particular, the VVD had voiced concerns over multiculturalism since the early 
1990s. However, after politicising the issue, the party did not incorporate 
immigration and integration in its electoral campaigns. Partly as a result of the 
changing discourse of the centre-right, issues pertaining to immigration and asylum 
that were previously considered to be of minor importance started to gain traction 
in the 1990s (Bale 2008). By politicising immigration, the centre-right allowed the 
epicentre of political competition to be shifted from socio-economic issues (e.g. 
government intervention in economy; the welfare state; redistribution) to non-
material issues (e.g. asylum; immigration) (van Kersbergen & Krouwel 2008: 400). 
This fundamentally altered the nature of party competition in the Netherlands, in 
the sense that the main axis of competition was no longer the economic left-right 
divide but a post-material axis, which facilitated the politicisation of immigration.  
After politicising the issue, the VVD could not actually deliver (i.e. cater to the anti-
immigrant vote) because it was constrained on the one hand by being in a coalition 
with the Dutch Labour party (PvdA) and the Christian Democratic CDA, and on 
the other hand by its more libertarian electorate, who saw immigrants as a cheap 
supply of labour (van Kersbergen & Krouwel 2008: 402). It also unleashed debates 
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inside the VVD between a more conservative faction, who favoured a monocultural, 
Eurosceptic and nationalist stance, and more a more libertarian wing advocating 
multiculturalism, economic liberalism and personal freedoms (van Kersbergen & 
Krouwel 2008: 399). This conflict intensified when Bolkestein left as party leader 
in 1998. His successor, Hans Dijkstal, was unwilling to shift the VVD in a more 
conservative direction, and during the 2002 general election, the VVD’s shift on 
the multicultural dimension ultimately did not materialise in the party’s programme 
(Pellikaan et al. 2003: 44). Thus, having created a new axis and politicising the 
immigration issue, the VVD could not actually ‘fill the space’, so demand for 
stricter immigration policies remained unfulfilled, which then paved the way for an 
anti-immigrant party to emerge (Vossen 2017: 141). In the words of Tim Bale 
(2008: 322), ‘once the toothpaste is out of the tube, the can of worms opened, the 
issues rarely go away.’ By politicising issues relating to immigration and 
integration, centre-right parties helped to increase the salience of these issues. In 
other words, the positioning of centre-right parties vis-à-vis the populist radical 
right shifted over time from demarcation to confrontation and accommodation. 
This explanation is in line with the sequential argument put forward by Ellinas 
(2010), who argues that populist radical right parties tend to succeed when 
mainstream parties ‘play the nationalist card’ but subsequently fail to deliver by 
moving back to the centre (see also Bornschier 2012; Ignazi 2003).  
In sum, in the 1990s, centre-right parties contributed to radicalising political 
competition over national identity in the Netherlands. As a result, they legitimised 
some of the appeals of the far-right and, above all, introduced a new axis of political 
contestation. By withdrawing the nationalist card, they lost ‘issue ownership’ over 
it and generated space for Fortuyn to assume this position. When the LPF imploded, 
the scene was set for Geert Wilders. 
4.1.2. Acquiescence of the Centre-Left 
A second factor that can help explain why the cultural line of conflict became 
dominant has to do with the behaviour of the centre-left. As shown below, the Dutch 
social-democratic PvdA moved to the centre on the economic left-right scale, which 
helped increase the salience of the cultural line of conflict. The PvdA assumed an 
ambiguous position on this new political dimension by choosing not to take a clear 
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stance on issues pertaining to immigration and integration. This behaviour 
ultimately played into the hands of the populist radical right. 
Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, Dutch mainstream parties positioned 
themselves closer to one another (Pennings & Keman 2003; Pennings & Keman 
2008: 159). Previous studies have shown that the Dutch Labour party largely 
abandoned its left-wing economic agenda by shifting closer to the centre (Green-
Pedersen 2001; Pellikaan et al. 2003: 41). The ideological convergence between 
centre-left and centre-right parties was not unique to the Netherlands; in the second 
half of the twenty-first century, social democratic parties in numerous European 
countries sought to increase their voter bases by moving to the political centre in 
order to appeal to a growing middle class (see Bickerton 2018). This set in motion 
a phase of programmatic and ideological renewal that became widely known as the 
‘Third Way’ (or die neue Mitte). This reinvention of social democracy was ‘an 
attempt to formulate a more “offensive” political project’ that would combine 
elements from ‘the failed old-style social democracy with its firm belief in the state 
as the instrument of social and economic intervention, and, on the other hand, the 
kind of ruthless neoliberalism that was advocated and sometimes practiced in the 
1980s with its rock solid confidence in the “free” markets’ (Green-Pedersen et al. 
2001: 310).  
This ideological convergence around economic issues was particularly pronounced 
in the Netherlands because of the pivotal role of the CDA (Green-Pedersen 2001). 
Because of its dominant role within the Dutch party system, neither the liberal VVD 
nor the social-democratic PvdA could afford to shift too far away from the CDA; 
after all, doing so would endanger future government coalitions (Pennings & 
Keman 2003: 65). In that sense, the CDA managed to draw the PvdA and the VVD 
closer to one another, thereby essentially turning both into centre parties (Green-
Pedersen 2001: 978). When the CDA-VVD cabinet under the leadership of CDA 
Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (1982-86) introduced a series of austerity measures, 
the PvdA moderated its critique because it did not want to be disqualified from 
future government participation. At the same time, the centre-right government 
sought to cultivate its social image, for instance by advocating special benefits for 
families that were particularly vulnerable. As a result, in the 1986 elections, the 
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three main Dutch parties were essentially advocating a nearly identical socio-
economic policy agenda (Green-Pedersen 2001: 978). 
Even after the CDA lost its pivotal position, the ideological convergence persisted 
and arguably intensified. In 1994, the electoral defeat of the Christian democrats 
(who had consistently been in power since the end of WWII) facilitated a coalition 
between the PvdA and VVD (along the socially-progressive liberal D66). This 
fundamentally altered the relationship between the two main parties: while they had 
principally excluded one another as potential coalition partners until the late 1980s, 
‘they now embraced each other’ (Pennings & Keman 2008: 52). The PvdA’s policy 
stance on economic issues became firmly centrist. A glance at the 1998 PvdA Party 
Manifesto is rather telling. On the relationship between the state and the market, the 
party noted the following:  
Political regulations and market forces can go hand in hand very well. [...] 
The market is not a panacea for all ills. Nor is the state. Each has its own 
strong and weak sides. Markets can solve economic imperfections and save 
costs but [also] create social imperfections that lead to new – social – costs. 
Government action can limit and prevent social inequality but [also] prevent 
social dynamism (PvdA 1998: 10). 
 
With the PvdA’s programmatic shift to the centre, the economic dimension became 
depoliticised and ultimately redundant, allowing the cultural dimension to become 
dominant. On this new political axis, however, the PvdA also assumed an 
ambivalent position: on the one hand, the party accepted the idea of a multicultural 
society with Muslims forming their own ‘pillar’; on the other hand, the party 
advocated measures to reduce the number of immigrants in the Netherlands 
(Pellikaan et al. 2003: 39). From the 1990s onwards, the PvdA started calling for 
the social integration of ethnic minorities. While the PvdA was aware of the 
electoral potential of more restrictive immigration policies, the party had initially 
hoped that government action in that direction would ‘defuse’ the issue instead of 
making it more salient (Bale et al. 2010: 416). To this end, the PvdA sought to 
frame immigration in socio-economic terms (e.g. by advocating labour market 
access and education); however, at the same time, Bolkestein (and later Fortuyn) 
insisted that the failed integration of minorities resulted from cultural differences 
linked to religion and language (ibid). According to Bale et al. (2013: 94), the 
ambiguous stance of the PvdA was reflected in the party programmes: ‘Indeed, a 
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closer look at it short manifesto for the 2003 parliamentary election indicates that 
the Labour Party prioritised the issue of social integration of ethnic minorities to a 
greater extent than in previous programmes. […] In the Labour Party’s programme 
of 2006, the issue receded to the middle of the document.’ The low priority given 
to immigration and integration suggests that the PvdA was trying to play down these 
issues. By doing so, the centre-left also assumed a more accommodating position 
towards the populist radical right. 
In fact, the ambivalent stance of the party resulted from disagreement inside the 
Labour party. Internally, the PvdA was divided between members who were in 
favour of the assimilation approach and those who had a more liberal outlook and 
were advocating multiculturalism (Bale et al. 2013: 94). This resulted in a ‘middle 
of the road’ policy that ultimately dissatisfied both camps. This ambiguity 
weakened the party’s position. As a result, the PvdA was no longer able to ‘defuse’ 
the immigration debate, which forced the party to assume a more restrictive stance: 
The failure to defuse the issue helped transform the strategic environment 
in which the Dutch social democrats now operated. Their move to the centre 
during the 1990s had weakened their core vote [...]. As the PvdA no longer 
defended its former multicultural positions – the hold strategy – and with 
their defuse strategy now backfiring, the party could do nothing else but 
adopt a more monocultural, tough-on-immigration stance. This was too late, 
however, to prevent radical populist mobilisation of discontent on both the 
left and right [...] (Bale et al. 2003: 416). 
Thus, as Lucardie (2008: 153) has observed, the ‘red’ of the social democrats in the 
‘purple’ coalition governments ‘turned out to be rather pale’; PvdA leader Wim 
Kok was ‘keen on “shedding the ideological feathers” of his party and his 
government mainly pursued liberal policies in both socio-economic and socio-
cultural spheres.’ When the VVD played the nationalist card, the PvdA did not offer 
any clear alternative but instead ‘went along’ with the new monoculturalist 
discourse. Mainstream parties seemed unable (and indeed unwilling) to freeze 
traditional lines of conflict. As a result, they were inadvertently tilling the field for 
the rise of the LPF. Fortuyn was able to assume issue ownership on the immigration 
issue, thereby capitalising on the increased salience of this new dividing line. As 
we shall see in the following chapter, the media also contributed to generating 
favourable discursive opportunity structures for the LPF and later the PVV. In that 
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sense, taken together, mainstream parties and the media helped paved the way for 
the rise of Fortuyn and later Wilders. 
4.2. Belgium 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is impossible to understand the rise of the populist 
radical right in Belgium without taking into account the regional dimension. Indeed, 
regionalism has had a profound impact on the party system(s). In the past, the 
Belgian party system was – just like the Dutch one – organised around three social 
cleavages (i.e. economic, denominational and communitarian), which gave rise to 
three traditional party families and associated pillars: i.e. Christian democrats, 
Liberals and social democrats. However, on top of these traditional cleavages, 
Belgium also has a cross-cutting linguistic cleavage. 
The linguistic cleavage became increasingly salient over the course of the twentieth 
century and ultimately transformed Belgium into a federal state, whereby the 
country was divided into two distinct party systems, each of which developed 
different patterns of party competition. Specifically, the Flemish party landscape is 
more fragmented than the francophone one (De Winter et al. 2006: 934). Relatedly, 
as shown below, in Wallonia (see Figure 8), support for traditional party families 
(i.e. social democrats, Christian democrats and Liberals) remains relatively stable, 
whereas support for Flemish mainstream parties (particularly support for the 





Figure 8 – Support for Mainstream Parties in Wallonia 
 
Source: Belgian Interior Ministry (2019) 
Notes:  In 1977, the PS and the Rassemblement Walloon (RW) formed a joint-list in the 
southernmost Belgian province called Luxembourg. 
In 1995 and 1999, the Liberal Reformist Party (PRL) formed a joint-list with the 
Francophone Democratic Federalists (FDF). In 1999, the Citizen’ Movement for 
Change (MCC) joined the alliance. In the 2000s, a German-speaking liberal party 
(Party for Freedom and Progress) joined the PRL-FDF-MCC alliance. This led to the 
foundation of the MR in 2002. 
 
 
Figure 9 – Support for Mainstream Parties in Flanders 
 
Source: Belgian Interior Ministry (2019) 
Notes: In 2003, the social-democratic sp.a (Socialistische Partij Anders or Socialist Party 
Differently) formed a joint-list with the social-liberal party SPIRIT (a break-away 
faction from the moderate nationalist Volksunie or People’s Union).  






















Differing levels of support for mainstream parties was particularly striking in the 
2014 Belgian Federal elections (see Table 5). In the francophone region, traditional 
party families won over 70 percent of the vote, compared to less than 50 percent in 
Flanders, where the relatively new nationalist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) 
garnered 32 percent of the vote. 


















Liberals Mouvement Réformateur 
(MR) 
25.96% Open Vlaamse Liberalen 
en Democraten (VLD) 
15.55% 




Belgian Interior Ministry (2019) 
Notes: The table shows regional electoral results obtained during federal elections. Since 
Belgium has a confederal party model, these results are most relevant here. 
 
4.2.1. The Salience of the Economic Cleavage in Wallonia 
The relative strength of Walloon mainstream parties (particularly the PS) can be 
attributed to the fact that traditional social cleavages are more pronounced in the 
francophone south of Belgium. Scholars have shown that social cleavages carry 
different weights in the two Belgian party systems (De Winter et al. 2006: 938). In 
Wallonia, ‘[t]he [economic] left–right dimension is still the most relevant for 
electoral behaviour […], whereas in Flanders ethnocentrism and political alienation 
have become the main factors’ (De Winter et al. 2006: 953). In Flanders, the ethno-
linguistic cleavage appears to trump all other lines of conflict. The importance of 
the regional dimension is reflected in the party names; with the exception of the 
social democrats, most political parties stress their Flemish identity: in 1992, the 
liberals changed their name from ‘Party for Liberty and Progress’ into ‘Flemish 
Liberals and Democrats’ (Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten or Open VLD), 
and in 2001, the ‘Christian People’s Party’ became ‘Christian Democratic and 
Flemish’ (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams or CD&V). In Wallonia, on the other 
hand, the economic line of conflict continue to play an important role. 92F93 
 
93 The salience of the traditional left-right cleavage in Wallonia may also help explain the rise of the 
far-left Parti du Travail de Belgique (Belgian Worker’s Party or PVDA-PTB) since 2010. With its 
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In Chapter 2, we saw that the salience of traditional cleavage structures can dampen 
demand for the populist radical right (Kriesi et al. 1995: 4). If old cleavages remain 
prominent, it is difficult to mobilise voters on new issues (Bornschier 2010). Over 
the past decades, as in the Netherlands, the erosion of the Belgian social pillars has 
contributed to the fragmentation of the Belgian party system(s). However, 
depillarisation has been less pronounced in Wallonia than in Flanders (van den Berg 
& Coffé 2012). Political fragmentation generally implies increased electoral 
volatility as well as partisan dealignment or detachment from traditional parties 
(e.g. Dalton et al. 2002), which, in turn, has increased the ‘availability’ of voters. 
This trend is more pronounced in Flanders, which helps explain the increased 
potential for demand for populist challenger parties.  
There are two different ways to explain the variation in the salience of cleavage 
structures. From a ‘bottom-up’ perspective, the importance of the economic 
cleavage in Wallonia may simply be understood as a reflection of the socio-
economic situation. As explained in Chapter 3, the southern, francophone region of 
Belgium is poorer than the northern Dutch-speaking part; although it was one of 
Europe’s first industrialised regions, Wallonia has faced economic decline since the 
end of WWII. In Flanders, on the other hand, post-war industrialisation was led by 
small and medium-sized enterprises and multinationals and, as a result, by the 
1960s, Flanders was prospering, while the Walloon economy was shrinking (De 
Winter et al. 2006: 183). Socio-economic issues may therefore simply be more 
relevant to Walloon voters. 
However, as Coffé (2005: 128) has rightly noted, the strength of the economic 
cleavage in Wallonia cannot solely be explained by the different economic 
situation. Instead, it must also be attributed to the behaviour of mainstream parties. 
From a ‘top-down’ perspective, it can be argued that Walloon mainstream parties 
have successfully managed to ‘freeze’ traditional lines of conflict. The dominance 
of the economic cleavage in Wallonia can be linked to the behaviour of the social 
democratic Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party or PS). Unlike most other social 
democratic parties in Europe, the PS has maintained a central position in the 
Walloon party landscape. This can be explained by the fact that the party plays a 
 
campaigns against globalisation, the PVDA-PTB appears to be mobilising voters on traditional 
economic issues, thereby appealing to voters from the PS. 
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pivotal role in the socialist ‘pillar’. As such, the links between the PS and its 
socialist subculture remain very close. Thanks to these links, the party managed to 
hold on to its traditional working-class electorate. It has done so through a 
combination of localised politics (‘socialism of proximity’) and clientelist practices, 
for instance by reserving jobs for party members in state enterprises, or by making 
use of the party’s auxiliary organisations (or ‘pillar organisations’), which grant the 
party direct access to public services, allowing it to distribute material benefits to 
its members (Coffé 2005; 2008: 184).93F94 For instance, the party maintains close ties 
with municipal utility companies, while public services (including health care, 
unemployment benefits and public-sector jobs) are also managed by party-affiliated 
organisations. The PS has deliberately used service provision (‘politiek 
dienstbetoon’) as a strategy to combat the rise of extremist groupings (Coffé 2005: 
143ff). Based on interviews with PS politicians, Coffé found that party 
representatives considered one of their main strengths to be their proximity to 
voters. According to the then-leader of the PS, Elio Di Rupo, ‘customer loyalty’ 
with voters is one of the party’s biggest strengths; moreover, ‘PS candidates do not 
mind putting in a good word for their voters with city administrations, or helping 
their constituents figure out how gas- and electricity connections work’ (Coffé 
2005: 146-7).  
Luther and Deschouwer (1999: 244) have shown that while membership in 
auxiliary organisations started plummeting in the Netherlands in the 1960s, it 
increased in Belgium for two more decades:  
Greatest stability is to be found amongst associations dispensing 
clientelistic [sic] services and it appears reasonable to conclude that the 
establishment of the latter type not only initially facilitated subcultural 
encapsulation, but also subsequently helped militate against the decline of 
organisational penetration. 
The survival of the socialist pillar in Wallonia ensures that the predictability of 
voting behaviour based on membership of socialist pillar organisations has 
remained relatively high (Billiet et al. 2006: 922). In that sense, the behaviour of 
 
94 In 2016 and 2017, the PS was struck by a series of corruption scandals regarding excessive 
renumerations awarded to PS politicians, who were also board members of public companies and 
non-profit organisations (e.g. Publifin and SAMUsocial). This led to several resignations. In June 
2017, Yvan Mayeur (PS) was forced to step down as Mayor of Brussels. The scandals generated a 
dip in public support for the PS, which coincided with a rise in support for the far-left PVDA-PTB. 
At the time of writing (May 2019), however, the PS seems to be recovering in the polls. 
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the PS has contributed to the preservation of traditional cleavage structures. Indeed, 
the party was able to capitalise on the salience of traditional economic issues (Coffé 
2008: 186).  
Unlike the Flemish social democrats (sp.a), the PS continued to advocate a classic 
left-wing socio-economic agenda. Even whilst governing with the liberals, the PS 
consistently maintained a strong leftist-socialist position and discourse (Coffé 
2008: 190). This observation is confirmed by looking at the overall positioning of 
Belgian social democratic parties over time. Using data compiled by the CMP, 
Figure 10 plots the right-left positions of Belgian social democratic parties during 
general elections according to the RILE-index (Volkens et al. 2018). The RILE-
index (arguably the most used and contested CMP index) is constructed based on 
certain a priori assumptions about the meaning of ‘left’ and ‘right’ (see Budge 
2013). In very basic terms, the index measures party positions on various issues 
(e.g. welfare state expansion; the role of the military; democracy; law and order; 
nationalism, etc.), and then plots them along a unidimensional right-left axis, where 
higher (positive) values indicate a right-wing position and negative values signify 
a left-wing position (Volkens et al. 2018). 94F95  
Figure 10 – Social Democratic Parties in Belgium on Left/Right Scale 
 
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2018) 
 
 
95 A full list of issues included in the RILE-index as well as a critique of the index can be found in 
Mölder (2016: 39). 
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The graph shows that the Walloon PS has moved further to the left over the past 
decades, whereas its Flemish counterpart has moved rightwards. In line with other 
social democratic parties of the Third Way, the Flemish social democrats revised 
their welfare agenda in the early 1990s by moving away from an outspoken leftist 
position and instead moving closer to the centre-right (Coffé 2008: 190). As a result, 
socio-economic issues became depoliticised: ‘This Third Way direction also 
implied that economic and welfare policies became a more consensual area, with 
limited party disagreement. […] As such, it receives less attention in political 
debates, thereby leaving more space for other political issues’ (ibid). Incidentally, 
the rise of the VB went hand in hand with the decline of the Flemish centre-left. 
When the VB had its initial electoral breakthrough in the early 1990s, nearly one 
fifth (19 percent) of the voters came from the social democratic Socialistische Partij 
(SP), while over 14 percent of the socialist trade union shifted their vote over to the 
VB, thereby turning the VB into ‘the biggest labour party’ in Flanders (Coffé 2008: 
183). 
The PS, on the contrary, managed to hold on to its core electorate. It did so by 
advocating a classic left-wing party. The party’s main official goal remains to end 
the class struggle. This focus is enshrined in the party statutes, the first article of 
which stresses its aim ‘to organise, within a class struggle context, all the socialist 
forces in Wallonia and Brussels, without distinction of race, sex, language, 
nationality, religious beliefs or philosophy, in order to conquer power and achieve 
the full emancipation of workers’ (PS 2017: 2). By comparison, the language of the 
Flemish social democrats (sp.a) is milder. In the first article of its party statutes, the 
sp.a maintains that it ‘wants a society without a class distinction, in which everyone 
can unfold freely and completely, without any form of it discrimination of gender, 
race, disability, language, nationality, religion or ideological belief’ (sp.a 2017: 3). 
The economic left-wing position of the PS was also reflected in the decision of the 
Socialist-led Walloon parliament to veto the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada in 2016. In the run-up to the 
decision, Walloon civil society had been very active in lobbying against EU trade 
deals. The resistance from the left against the trade agreements in Wallonia (and 
elsewhere) was driven by concerns that transatlantic trade deals would enable 
multinational corporations to undercut European labour and environmental 
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standards. Given the precarious economic situation in industrial Wallonia, the trade 
deals were considered particularly controversial and therefore became highly 
politicised. The PS had to cater to its electorate in order to thwart the risk of 
outflanked by the far-left PTB and the green party Ecolo. In October 2016, PS 
politician and then-Minister-President of Wallonia Paul Magnette announced that 
the Walloon parliament would not be signing the trade deal, thereby blocking the 
entire CETA deal, explaining that he had a democratic mandate to represent his 
constituents: 
Wallonia has always been a land of great democratic vitality. We have trade 
unions, social security providers, societies and associations in all sectors 
who are extremely active and vigilant, who mobilised and studied this text 
[i.e. CETA] very seriously, and who consulted the best experts […]. This 
democratic vitality of our own people we cannot ignore; we cannot brush it 
off with the excuse that we might run the risk of being isolated. To be 
isolated from one’s own people, to be isolated from one’s own citizens, at a 
time in the early twenty-first century when democracy is already deeply in 
crisis, would be at least as serious as being diplomatically isolated 
(Magnette 2016).  
By maintaining a classic left-wing discourse and agenda, the PS managed to 
strangle support for the populist radical right (see also Hossay 2002: 169). In other 
words, lingering demand for right-wing populism has, to some extent, been 
absorbed by the PS. In that respect, the PS has acted as a buffer to dampen demand 
for the far right (Coffé 2008).  
Besides absorbing demand for the populist radical right, the PS has also managed 
to absorb supply. The party has a history of recruiting politicians with nationalist 
(and sometimes even racist) tendencies and successfully neutralising them by 
embedding them into the wider socialist party structure. The case of José Happart 
serves as a useful example to illustrate this point (Coffé 2005: 153; see also 
Demelenne 1995). Happart was born in Herstal, a suburb of Liège. When his father 
was expropriated in the early 1960s due to the expansion of the steel industry, the 
latter proceeded to buy a new farm in Sint-Pieters-Voeren, a town which, at that 
time, still formed part of the francophone province of Liège. In 1962, the 
municipality of Voeren became part of the Dutch-speaking province of Limburg. 
José Happart campaigned on behalf of the francophone population for the region to 
be returned to Liège. In 1982, the linguistic struggle intensified when a local party 
called Retour à Liège (Return to Liège) won a majority in the municipal elections 
160 
 
and nominated José Happart as their mayoral candidate. Happart refused to speak 
Dutch, and to many francophone Belgians he became a symbol of anti-Flemish 
resistance. Initially, Happart was only active in local politics and did not seek to 
connect to established political parties. At the 1984 European elections, however, 
he was offered a place as an independent candidate on the list of the PS and was 
elected with nearly 235,000 personal votes (Volkskrant 1996). That same year, 
Happart joined the PS. In the words of Hilde Coffé (2005: 154): ‘By receiving him 
[i.e. Happart] with open arms, the PS swallowed almost the entire Walloon 
Movement. [...] He was, to some extent, an outsider of the political system and was 
therefore able to appeal to discontent voters. In that way he formed a barrier against 
the extreme right.’  
The Happart case was not an isolated incident. There are several other examples of 
local PS politicians flirting with nationalist and/or xenophobic ideas. In September 
2015, for instance, Freddy Delvaux, a local PS councillor in Sambreville (located 
in the province of Namur), caused public uproar after posting a Belgian flag on his 
Facebook profile with the caption: ‘Protecting your country from an invasion [of 
immigrants] is not racism or xenophobia but patriotism.’ In October 2018, Christian 
Michel, who was a PS candidate in Arlon, was accused by other parties (notably 
Ecolo) of being a right-wing extremist after promising to advocate social rights ‘for 
our fellow citizens before others’ in the run-up to the Belgian local elections’ 
(Michel 2018).  
To be sure, the PS has not always managed to ‘discipline’ local PS politicians, 
which has occasionally resulted in expulsions (see, for example, Le Soir 2015).95F96 
However, the official party line of the PS has remained unequivocally in favour of 
multiculturalism and immigration. This can partly be attributed to PS leaders such 
as Elio Di Rupo, who himself is of Italian descent, and who has consistently 
advocated social tolerance. Reacting to the outcry over PS local councillors 
supporting racist slurs, Di Rupo (quoted in RTBF 2015) took a clear stance by 
distancing his party from the latter:  
 
96 Serge Reynders, a PS local councillor from Saint-Nicolas (located in the Province of Liège), who 
was expelled in September 2015 after repeatedly targeting immigrants on social media has since 
joined the ranks of the right-wing People’s Party (PP). 
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Today’s Belgium is no longer ‘daddy’s Belgium’, it’s no longer 
francophones in the south nor Dutch speakers in the north, there is a melting 
pot all over the country and we also need to promote the talents of those 
people who come from horizons beyond Belgium. […] Over the course of 
the centuries, we have built an open, supportive and tolerant country, and it 
must remain so. 
As Coffé (2005: 155) has observed, unlike their Flemish colleagues, francophone 
mainstream politicians have ‘resolutely opted for an “open society”.’ This can be 
explained by the different historical experiences the two regions have had with 
immigration. The francophone region has a long history of migration. In the wake 
of World War II, the Belgian government actively recruited Italian workers for the 
country’s booming industries, most of whom settled in Wallonia (Coffé 2004: 198). 
From their very arrival, foreign workers were incorporated into existing social 
structures, notably trade unions, which pre-empted the emergence of Italian 
political associations because it effectively depoliticised and neutralised any 
potential immigrant community leaders (Hossay 2002: 171). This practice, which 
fostered a relatively seamless integration, set the tone for future waves of 
immigrants. 
4.2.2. The Politicisation of Immigration in Flanders 
In Flanders on the contrary, immigrant labour is a relatively recent occurrence; it 
was not until the 1960s that the Belgian government started to recruit Moroccan 
and Turkish guest workers to supplement the declining supply of migrants from 
southern Europe. Unlike Italian workers, these new immigrants settled in cultural 
enclaves and remained relatively isolated. Although the flow of migrant workers 
ebbed in the 1970s, the immigrant communities continued to grow as a result of 
high birth rates and family reunification laws (Hossay 2002: 172). While 
antagonism towards immigrants started to rise in Flanders, francophone politicians 
strategically started advocating voting rights for migrants in an attempt to increase 
their voter bases (Hossay 2002: 173). The Flemings were generally opposed to 
granting voting rights to immigrants because they feared that the latter would 
support Francophone candidates; according to Hossay (2002: 179), ‘[a]fter over a 
century of struggle to gain equal recognition of their culture and language, Flemings 
were unlikely to easily adopt a multiculturalist perspective of society. The fact that 
many African immigrants were Francophone only sharpened tensions.’ These 
different historic experiences also help explain why migration became more 
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politicised in Flanders than in Wallonia, where the relatively seamless integration 
prevented the creation of a new, cultural line of conflict.  
While Walloon mainstream parties (particularly the PS) were able to hold their 
positions by maintaining their traditional party lines, Flemish parties tried to co-opt 
the populist radical right by accommodating them and copying some of their issues. 
As Bale et al. (2010: 413) have observed, when faced with the rise of a far-right 
challenger, such a ‘principled’ response is generally quite risky for social 
democratic parties because it implies ‘making the case for tolerance of migration 
and multiculturalism in the face of contemporary, media-fuelled, concerns about 
terrorism, crime, welfare abuse and dependency, and the sheer pressure of 
population on public services and housing.’ While such a principled stance might 
have been risky in Flanders, it proved possible in Wallonia. As shown in the 
following chapter, migration-related topics were less politicised in the francophone 
media than in the Flemish press (Coffé 2004: 203-5). This enabled the PS to 
maintain a demarcating stance, thereby successfully defusing the salience of new 
political issues by focusing the agenda on other topics (see also Bale et al. 2010: 
413). 
This contrasts starkly with the Flemish case, where mainstream parties and the 
media facilitated the politicisation of new issues. To be sure, the spectacular rise of 
the VB in Flanders did not just affect social democrats. As Erk (2005: 499) has 
observed, the party managed to pull the entire political centre towards the right. The 
main difference with the Dutch case, however, is that the VB politicised 
immigration after entering the electoral arena. As explained in the previous chapter, 
the VB emerged as a regional pro-independence party and only morphed into a 
populist radical right party in the 1990s. The party thereby managed ‘to put the issue 
of immigration on the political agenda without much competition from other 
Flemish parties’ (Pauwels 2014: 110).  
In the early 1980s, the VB’s xenophobia primarily targeted Walloons and Belgian 
nationalists, but in the following decades, non-European immigrants (notably 
Muslims) became increasingly under attack (Pauwels 2014: 102-3). After the VB 
had seen its first electoral success at the local level by winning more than 17 percent 
of the votes in the city of Antwerp in the 1988 municipal elections, mainstream 
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Flemish parties were alarmed and felt compelled to adopt some aspects of the VB’s 
agenda (Coffé 2004: 225). This increased the salience of issues related to crime and, 
above all, immigration (Coffé 2008: 190). In 1992, the VB developed its (in)famous 
seventy-point programme, which was essentially a plan for repatriating non-
European foreigners to their countries of origin. By the time other mainstream 
parties started appropriating the immigration issue, the VB had already established 
issue ownership. Once a populist radical right party has persuaded voters that it is 
better suited to ‘handle’ certain issues, the increased salience of those issues will 
benefit the populist radical right (Mudde 2007: 241-2).  
To be sure, in both regions in Belgium, mainstream parties adhered to political 
demarcation by agreeing not to cooperate with the far right by means of a political 
cordon sanitaire. The idea of boycotting the VB originated in Flanders, following 
the VB’s breakthrough in the 1988 municipal elections. When the party also won a 
seat in the European elections a year later, other parties decided to formally exclude 
the Vlaams Blok. Under the initiative of Jos Geysels, who was an MP for the 
Flemish Green Party Agalev (now called Groen! or Green!), representatives of the 
remaining Flemish parties, including the Christian democratic CVP (Herman Van 
Rompuy), the progressive liberal PVV (Annemie Neyts), the social-democratic SP 
(Frank Vandenbroucke), the conservative liberal VLD (Jaak Gabriëls) and the 
moderate Flemish-nationalist VU (Paul Van Grembergen) signed a protocol in 
which they committed their parties to completely refrain from cooperating with the 
Vlaams Blok, whether at the local, provincial, regional, national or European levels 
(Damen 2001: 92). 
However, the cordon could not prevent the electoral breakthrough of the VB in 
Flanders. First, it was set up after the VB had made important electoral gains at the 
local level. In other words, the cordon sanitaire was initiated in response to the 
presence of an electorally successful far-right party in Flanders, whereas the 
comparable movements had not yet managed to enter the electoral arena in 
Wallonia. Second, the cordon became porous relatively quickly; barely forty days 
after signing the agreement, the then-chairman of the Flemish-nationalist People’s 
Union (VU) Jaak Gabriëls proclaimed in an interview with the Gazet van 
Antwerpen that the cordon was absurd, and that it would ultimately grant too much 
publicity to the VB (Coffé 2005: 165). Because of the defection by the VU, the 
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cordon became less effective; after all, as noted in Chapter 2, if a cordon is not fully 
‘watertight’ (i.e. solid), it is less likely to fulfil its purpose (Art 2011: 44). Therefore, 
the cordon could not prevent the electoral breakthrough of the VB. Yet, the Flemish 
VB has consistently and principally been excluded as a viable coalition partner at 
the regional and federal level. It is possible that the party’s systematic exclusion 
from power has had a negative impact on its electoral persistence. According to 
Pauwels (2011a), it can help explain ‘the strange decline of the VB’, given that 
being forced into ‘permanent opposition’ can deter voters in the long run from 
voting for that party.  
Overall, Walloon mainstream parties (notably the social democratic PS) have 
played an important role in defusing the debate around immigration. By 
maintaining the salience of the economic line of conflict, they effectively ‘froze’ 
existing cleavage structures, which hampered the introduction and politicisation of 
a new, cultural axis. In Flanders, mainstream parties were unable to prevent the 
introduction of a new political cleavage and proceeded to co-opt the nationalist 
agenda of the VB. 
4.3. Luxembourg 
In comparison to Belgium and the Netherlands, there are very few academic studies 
of party competition and the state of consociationalism in the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg. Although Luxembourg is generally considered an archetypal 
consociational democracy, it is often excluded from analyses. This may partly be 
due to the country’s size. Yet, the lack of literature may also be attributed to the fact 
that politics in the Grand Duchy are generally quite uneventful. 
Luxembourg is widely known for its great political stability. This is reflected in the 
overall support for the three traditional party families: the Christian-democratic 
CSV; the social-democratic LSAP and the liberal DP. Since the end of WWII, these 
three parties have competed for voters at the centre of the ideological triangle, 
which helps explain why polarising issues never really gained traction during 
elections (Lorig 2008: 39-40). As shown in Figure 11, unlike in the Netherlands 
and Flanders, support for Luxembourgish mainstream parties has remained 
relatively stable over the last half century. 
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Figure 11 – Support for Mainstream Parties in Luxembourg 
 
Source: Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (2019) 
 
 
The stability of Luxembourgish politics can be linked to the country’s remarkable 
economic success (see Chapter 3), which, in turn, has been attributed to what 
Katzenstein (1985) has labelled ‘democratic corporatism’, an ideology that is 
characterised by a willingness of different interest groups to cooperate by sharing 
political power, thereby creating a particularly stable political environment. 96F97 
Specifically, the post-war economic success of Luxembourg (and other small, 
consociational democracies) can be explained by 
an ideology of social partnership expressed at the national level; a relatively 
centralized and concentrated system of interest groups; and voluntary and 
informal coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous political 
bargaining between interest groups, state bureaucracies, and political parties 
[which has resulted in] low-voltage politics (Katzenstein 1985: 32). 
There is very little evidence of polarisation in Luxembourg, and mainstream 
political parties have truly established a consensus democracy. Therefore, 
‘[c]omparative analysis with other EU countries qualifies Luxembourg as a 
 
97 Although Katzenstein (1985) focused his study of Small States in Global Markets primarily on 












relatively low-conflict society, where democratic institutions […] are traditionally 
widely accepted’ (Lorig 2008: 41). 
The very essence of consociationalism is the ‘that democratic instability resulting 
from social segmentation can be avoided when the segmental elites refrain from 
competition’ (Andeweg 2000: 532). In consociational democracies, the co-optation 
of minorities has contributed to decreasing the salience of political cleavages, which 
has raised questions as to whether consociationalism was ultimately ‘bound to 
disappear by rendering itself superfluous’ (Lehmbruch 1993: 56–57). Once social 
cleavages have disappeared, elites often continue to engage in consociational 
practices. For instance, they might avoid majority decision-making by instead 
seeking to accommodate differing viewpoints and forging a consensus. According 
to Andeweg (2000: 532), elites are particularly likely to refrain from engaging in 
political competition after cleavages have waned ‘when the conditions or 
institutional arrangements are such that they think it is beneficial and/or appropriate 
for them to do so.’ When elites stick with consensus-making habits after societal 
cleavages have disappeared, we find ourselves in a depoliticised democracy.  
In line with this observation, at the turn of the twenty-first century (i.e. before the 
rise of the populist radical right), scholars noted that politics in the Netherlands had 
become ‘depoliticised’ (e.g. Andeweg 2000; Lijphart 2001; Koole & Daalder 
2002).97F98 This description also seems applicable to Luxembourg. According to 
Lijphart (1981: 9), the Grand Duchy ‘reached the high point of [its] consociational 
development in the late 1950s and [has] been declining since – not, it is worth 
emphasizing, as a result of a failure of consociational democracy, but because 
consociationalism by its very success made itself superfluous.’ Although social 
cleavages and differences between political parties have faded, political elites 
remain actively engaged in employing consociational practices. Cooperation at the 
elite level is facilitated by the small size of the country. As Lijphart (1984: 123) has 
observed, ‘[i]n small countries political leaders are more likely to know each other 
personally than in larger countries, the decision-making process is less complex, 
and such countries generally do not conduct a very active foreign policy.’ Given 
the nature of the Luxembourgish political landscape, it makes little sense to discuss 
 
98 Rudy Andeweg (2000) has argued that consensus democracies provide fertile ground for anti-
system parties (see also Hakhverdian & Koop 2007). 
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party competition; to put it bluntly, there is very little competition between political 
parties in the Grand Duchy. It makes more sense to consider elite behaviour instead. 
The tradition of accommodation and inter-party cooperation that is characteristic of 
consensus democracies has given rise to the ‘cartelisation’ of politics (Katz & Mair 
1995: 17). In very basic terms, cartelisation is a term used to describe a situation in 
which political parties have moved away from civil society and closer to the state, 
whilst also moving closer towards one another, thereby contributing to the 
‘hollowing out’ of democracy (Mair 2006). This implies that party programmes 
have become increasingly similar and campaigns focus on achieving previously 
agreed goals. Cartelisation is more likely to occur in consociational democracies; 
as Katz and Mair (1995: 17) have observed, cartelisation is ‘a process that is likely 
to develop most easily in those political cultures marked by a tradition of inter-party 
cooperation and accommodation.’ Similarly, Lijphart (1969:216) has argued that 
‘[c]onsociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a 
democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.’ 
The cartelisation of Luxembourgish parties is reflected in the fact that, up until 
2013, power was traditionally shared between two of the three traditional party 
families. The Christian democrats played a pivotal role in the formation of 
government coalitions; indeed, between 1947 and 2013, the CSV had only been in 
opposition once (1975-1979). As shown in Table 6, in the past, coalition 
governments were typically composed of either Christian democrats and social 





Table 6 –Government Participation of Mainstream Parties in Luxembourg 
 CSV LSAP DP 
1945-1948 + + + 
1948-1951 + - + 
1951-1954 + + - 
1954-1959 + + - 
1959-1964 + - + 
1964-1968 + + - 
1968-1974 + - + 
1974-1979 - + + 
1979-1984 + - + 
1984-1989 + + - 
1989-1994 + + - 
1994-1999 + + - 
1999-2004 + - + 
2004-2009 + + - 
2009-2013 + + - 
2013-2018* - + + 
2018-* - + + 
Total Number: 14 12 9 
 
Source: Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (2019) 
Notes: Government participation is marked in green (+); opposition in red (-). 
*In 2013 and 2018, LSAP and DP formed a three-way coalition with the Green Party. 
 
The cartelisation of Luxembourgish politics is evidenced by the fact that there is a 
broad cross-partisan ‘cosmopolitan’ consensus. In other words, party elites 
representing the traditional party families generally agree that immigration is both 
necessary and positive for the Grand Duchy. This is reflected in their advocacy of 
enfranchising foreign residents. Similar to Wallonia, Luxembourg has a long 
history of immigration. As shown in Chapter 3, the wealth of the country is largely 
dependent on foreign workers. Luxembourgish politicians are acutely aware of this, 
and since the 1970s, they have resolutely opted for a xenophile discourse. 
This has not always been the case. As Scuto (2012) observed, the Grand Duchy’s 
official stance on immigration has oscillated between active recruitment of foreign 
workers as a result of acute labour shortages to fear of Überfremdung and restrictive 
immigration laws. Up until WWI, immigration was largely unregulated as the 
Luxembourgish government adopted a ‘laissez-faire’ approach (Fetzer 2011: 8; 
Willems & Milmeister 2008: 75). In the interwar period, the large proportion of 
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foreign workers assumed the role of a ‘safety valve’ that could be opened and closed 
as needed, allowing the government to export unemployment and other social 
problems in times of economic hardship (Scuto 2012: 88-9; Thomas 2015: 32). 
During the global depression in the 1930s, more than half of the foreign workers 
were simply sent home, thereby allowing the Grand Duchy to maintain a 
remarkably low unemployment rate. After WWII, the number of foreigners started 
to rise sharply (see Chapter 3), which evoked rising nationalist and xenophobic 
sentiments among the local population (Scuto 2012: 93). Consequently, until the 
mid-1970s, the Luxembourgish government maintained restrictive citizenship laws 
as well as protectionist and discriminatory immigration policies. Throughout the 
1950s, for instance, annual quotas were set to restrict the number of Italian 
immigrants, workers were only given short working permits, and they were not 
allowed to bring their families (Scuto 2012: 284-5).  
It was only after the European Economic Community (EEC) introduced the first 
regulation on the free movement of workers in 1961 that the Luxembourgish 
government started to ease restrictions again. According to Scuto (2012: 286), ‘the 
government’s immigration policy was “reduced to rubble” [‘battue en brèche’] by 
the principle of free movement.’ Similarly, Thomas (2015: 32) notes that European 
integration brought a certain element of stability and protection for migrant workers 
in the EEC. Indeed, it was the European Social Charter (drafted by the Council of 
Europe) in combination with recommendations by the European Commission that 
prompted Luxembourg to install government support services for immigrant 
workers in 1964 (Scuto 2012: 296). 
The 1960s marked an important turning point for the country, as it eventually 
started to overcome its fear of being annexed by its neighbours. According to Scuto 
(2012: 286), this was a time of ‘progressive opening towards modernity’ as the 
patriotic and nationalistic rhetoric ebbed. During the 1970s, the country’s leaders 
gradually came to accept immigration as a structural rather than a temporary 
phenomenon (Scuto 2012: 296; Thomas 2015: 32). As the elites started to fully 
grasp the importance of foreign workers to the Grand Duchy’s economy, their 
public discourse became openly xenophile. In 1984, Jacques Santer, then newly 
elected head of government and leader of the conservative Christian-democratic 
party, declared that ‘immigrants have largely contributed to the upswing of the 
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country and their presence will continue to be indispensable for the future success 
of our economy’ (quoted in Scuto 2012: 308). This set an important precedent for 
Luxembourgish leaders. 
The resolutely open stance of Luxembourgish elites initially generated a backlash, 
as demonstrated by the creation of several localist nationalist and xenophobic 
groupings (see Chapter 3). According to Scuto (2012: 308), ‘this context explains 
why the xenophile discourse on migration and integration adopted by the 
government on the one hand and the majority of MPs on the other was not 
accompanied by adequate political measures.’ In other words, localised domestic 
resistance kept the government from matching its words with policy deeds. In 
response, Luxembourgish elites in government as well as in trade unions have 
strategically used the European framework to advocate for and introduce more 
immigrant-friendly policies. By strategically using the strong tailwind from 
Brussels, Luxembourgish government officials were able to gradually enfranchise 
foreign residents.  
A specific example can be found in the introduction of voting rights for foreign 
residents in local elections. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of 
European citizenship and thereby ‘the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for 
European and municipal elections in the State in which he or she resides’ (European 
Union 1992 [2012]). In accordance with this treaty, EU citizens residing in 
Luxembourg were given the right to vote in European parliamentary elections in 
1994. In 1999, non-national EU citizens were also allowed to vote and stand in local 
elections, provided they were able to prove six years of residency (CEFIS 2014). In 
2003, the government went one step further by granting all non-national residents 
(including those from non-EU countries) the right to vote in communal elections, 
provided they had resided in the country for a minimum of five years (Fetzer 2011: 
98). Since 2011, non-EU citizens are also allowed to stand for communal elections. 
In addition, since 2011, non-national residents can also run for the posts of mayor 
and deputy mayor (CEFIS 2014).  
In addition, the country’s two main trade unions have consistently lobbied the 
government for more inclusive policies for immigrants and cross-border workers. 
When the government started to become cautiously xenophile during the 1970s, the 
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two major trade unions at the time, the Lëtzebuerger Arbechterverband 
(Luxembourgish Workers’ Federation or LAV) and the Lëtzebuerger 
Chrëschtleche Gewerkschaftsbond (Luxembourgish Confederation of Christian 
Trade Unions or LCGB) followed suit and started to align themselves with migrant 
workers (Scuto 2012: 298). In the following decades, these unions began actively 
to recruit immigrants and cross-border workers into their ranks. From the 1980s 
onwards, trade unions became increasingly attentive to the demands of foreign 
workers and started lobbying for their political and social integration. Once again, 
the European framework served as a stepping stone to initiate more inclusive social 
structures within the unions. As Thomas (2015: 39) notes,  
[Luxembourgish] unions initially relied on the existence of a common legal 
infrastructure, consisting of the provisions on the free movement of 
workers, which applied to citizens of the EEC and later the EU. This 
common infrastructure made it possible to put in place support and 
information services for [union] members in the areas of social- and 
workers’ rights. 
When the Luxembourgish Parliament reformed the country’s system of family 
allowances in 2010, thereby limiting cross-border workers’ access to student grants, 
trade unions protested on their behalf by invoking EU legislation and arguing that 
the modified law was in violation of the principle of non-discrimination. In his 
detailed analysis of this case, Thomas (2013: 164) explained that: 
[Luxembourgish] trade unions have been active at the different levels of 
micro-regional integration, as well as in the EU dimension, in accordance 
with the Europeanised rhetoric, making use of the different levels of EU 
governance [...]. [T]hey turned to EU authorities, including members of the 
European Parliament and the European Commission.  
4.3.1. The Politicisation of National Identity in Luxembourg 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in 2015, the government initiated a consultative 
referendum on constitutional changes, asking voters (among two other questions) 
to voice their opinion on extending the voting rights of non-citizens to legislative 
elections (de Jonge & Petry 2019). In a country otherwise known for its stability, 
the referendum resembled something of a political earthquake: all three questions 
initiated by the governing parties were rejected by a landslide. While the 
referendum was intended as a means to enfranchise foreign residents, it led to the 




Upon taking office (in 2013), the Gambia coalition announced its ambition to 
modernise the political institutions of the country by advocating increased 
participatory democracy and strengthening the political rights of residents who do 
not have Luxembourgish nationality: ‘We want more participation, which means 
actively involving people in political decision-making processes […]. We are 
looking to establish a constructive dialogue with them and are therefore willing to 
strengthen their rights’ (Service Information et Presse 2014: 86). In line with this 
announcement, the prime minister framed the referendum as an opportunity to boost 
the democratic credentials of the country. During his annual state-of-the-nation 
address, held on 5 May 2015, Luxembourg’s liberal Prime Minister Xavier Bettel 
pledged for the introduction of the Awunnerwahlrecht (‘resident suffrage’), arguing 
that Luxembourg could become a ‘reference country’ for other European states. 
Bettel explained that: 
[the referendum] is an opportunity for Luxembourg to stand out as a country 
that is not only characterized by diversity and multilingualism, but as a 
country where people with different nationalities are welcome and invited 
to participate’, and that ‘participation should not be limited to people who 
have a Luxembourgish passport, but should be extended to those who live, 
work and reside here (quoted in Chambre des Députés 2015).  
 
The official campaign leading up to the referendum was remarkably one-sided. The 
Auslännerwahlrecht was supported by most of the established political parties as 
well prominent civil society actors and media outlets (see Chapter 5), who felt that 
enfranchising the large foreign population in Luxembourg was important for both 
demographic and moral considerations. At the forefront of the campaign were the 
three governing parties (i.e. DP, LSAP and Greens), which argued that voting rights 
in Luxembourg should be seen as a corollary of residency rather than citizenship.  
The ‘Yes’ camp was backed by youth parties as well as an eclectic mix of civil 
society actors. In April 2015, the youth wings of the four main parties (social 
democrats, Greens, liberals and Christian democrats) published a joint statement to 
express their support of the Auslännerwahlrecht and even went one step further by 
demanding less restrictive prerequisites to enfranchise foreign residents 
(Luxemburger Wort 2015a). In an open letter published later that month, a group of 
some fifty prominent Luxembourgish writers and artists also pledged their support 
for the initiative, urging voters to say ‘yes’ because ‘Luxembourg is a multilingual 
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and multicultural country’ and ‘this diversity should become a driving force for 
democracy, cultural dialogue and politics, through which a society of “inclusion” 
emerges’ (Tageblatt 2015). In June 2015, a group of leading business 
representatives followed suit, signing and publishing a full-page ad in the printed 
press: ‘We say […] YES, because we are convinced that this choice is important 
for our democracy and right for our country’ (RTL 2015). Two of the country’s 
main trade unions (i.e. the socialist-oriented OGBL as well as the Christian-
conservative LCGB) also expressed their support for the Auslännerwahlrecht by 
joining the Migration and Integration platform MINTÉ (Plateforme Migrations et 
Intégration), a group composed of nineteen associations representing foreign 
workers’ rights in the Grand Duchy. These examples illustrate that Luxembourgish 
elites (alongside various civil society actors) have played an important role in 
promoting an open society. As demonstrated in the following chapter, this view is 
also reflected and supported by the traditional media outlets.  
Opposition to the 2015 referendum through established channels was 
comparatively weak. Only two of the six political parties that held seats in 
parliament at the time voiced concerns over the Auslännerwahlrecht. First, the CSV 
assumed its role as opposition party by objecting to the Auslännerwahlrecht 
initiative proposed by the governing parties by arguing that a simple ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ 
vote on complex issues such as the Auslännerwahlrecht might risk polarising 
society (see Petry 2016: 53). According to the CSV, ‘participation in national 
elections and citizenship are very closely intertwined’; ‘nationality is a more 
effective tool for integration than optional voting rights’; and ‘no other European 
country separates voting rights from citizenship’ (CSV 2015). Thus, the CSV was 
not opposed to the enfranchisement of foreign residents per se. Indeed, over the 
course of the campaign, the party made it very clear that it shared many of the 
objectives pursued by the proponents of the Auslännerwahlrecht, notably the 
promotion of social cohesion as well as increased political participation for foreign 
residents (Petry 2016: 53-54). However, the CSV had different views on how these 
goals were to be achieved. Specifically, the party suggested alternative routes to 
ensure the political integration of foreign residents in the future, notably by 
facilitating access to citizenship. In line with this rather convoluted stance, the 
party’s campaign slogan for the referendum was somewhat ambiguous. Indeed, the 
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CSV’s campaign posters did not explicitly say ‘No’ to the referendum question(s), 
but merely urged voters to inform themselves before casting their ballots (CSV 
2015). 
In light of the ambivalent position of the CSV, the main partisan opposition came 
from the nationalist ADR. In comparison to the CSV, the ADR was vocally and 
explicitly opposed to granting foreigners the right to participate in general elections. 
In the run-up to the 2015 referendum, the ADR argued that voting rights entitle 
voters to have a say on questions related to national sovereignty, and that the right 
to vote should therefore remain coupled to Luxembourgish citizenship (ADR 
2015d). The ADR also highlighted the fact that Luxembourg already offered many 
opportunities for political participation to foreign citizens, and that the country 
accepts dual citizenship. Furthermore, the party warned that instituting voting rights 
for foreign nationals would be irreversible, and that even though the referendum 
question only concerned active voting rights, it would likely eventually lead to 
passive voting rights. Throughout the campaign, the party relied on emotional 
arguments by evoking feelings of Überfremdung (Petry 2016: 55-56; see also de 
Jonge 2015). 
Besides the CSV and the ADR, the civil servants’ trade union (CGFP) was also 
opposed to granting voting rights to non-Luxembourgish citizens, arguing that 
Luxembourg already grants dual citizenship, which allows non-nationals to acquire 
voting rights via Luxembourgish citizenship (see Petry 2016: 71-72). Overall, 
however, the opposition to the Auslännerwahlrecht from established political and 
civil society actors was rather weak, especially in comparison to the enthusiastic 
‘Yes’ campaign discussed above.  
Given this half-hearted political opposition as well as the general lack of space in 
the media (see Chapter 5), it is perhaps not surprising that the ‘No’ campaign for 
the 2015 referendum largely emerged in virtual forums. Since there was only very 
little resistance from established parties, two Luxembourgish citizens decided to 
take matters into their own hands by launching a website entitled ‘Nee2015.lu’ (i.e. 
‘No2015’). On their site, Fred Keup and Steve Kodesch, presented themselves as 
‘the political middle’ and listed various arguments to persuade readers to say ‘No’ 
to the Auslännerwahlrecht (Keup & Kodesch 2015). In line with the ADR, the 
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Nee2015 movement argued that every foreign national could easily acquire 
Luxembourgish nationality; applying for citizenship would signal their willingness 
to learn the Luxembourgish language, thus preserving the nation’s identity. 
Furthermore, Keup and Kodesch (2015) maintained that, by extending voting rights 
to non-nationals, Luxembourgers would ‘give up their own sovereignty’, which 
could be ‘the beginning of the end of “our” nation’ as it would lead to ‘the 
increasing disappearance of “our” language’ [i.e. the Luxembourgish language]. As 
mentioned earlier, nearly 80 percent of the population eventually voted ‘No’. The 
overwhelming success of the ‘No camp’ can largely be attributed to the activism of 
the Nee2015 movement. 
The debates surrounding the Auslännerwahlrecht referendum contributed to the 
politicisation of national identity and brought to the fore new dividing lines in 
Luxembourgish society. Above all, it introduced an ‘us versus them’ discourse (on 
the basis of the ‘80 versus 20 percent’ referendum result) and propelled identity 
politics to the centre of the political debate. Since the 2015 referendum, issues 
pertaining to the preservation of the Luxembourgish language have gained traction. 
The ripples of the 2015 referendum were also clearly noticeable in the run-up to the 
2018 general elections (see Chapter 3). 
In light of these developments, it appears that the ‘nationalist card’ has belatedly 
been put on the table by Luxembourgish mainstream parties. Following Ellinas 
(2010: 28), the politicisation of national identity ‘sets into motion a process of 
intense political competition’ along a new, cultural axis, which can lead to 
polarisation. This can increase the legitimacy of the populist radical right, because 
it is likely to shift the boundaries of what is politically acceptable. As long as 
mainstream parties keep the ‘nationalist card’ on the table, the increased legitimacy 
of far-right actors is likely to remain inconsequential; however, when they retract 
this card, it can create fertile ground for populist radical right parties to thrive 
(Ellinas 2010: 30). In Luxembourg, this is less likely to happen because of the 
unique structure of the Luxembourgish electorate (see Chapter 3) and the moderate 
media landscape, which is averse to polarisation (see Chapter 5). Yet, if the rise of 
the radical right is indeed part of a two-step process involving radicalisation of the 
discourse and polarisation of the party system, followed by political de-alignment, 
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as Ignazi (2003: 203) has argued, then Luxembourg may witness the rise of the 
radical right in the future. 
The recent electoral trajectories of Luxembourgish mainstream political parties 
resemble what occurred in the Netherlands some twenty years ago. As noted above, 
1994 marked a major electoral defeat for the Dutch Christian democrats, which 
resulted in a coalition government between social democrats and liberals. During 
the ‘purple coalition’, ethical issues were ‘resolved’, thereby forcing the Christian-
democrats to reposition themselves. In the Netherlands, this period (which has been 
described as a depoliticised consensus democracy) helped pave the way for the rise 
of Fortuyn and later Wilders. 
With reference to the works of Lijphart, Rudy Andeweg (2000: 533) foresaw the 
rise of anti-system parties in the Netherlands, on the basis that ‘the absence of true 
opposition within the system is likely to result in opposition against the system’, 
explaining that ‘[t]his hypothesis perfectly fits the rise of populist parties of the 
radical right in recent elections in Austria, Belgium and Switzerland.’ In 
Luxembourg, the ethical line of conflict appears to have become obsolete in recent 
years. In 2009, the CSV-LSAP government adopted legislation on euthanasia and 
assisted suicide, and in 2014, the Gambia coalition legalised same-sex marriage as 
well as the adoption of children by homosexual couples. With the CSV relegated to 
opposition, the Gambia coalition launched further substantial reforms to separate 
church and state. Thus, it appears that political competition is entirely depoliticised 
in the Grand Duchy. 
If Luxembourg is indeed following a similar path as the Netherlands, the country 
could witness the rise of anti-system parties in the near future. The electoral success 
of the Pirate Party in the 2018 general elections (which won 6.45 percent of the 
vote) could be interpreted as an early warning sign. More generally, the overall lack 
of partisan competition in Luxembourg could result in the rise of anti-system parties 
in the future. 
4.4. Conclusion 
As in other polities, the traditional (consociational) parties in all three Benelux 
countries have been affected by partisan dealignment and rising electoral volatility 
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(see Figure 12). In Luxembourg and Wallonia, however, the decline of mainstream 
parties has progressed at a slower pace. 
Figure 12 – Total Support for Mainstream Parties in the Benelux 
 
Sources: Belgian Interior Ministry (2019); Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg 
(2019); Kiesraad (2019). 
 
These differences may be due to the varied strengths of the related subcultures or 
‘auxiliary organisations’ that helped tie the parties to their specific pillars. In the 
Netherlands, ties between the pillar parties and their subcultures have always been 
weak and, accordingly, there has been very little evidence of clientelism:  
During the heyday of pillarization, many services [in the Netherlands] such 
as housing and health care were provided by pillar organizations, but over 
the years these have become professionalized and less oriented to members 
of their own subculture. Unlike […] in Belgium [notably Wallonia], the 
parties have never used, or been able to use, this potential for patronage to 
reinforce, or later to replace, mobilization based on interest representation. 
This reluctance or impotence on behalf of the parties has probably advanced 
and accelerated depillarization, but it may also have so far saved these 
parties from accusations of corruption (Andeweg 1999: 120). 
This has created a much more ‘level playing field’ in the Netherlands, with 
increased opportunities for political challenger parties. Similarly, Steven Wolinetz 
(1999: 240) has argued that, unlike Belgian pillar parties, their Dutch counterparts 
















Belgian social democrats have been more successful in exercising their ‘vertical’ 
role of mobilising its subculture. In Luxembourg, the media has played an important 
role in preserving the remnants of the pillar structure (see Chapter 5). 
In line with Luther and Deschouwer (1999: 260), the analysis presented above has 
shown that political parties are not ‘simply at the mercy of their societal 
environment. On the contrary, they are […] in control of what is happening to them, 
or at least of what is happening in their institutional environment.’ In Flanders and 
the Netherlands, mainstream parties contributed to the increasing salience of the 
immigration debate. The following chapter will show that in these polities, the 
media also played an important role in the radicalisation of the political discourse, 
which helped create a fertile breeding ground for the rise of the populist radical 




Chapter 5: The Media 
Like mainstream parties, the media can also play a crucial role in generating 
favourable or unfavourable opportunity structures for right-wing populist parties to 
thrive (see Chapter 2). The relationship between political systems and the media is 
best conceptualised in terms of co-evolution (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 47). The 
previous chapter has shown that broad, macro-level changes, including 
secularisation and depillarisation, contributed to various degrees of partisan 
dealignment and political fragmentation in the Benelux countries. This chapter 
discusses the ways in which these societal transformations have impacted their 
respective media landscapes as well as the interactions between the media and the 
populist radical right. 98F99  
Journalistic norms play a crucial role in shaping media coverage about the far right 
(Art 2006: 47). These norms are shaped by the media environment in which 
journalists operate (Ellinas 2010: 211). Drawing on existing research as well as a 
series of in-depth, semi-structured interviews (N=46) with media practitioners 
including editors-in-chief and journalists of traditional media outlets (i.e. 
newspapers, radio stations and television stations), the evidence presented below 
indicates that the Dutch and Flemish media landscapes are more accessible to right-
wing populist challengers than those Wallonia and Luxembourg. Specifically, the 
chapter shows that media practitioners in Luxembourg and Wallonia adhere to strict 
demarcation, whereas the strategies of Dutch and Flemish media practitioners have 
become more accommodating over time. The following subsections present the 
different media strategies in the four cases. The closing section compares the ways 
in which the media approach the populist radical right in the Benelux. Drawing on 
the seminal work of Hallin and Mancini (2004), it also reflects on the ways in which 
different media structures and strategies can create favourable or unfavourable 
opportunity structures for the rise of right-wing populist parties. 
5.1. Luxembourg 
The Luxembourgish media landscape is very distinctive. Given the size of the 
country, the number of potential media consumers is relatively small; yet, the media 
landscape is characterised by an unusually large number of media outlets (Barth & 
 




Hemmer 2008: 208). Alongside five daily (paid) newspapers as well as a dozen 
weekly and monthly print publications, there are three national radio stations and 
one national television channel. The remarkable quantity of media outlets can be 
ascribed to the Grand Duchy’s protectionist media legislation and the persistence 
of partisan ties in the press. In an attempt to safeguard media pluralism, print 
publications benefit from a generous public funding scheme, which amounts to 
nearly €7.5 million annually (Service Information et Presse 2017). Thanks to these 
press subsidies, financial pressures are limited, and most media outlets have the 
luxury of not having to cater to consumer demands. 99F100  
Furthermore, contrary to most Western European countries where the print media 
gained independence from political parties in the 1960s, partisan ties persist in the 
Luxembourgish press, and there are few truly independent (print) publications. This 
helps explain the high number of dailies, as ‘[t]he difference between the various 
paid [print] titles on offer has less to do with each newspaper’s areas of 
specialisation than […] its political or ideological leanings’ (Service Information et 
Presse 2013: 3). Virtually all (paid) daily newspapers have historic partisan ties. 
For example, the Luxemburger Wort (the oldest and largest daily newspaper in 
Luxembourg), which is read daily by 32 percent of the population (TNS ILRES 
2017), is published by the Imprimerie Saint-Paul (ISP). ISP belongs to the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of Luxembourg and the Wort is generally associated with the 
conservative Christian Social People’s Party (CSV). The Tageblatt (the second 
largest newspaper) is published by Groupe Editpress, which is partly owned by the 
socialist-oriented trade union (OGBL) and maintains ties to the Socialist Workers’ 
Party (LSAP) (Barth & Hemmer 2008: 210). While partisan links are fading, they 
remain a reality in the minds of the Luxembourgish people. As one editor-in-chief 
put it, the legacy of these partisan ties continues to ‘rub off on the image of the 
newspapers’. 100F101  
 
100 Because of their prominent position, RTL (the only commercial television and radio station) has 
signed an agreement with the Luxembourgish government to carry out a ‘public service mission’. 
In return, radio and television frequencies are made available to RTL by the Grand Duchy, and part 
of its production and broadcasting costs are covered by the state. 




Finally, because of the country’s small size, there is a very high degree of familiarity 
between the media and political actors. Indeed, it is common for journalists to 
maintain personal relationships with key actors in politics and civil society. One 
study conducted in 2003 about the Luxembourgish media landscape showed that 
80 percent of the Luxembourgish editors-in-chief maintained personal relationships 
with political decision-makers (compared to 46 percent in Germany) (Barth & 
Bucher 2003: 11). According to one editor-in-chief, ‘[t]he problem here in 
Luxembourg is that everyone knows everybody else [and so] one knows every 
parliamentarian and every minister. Very many journalists use the informal ‘you’ 
[‘du’] to address the minister, the minister of state and other parliamentarians’ 
(quoted in Barth & Bucher 2003: 11). In addition, there seems to be a ‘revolving 
door’ mechanism at work in the sense that many politicians used to work in 
journalism prior to entering politics. For instance, no fewer than five of the eighteen 
government ministers in office between 2013 and 2018 were former journalists, 
four of whom used to work for RTL. 101F102 One editor-in-chief described the situation 
as follows: 
I think the relationship in general in a small country, where everyone knows 
everyone – I mean if you are a domestic political journalist, […] you quickly 
get an overview of who does what, and you don’t have these massive 
apparatuses like you have abroad. In everyday life, this forges – how should 
I say – a close proximity because you are regularly in touch with these 
people.102F103  
The high degree of familiarity in combination with partisan ties and government 
subsidies make for a very moderate media landscape. One interviewee described 
the Luxembourgish media landscape as ‘something terribly artificial’, by 
explaining that it is very diverse but lacks a sound economic basis: 
We have I don’t know how many daily newspapers, we have X weekly 
journals, revues and gazettes and this and that, and we have radios, and one 
or two television channels. And all of this runs on a market of 550.000 
people. That’s just not possible. [This also creates challenges as far as the 
content quality is concerned]. Therefore, I’d say, there is no reflex in our 
 
102 The former journalists who were in government from 2013 until 2018 are: Félix Braz, Corinne 
Cahen, Francine Closener, Marc Hansen and Lydia Mutsch. 
103 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of the public service radio station (Radio 100,7) on 27 
September 2016 in Luxembourg City. 
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media landscape to make it [i.e. right-wing populism] an issue. There’s 
more of a ‘let’s stay away from this’. That is my impression. 103F104 
While all interviewees maintained that there was no formal agreement on how to 
deal with right-wing populism, many pointed to the ethics code of the press council, 
explaining that there appeared to be an informal understanding among 
Luxembourgish journalists to be highly critical towards populism and extremism. 
According to one interviewee, ‘there is a great tacit consensus in the press against 
racism and exaggerated nationalism, even among the more conservative 
newspapers.’104F105 Indeed, the Luxembourgish media generally reflect the moderate 
views of the political elites. Given the uncommercial nature of the media landscape, 
there is little evidence of ‘sensationalism’ in the Luxembourgish press. 105F106 In 
comparison to other countries, topics such as immigration are not very politicised 
in the media, even though these views are not necessarily shared by the public.  
As shown in Chapter 4, there is a broad consensus at the elite level in Luxembourg 
that immigration and diversity contribute to the country’s wealth. This view is 
reflected in rather than criticised by the press. This became ever more obvious in 
the debates on ‘foreigner voting rights’ leading up to the 2015 referendum. Just like 
the majority of mainstream parties, the print media were generally sympathetic to 
the Auslännerwahlrecht. For instance, in an article entitled ‘If the “Wort” could 
vote’ published in May 2015, the editors of the Luxemburger Wort expressed their 
support for granting foreigners the right to vote:  
The editors of the ‘Luxemburger Wort’ are willing to open the right to vote 
(not, however, the right to be elected) to foreigners having resided in 
Luxembourg for more than ten years on the basis of their noticeable 
integration into everyday-life. We don’t see it as a threat to the political 
order nor to the Luxembourgish language, which we perceive to be more 
alive than ever (Siweck 2015). 106F107  
 
104 Interview with the Director of the public service radio station (Radio 100,7) on 2 September 2016 
in Luxembourg City. 
105 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of Lëtzebuerger Land on 20 September 2016 in Luxembourg 
City. 
106 Luxembourg does have a ‘tabloid’ news outlet called Lëtzebuerg Privat. However, it is boycotted 
by other news outlets and circulation numbers are not included in national surveys, which makes it 
difficult to gauge the number of regular readers. Moreover, demand for ‘tabloid’ newspapers is 
covered by foreign news outlets such as the German Bild Zeitung. 
107 In September 2017, Jean-Lou Siweck resigned as Editor-in-Chief of the Luxemburger Wort after 
clashing with the board of directors of the publishing house ISP over the newspaper’s editorial line. 
According to various news sources, the chairman of the board, former CSV cabinet minister Luc 
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This decision was surprising given that the Wort is generally considered to be a 
conservative newspaper. Interestingly, no media outlet spoke out against the 
Auslännerwahlrecht, which is striking given that 80 percent of the electorate 
eventually voted against it. It is also noteworthy that neither political parties nor 
media outlets took a critical stance in the aftermath of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. In 
an op-ed published in the Luxemburger Wort in July 2016, a prominent political 
news commentator asked to what extent the Grand Duchy really needs all these 
different media outlets when they all have the same opinion, and summed the 
situation up as follows:  
In Luxembourg, […] there is no medium in which commentators took a 
“conservative” stance in the ongoing refugee debate. Similarly, there was 
also no media outlet that took a stance against the [Auslännerwahlrecht 
referendum], so that at the time, 80 percent of the Luxembourgish 
population did not feel represented by any medium (Bumb 2016). 
This suggests that the public debate in Luxembourg is generally steered by the 
moderate views of the ruling elites, and these views are reflected in rather than 
criticised by the media. Because of the uncommercial character of the 
Luxembourgish media landscape, journalists have little incentive to establish close 
affinities to their audiences, spread anti-establishment sentiments or adopt a 
‘populist newsroom logic’ (see Esser et al. 2017: 367). The Luxembourgish media 
system is therefore not very compatible with the populist logic. As a result, there is 
little evidence of ‘media populism’ in the Grand Duchy.  
Overall, there seems to be a strong aversion towards right-wing populist tendencies 
among Luxembourgish media practitioners. For instance, when asked about his 
editorial line towards right-wing populism, the Editor-in-Chief of the liberal 
Journal said: ‘We try to debunk the various clichés and prejudices that are spread 
by those people, and those unfounded ideas – we try to expose them… by depicting 
reality’.107F108 The aversion towards right-wing populist tendencies is so strong that it 
has become a bit of a taboo topic. The then Editor-in-Chief of RTL Radio 
remembered an incident that occurred in the wake of the Balkan wars, which led to 
an increase in the number of refugees from former Yugoslavian countries, where 
 
Frieden, was dissatisfied that Siweck had made the newspaper too mainstream and that the paper 
had thereby lost its centre-right (i.e. Christian democratic) political identity (see Reporter 2017). 




he interviewed a government representative about the prospect of hosting thousands 
of people in the LuxExpo exposition building: ‘In light of the very sudden and rapid 
influx of refugees, I asked, “Don’t you think that that might be a bit too many?” 
That’s when immediately so-called progressive journalist colleagues put me in the 
corner of the ADR. That is to say: I was apparently very right-wing extremist at that 
time’. 108F109 According to one interviewee, ‘Nobody dares to say anything, because one 
is afraid that others will give you hell for it. But there is no contract in which this is 
agreed upon.’109F110 
Thus, overall, Luxembourgish media practitioners choose to demarcate the populist 
radical right; while there is no formal agreement on how to deal with right-wing 
populist movements, there is an implicit consensus not to give too much voice to 
these tendencies. As a result, the Luxembourgish media landscape provides 
unfavourable opportunity structures within which right-wing populist parties can 
thrive. 
5.2. Wallonia 
In francophone Belgium, media practitioners adhere to strict demarcation. There is 
an explicit agreement among media commentators not to offer a platform to the far 
right (see CSA 2011; 2012). This agreement, which is known as the cordon 
sanitaire médiatique, was initiated by francophone media outlets in the 1990s, and 
later formalised by the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (Superior Council of the 
Audio-visual or CSA), an organisation that regulates various electronic media in 
Belgium including television and radio stations. Essentially, the media cordon 
stipulates that, during election campaigns, audio-visual media cannot provide a 
platform to people who are linked to parties or movements that are labelled racist 
or ‘liberticides’, i.e. profoundly hostile to freedom (CSA 2012). 
In Belgium, political parties are represented on the governing body (conseil 
d’administration) of their public service broadcasters (i.e. the Flemish VRT and the 
francophone RTBF) proportionally to the number of votes they receive in their 
respective language communities. When the Vlaams Belang won seats on the board 
of the VRT after its initial electoral breakthrough on ‘Black Sunday’ in November 
 
109 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of RTL Radio on 8 September 2016 in Luxembourg City. 




1991, the RTBF decided to come up with a set of loose guidelines to prevent far-
right parties from gaining media access. Specifically, extremist parties were not to 
be interviewed ‘live’, and they were to be barred from participating in televised 
debates. These two guidelines were intended to obstruct extremist parties from 
gaining influence, because the RTBF feared that granting initial access would be 
impossible to reverse. To use the words of Simon-Pierre De Coster, who developed 
the legal basis for the cordon médiatique at the RTBF: ‘Once the worm is in the 
fruit, it will continue to make its way through the apple of the VRT.’ 110 F111 
Based on these two guiding principles (i.e. no livestreamed interviews and no 
participation in debates), the RTBF decided to deny access to the FNb in the run-
up to the 1994 elections because the party was considered racist and xenophobic, 
thereby clashing with internal RTBF regulations. This led to a series of lawsuits 
against the francophone media, most of which the FNb won, on the basis that the 
RTBF did not have sufficient proof to show that the party was, indeed, racist and 
xenophobic. In response, the RTBF set up a detailed vetting process to comb 
through the publications of parties they suspected of extremism. The aim was to 
demonstrate that some of their points ran contrary to certain legal principles – 
notably those enshrined in the non-discrimination clause of the European 
Convocation of Human Rights. In 1999, the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Belgium (Council of State) ruled that the RTBF had the right to deny access to 
parties they considered undemocratic. 111F112 This led to the formalisation of the cordon 
sanitaire médiatique. To date, the RTBF continues to scrutinise party publications 
in detail in the run-up to elections to determine whether or not a party abides by the 
rules of democracy. This process is taken very seriously. As the director of legal 
affairs explained, ‘I assume my responsibilities. I examine these party programs 
before every election. It takes a lot of time, but that’s the only way to fight non-
 
111 Interview with the Director of legal affairs at RTBF on 28 September 2017 in Brussels. 
112 The court ruling was based on the 1973 law on the Cultural Pact, which regulates media access 
for political groupings (Jamin 2005: 98). The law (article III, §1) only safeguards the protection of 
cultural and philosophical movements that respect the principles and rules of democracy (Service 
Public Fédéral Belge 2018). The Cultural Pact does not ban extremists from cultural boards, but 
merely permits cultural organisations to ban members of ‘extremist’ parties from participating 
(Jamin 2005: 100). The Flemings grant access to members of the VB, while the Walloons do not, 
suggesting that the two polities have different interpretations of the Cultural Pact. 
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democratic parties – that is to say: show where and how they do not respect the 
rules of democracy.’ 112F113 
Given that there was a consensus among francophone editors to maintain a cordon 
sanitaire médiatique, it became legally binding for electoral campaigns in 2011 
(CSA 2011), when televisions and radio stations in Wallonia agreed not to ever 
feature ‘extremist’ politicians in live-stream in the run-up to elections. This is not 
to say that they do not quote them or that they do not talk about them; they just 
never feature these parties directly. In other words, all quotes by and references to 
these parties are contextualised. It is worth emphasising that the cordon was not 
imposed by the CSA; rather, it was initiated by Walloon media practitioners as a 
purely voluntary and self-regulatory measure. 113F114 Although the CSA regulation only 
legally applies to electoral campaigns, most editors-in-chief adhere to this principle 
all year round – even outside electoral campaign periods. 114F115 It is not up to the CSA 
to classify political parties, however, which appears to be the greatest difficulty with 
the cordon sanitaire.115F116 Newsrooms have different ways of determining which 
parties should be covered by the cordon; they typically conduct internal 
investigations and consult with political scientists and/or Unia, an independent 
public institution in Belgium that was set up to combat discrimination and promote 
equal opportunities. 
The interviews revealed that there is a remarkable sense of solidarity among 
francophone media practitioners. Most (if not all) interviewees expressed a sense 
of pride in the media cordon. Upholding the policy was seen as a matter of principle. 
As one journalist at RTL television put it: ‘On ne s’approche pas du diable’ – you 
don’t talk to the devil.116F117 Similarly, the director of legal affairs at RTBF stated the 
following: ‘As journalists, we are the watchdogs of democracy, and as watchdogs, 
it is our job to bark and – if necessary – bite’.117F118  
Although the media cordon technically only covers domestic politics, it is also 
applied to foreign politicians since the RTBF wants to avoid being accused of 
 
113 Interview with the Director of legal affairs at RTBF on 28 September 2017 in Brussels. 
114 Interview with a CSA representative on 7 April 2017 in Brussels. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Interview with a political journalist at RTL on 12 April 2017 in Brussels. 
118 Interview with the Director of legal affairs at RTBF on 28 September 2017 in Brussels.  
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inconsistency. 118F119 Therefore, the public service broadcaster also refrains from 
featuring live interviews with representatives of the French Front National.119F120 In 
the run-up to the 2017 French presidential election, the RTBF decided to put a two-
minute delay in broadcasting the debate between Emmanuel Macron and Marine 
Le Pen. 120F121 The intention was to discourage any future domestic far-right 
movements from making the case that media access was to be granted, given that a 
representative of the French FN had been featured on live television. 
The print media also generally adhere to this ostracising principle, although some 
interviewees admitted that this position is becoming increasingly untenable. The 
deputy Editor-in-Chief at Le Soir, for instance, raised the problem of deciding who 
should be covered by the cordon: ‘Say we receive a chance to interview Donald 
Trump – do we do this? And what about Marine Le Pen? Where do you draw the 
line?’121F122 She also explained that Le Soir forms part of an international newspaper 
group LENA (Leading European Newspaper Alliance). Given that they are the only 
newspaper in this group to maintain such a measure, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to justify. Nevertheless, the press also generally abides by the guidelines 
stipulated by the cordon. 
The election of Donald Trump in the United States in November 2016 only seemed 
to reassure francophone media practitioners. In a televised debate about the future 
of the cordon sanitaire organised by RTL in the aftermath of the 2016 US 
presidential election, the Editor-in-chief of Le Soir explained that, ‘It’s a matter of 
values. We will not change our rules now that Trump has been elected. The 
experience that the francophone media have had with the cordon médiatique seems 
to have borne fruit to this date’ (quoted in Le Soir 2016). Overall, given the 
communication barriers, the Walloon media landscape seems impenetrable to right-
wing populist parties. To use the words of former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, the media deprive far-right movements of the ‘oxygen of publicity’. In 
 
119 Interviewing other far-right movements could provide ammunition for comparable domestic 
movements to advocate laxation of the cordon. Interview with the Director of legal affairs at RTBF 
on 28 September 2017 in Brussels. 
120 Interview with the Director of news and sports at RTBF on 29 March 2017 in Brussels. 
121 Interview with the Director of legal affairs at RTBF on 28 September 2017 in Brussels. 
122 Interview with the deputy Editor-in-Chief of Le Soir on 7 April 2017 in Brussels. 
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such a hostile media environment, it is particularly difficult for right-wing populist 
parties to thrive.  
5.3. Flanders 
While the political cordon sanitaire persists to this day in the Dutch-speaking 
region of Belgium, the media cordon was never formalised in Flanders and 
therefore became porous relatively quickly. Although most media outlets initially 
did not treat the Flemish Interest Party as an ‘ordinary party,’ media coverage of 
the party became more nuanced (i.e. less hostile) over time (Schafraad et al. 2012). 
In 1999, at the initiative of a Brussels-based organisation ‘Extreme right? No. 
Thanks’ (Extreemrechts? Nee. Bedankt), Flemish social scientists and journalists 
formulated a set of recommendations for ‘how to report on the extreme right’. 
Drawing on guidelines set up by their Dutch colleagues, they advised Flemish 
media editors to ensure that far-right spokespersons were only given very limited 
opportunities, for instance, by removing topics related to the far right from 
newspaper headlines, or by not publishing any readers’ letters written by far-right 
politicians (Dierickx 2005; De Swert 2001: 11). 
In the early 2000s, there was still a broad consensus among Flemish news editors 
to combat the Vlaams Blok. For example, in May 2003 (one day before the federal 
elections of that year), an article appeared in De Standaard in which then Editor-
in-Chief Peter Vandermeersch listed five reasons to vote in favour or against each 
of the major Flemish parties, but then explicitly stated that there was no valid reason 
whatsoever to vote for the Vlaams Blok: ‘We have […] analysed its [i.e. the VB’s] 
programme, studied how well it functioned in Parliament and investigated the 
quality of its political personnel. After careful consideration, we decided that there 
are no valid reasons to vote for the Bloc’ (De Standaard 2003).  
The Flemish public broadcaster (which at the time already counted two 
representatives of the Vlaams Blok on its board of directors) also took a clear stance 
against the VB. In a special note on its democratic and societal role (entitled De 
VRT en de democratische samenleving), the VRT explained that it would be 
particularly cautious when reporting on the VB, because it was ‘not a political party 
like any other’ (see De Standaard 2001). The directive stated that the VRT would 
not grant open tribunes to groups that could pose a threat to a pluralistic, democratic 
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society; only facts that were newsworthy or ‘journalistically relevant views’ were 
to be covered. However, as one interviewee pointed out, this directive has since 
‘disappeared somewhere in a drawer’. 122F123  
According to several interviewees, the demarcation strategy simply became 
unsustainable. Indeed, as the VB gained influence, media coverage intensified and 
became more nuanced. This can partly be explained by the rapid growth of the VB, 
as it is difficult to justify isolating a party once it has gained a substantial portion of 
the vote. As Esser et al. (2017: 366) noted, populist parties generally receive less 
coverage if their standing in the polls and their electoral strength is low; however, 
once a party gains influence, ‘media coverage becomes more intense and nuanced’, 
turning the VB from a ‘controversial outsider’ into an ‘established outsider’ 
(Schafraad et al. 2012). 
Some interviewees linked this shift to market pressures, by pointing out that putting 
a substantial part of the electorate offside would simply not be beneficial from a 
commercial point of view. This became evident when interviewing the Editor-in-
Chief of the Gazet van Antwerpen, a regional newspaper sold predominantly in the 
city of Antwerp, where the VB reaped some of its earliest electoral breakthroughs. 
She explained that, in the early days of the Flemish Interest Party, the Gazet sought 
to maintain a cordon, but this position was simply not sustainable because the party 
became such an important electoral force in Antwerp: 
There were lots of discussions here at the office about this at the time: ‘Why 
did that have to be so big?’; ‘Again Filip Dewinter?’; ‘Don’t put that on the 
front page!’ or ‘Keep this in the regional pages’ – those were the discussions 
we had constantly. But I think we’ve grown up a bit by becoming much 
calmer about this […]. So [the Vlaams Belang] has become a party that we 
treat with wariness, but we do talk to them… 123F124 
Similarly, when asked why there was no Flemish equivalent of the cordon 
méditique, one interviewee explained there had been one, but that it eroded after 
2004, when the Vlaams Blok was sentenced for racism. 124F125 The subsequent name 
change caused some of the quality newspapers to change their editorial line towards 
the VB. Many interviewees referred to an editorial published in 2004 by Peter 
 
123 Interview with a political journalist at VRT on 29 March 2017 in Brussels. 
124 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of the Gazet van Antwerpen on 27 March 2017 in Antwerp. 
125 Interview with a journalist at Apache, 27 March 2017 in Antwerp. 
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Vandermeersch in De Standaard, who argued that the name change signified a 
return to a normal political landscape in which the cordon sanitaire would be 
redundant (De Standaard 2004a). In the same year, De Standaard published an op-
ed by one of the leading members of the VB, Filip Dewinter, thereby granting direct 
access to the party for the very first time (see De Standaard 2004b). 
This decision seems to have marked a critical turning point, as it may have provided 
an incentive for other newspapers to follow suit. 125F126 At the left-leaning De Morgen, 
it was not until June 2016 that the newspaper first published an extensive featured 
interview with Dewinter (see De Morgen 2016a). In a corresponding editorial, the 
Editor-in-Chief Bart Eeckhout explained the reasoning behind this decision:  
De Morgen still does not consider the Vlaams Belang to be a party like any 
other. […] With his social image, Filip Dewinter is far removed from the 
open, free and equal society that this newspaper embraces. That is precisely 
why we believe that his voice should be heard, also extensively in De 
Morgen. This ‘independent newspaper’ has a social conviction. That’s 
nothing to be embarrassed about. Journalistic interest, especially for 
disturbing, deviating and conflicting opinions, is an integral part of that 
conviction (De Morgen 2016b). 
When interviewed, Eeckhout elaborated on this justification by explaining that, as 
a journalist, he had learned to become relatively self-critical and cautious about 
judging people who vote for right-wing populist parties by distancing himself from 
this classically progressive way of thinking. Instead, he was interested in analysing 
what motivates people to vote for these parties:  
It’s difficult to say that you’re interested in their incentives – even though 
you may not agree with these incentives, and even though you can see the 
risks of those incentives – but you cannot look at this with an open mind 
whilst also maintaining that those politicians are not allowed to speak. That 
simply no longer works from a journalistic point of view. 126F127  
This editorial line appears to have persisted. In March 2018, for example, De 
Morgen published an in-depth featured interview with the then rather unknown 
Dries Van Langenhove, founder of Schild & Vrienden, a Flemish far-right youth-
organization (see De Morgen 2018a).127F128 This generated considerable backlash 
 
126 Interview with a journalist at Apache, 27 March 2017 in Antwerp. 
127 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of De Morgen on 30 March 2017 in Kobbegem. 
128 Schild & Vrienden (literally ‘Shield & Friends’) refers to an episode during the Franco-Flemish 
war (1297-1305), during which Flemish militias allegedly used the phrase as a shibboleth to 




among the more left-leaning readership of the newspaper. In response to the 
criticism, Joël de Ceulaer, a senior writer at De Morgen, who had conducted the 
interview with Van Langenhove, published an editorial in which he explained: ‘I 
don’t think journalists should be paternalistic. The question as to what effect an 
interview has on readers’ voting behaviour is, in my opinion, irrelevant. I’m just 
doing my job’ (De Morgen 2018b). 
In general, media practitioners in Flanders seemed to abide by different journalistic 
standards from their Walloon colleagues. Most interviewees highlighted the 
importance of maintaining an open mind when it comes to discussing right-wing 
populist parties. For instance, the Editor-in-Chief of VTM Nieuws (the daily news 
broadcast of the commercial Flemish Television Company) insisted that it is 
important to dare to call things what they are, maintain an open spirit and portray 
different opinions. 128F129  
In fact, several interviewees explained that isolating the far right was simply 
unprofessional, which suggests that they held different views about the role of 
journalists in society from their Walloon colleagues. Overall, Flemish media 
practitioners highlighted the importance of taking readers’ views very seriously. 
The Editor-in-Chief of the Gazet van Antwerpen explained that, as a newspaper, 
they tried very hard to respect their readers by taking their fears and opinions into 
account: ‘In my op-eds, I always try to show some degree of understanding – not 
for the politicians who say these things, but for those people who might be prone to 
believe them. That is a nuance that I find important.’ 129F130  
Thus, the positioning of media practitioners vis-à-vis right-wing populist parties 
shifted over time from demarcation to confrontation and accommodation. This 
observation is in line with previous studies, which showed that many newspapers 
initially applied confrontational ‘exposure’ strategies to unveil the VB’s ‘true face’, 
especially in the run-up to elections (De Swert 2002). Perhaps more importantly, 
scholars have also shown that the Flemish media helped politicise some of the 
issues of the VB by paying disproportionate attention to immigration and crime, 
thereby contributing to its electoral success (Coffé 2005: 172-4; Walgrave & De 
 
129 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of VTM on 6 April 2017 in Vilvoorde. 
130 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of the Gazet van Antwerpen on 27 March 2017 in Antwerp. 
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Swert 2004). In other words, although ‘the [Flemish] media did not open their gates 
entirely and uncritically to the populist radical right, […] the news media did focus 
extensively on nationalism, immigrant topics, and crime-related themes as issues 
“owned” by the VB’ (De Cleen & Van Aelst 2017: 103).  
The effort of media practitioners to focus on the experiences of common citizens 
(i.e. populism by the media), as well as their tendency to open up to populist 
messages (i.e. populist citizen journalism) is illustrative of the populist newsroom 
logic (see Esser et al. 2017), which makes the Flemish media landscape accessible 
to right-wing populist parties. 
5.4. The Netherlands 
These trends were also visible in the Netherlands, where editors held similar views 
to those in Flanders. Most media practitioners highlighted the importance of 
maintaining an open mind. When asked about the role of newspapers in society, 
one editor-in-chief responded: ‘We’re a platform for collisions. And if you have a 
closed worldview as a newspaper, well, you take position on one side of the 
debate… Yes, and I find that boring from an intellectual point of view’. 130F131 
Similarly, the Editor-in-Chief of the weekly newsmagazine Elsevier Weekblad 
stated: ‘It’s our job to collect facts and arguments, and to pass them on to society. 
It’s not for us journalists to decide whether someone might benefit from that 
information. We should be able to call things what they are; throw it into the open! 
The facts will emerge through these clashes of ideas.’ 131F132  
In general, the Dutch media see their role less as educators; instead, they think of 
themselves as providing a forum for debate. This was exemplified in their emphasis 
on ‘populist citizen journalism’ (see Esser et al. 2017: 371). Several media 
practitioners highlighted the importance of providing opportunities for readers and 
viewers to express their opinions. For instance, the Editor-in-Chief of the popular 
tabloid Telegraaf stated that the views of ‘the common people’ are considered just 
as important as those held by elites.132F133 The two biggest newspapers in the 
Netherlands, the Algemeen Dagblad (AD) and the Telegraaf, both reserve pages in 
their newspapers for readers to voice their hopes, fears and concerns. This view is 
 
131 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of de Volkskrant on 21 March 2017 in Amsterdam. 
132 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of Elsevier Weekblad on 9 August 2017 via phone. 
133 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of de Telegraaf on 23 March 2017 in Amsterdam. 
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based on the premise that newspapers should also serve as an ‘safety valve 
[uitlaatklep]’ for people to express their views. 133F134 According to the Editor-in-Chief 
of the AD, it is crucial for a newspaper to stay close to its readers: 
There are two groups of people who are overrepresented in the media: the 
elites, and the opposite, that is: those who are kicking at everything. The 
large group in the middle does not feel represented. And that is our group! 
We are your voice; we cater to the average Dutch person – not because they 
are average, but because there are so many of them. […] If you have to say 
something, you can do it here – not just in our letter section, but also in 
interviews: people like you. So if we write about education, we always 
feature the educators, not the directors. 134F135 
Overall, there was a great drive among Dutch journalists to address uncomfortable 
issues to avoid creating any taboos. This marks a clear departure from the media’s 
demarcating stance during the 1980s and 90s toward earlier (and less successful) 
far-right movements (see Chapter 3), notably Hans Janmaat’s Centre Democrats, 
which were portrayed as ‘a party of fascists, criminals and scum’ (Rensen 1994). 
Indeed, in the past, the Dutch media ‘did all it could to damage the party’s 
reputation’ (Art 2011: 85; see also Ellinas 2010: 209; Mudde & Van Holsteyn 2000: 
148). In a TV show entitled Het zwarte schaap (‘The Black Sheep’), which aired in 
1999, a prominent Dutch political commentator and journalist, Paul Witteman, 
acknowledged that Janmaat ‘did not receive a fair chance to present his ideas’ as 
‘politicians and journalists at the time were concerned about the question how to 
best defuse the danger posed by the extreme right’ (see Het zwarte schaap 1999). 
When asked whether he had ever interviewed Janmaat, Witteman said no, 
explaining that he worked for the VARA, a broadcasting association which, at the 
time, was associated with the Socialist pillar, and that the views proclaimed by 
Janmaat clashed with the ideological foundations of this pillar: ‘We thought that 
every vote for the CD was one vote too many’ (ibid). When asked whether, in 
retrospect, this was justified, he responded that although it was not objective, this 
stance was perfectly legitimate. An analysis of newspaper coverage of the CD 
illustrates the difficulty the party had in gaining media access: in 1994, only 2.9 
percent of the total references made to party programmes in the NRC Handelsblad 
 
134 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of de Telegraaf on 23 March 2017 in Amsterdam. 
135 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of Algemeen Dagblad on 24 March 2017 in Rotterdam. 
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and the AD went to the CD, compared to zero percent in 1998, and 0.9 percent in 
2002 (Bornschier 2008: 237). 
The limited media exposure that Janmaat received contrasts starkly with that of Pim 
Fortuyn. Indeed, Fortuyn dominated the 2002 electoral campaign and was by far 
the most visible politician in the media. According to Kleinnijenhuis et al. (2003: 
86), no less than 24 percent of all media coverage devoted to individual politicians 
was dedicated to Fortuyn, while the runner-up merely received 7.3 percent. 
Fortuyn’s spectacular rise to fame marked an important turning point in the Dutch 
media landscape (see Koopmans & Muis 2009), after which journalists decided to 
start paying more attention to the ‘silent majority’. This was an event that 
contributed to the dissemination of populist discourses in the media. According to 
one editor-in-chief, ‘all sluices burst open’ after Fortuyn gained prominence, 
explaining that his success ‘showed that we’d really been locked into our own 
bastions […], and we have not listened enough to the people living in working-class 
neighbourhoods.’135F136 
This trend was reinforced by the Brexit vote in the UK in June 2016 and, above all, 
the election of Donald Trump in the United States several months later, which 
produced an ‘issue culture’ (see Esser et al. 2017: 374) that generated favourable 
discursive opportunity structures for the populist radical right. One week after the 
2016 American Presidential Elections, the head of the main Dutch public 
broadcaster (NPO) wrote an op-ed published in the Volkskrant to announce that the 
Dutch public broadcaster was going to learn from the American elections, 
explaining they were going to pay more attention to the ‘common people on the 
street’: 
In the Netherlands, the question is raised whether the so-called mainstream 
media know what happens on the street. Whether they give sufficient voice 
to all Dutch people, or whether they only give voice to the highly-educated, 
cosmopolitan Dutch person. We here in Hilversum take this discussion 
seriously. Because the public broadcaster belongs to everybody. […] It is 
our duty to take all sounds and visions in society seriously and to give them 
a voice and show them. (Rijxman 2016) 
This sort of self-criticism is a recurring theme among Dutch media practitioners 
since Fortuyn’s electoral breakthrough in 2002 (Akkerman 2016). There is a 
 
136 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of de Volkskrant on 21 March 2017. 
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tendency in the Dutch media to (over)compensate for the past lack of attention 
given to the concerns of Dutch citizens by seeking to amplify the voice of the 
‘common people’. In an article, the co-founder and Editor-in-Chief of the online 
news website de Correspondent argued that, after Pim Fortuyn proclaimed the 
failure of multiculturalism, 
[a] long-brewing discontent with diversity flared up, seemingly out of 
nowhere. Politicians in The Hague looked on in shock as the bald professor 
from Rotterdam shook the foundations of the status quo. Meanwhile, Dutch 
journalists looked in the mirror despairingly. How did we miss this? What 
followed was a decade of ‘saying the unsayable.’ (Wijnberg 2017) 
Similarly, the Editor-in-Chief of Elsevier Weekblad noted: ‘In the past, some issues 
were ignored by the media, and Fortuyn was able to benefit from this. Following 
his rise, the immediate reaction of the media was to say: “We did something 
wrong,” and what followed, was a lot of: “Let’s hear the voice of the people” – it 
really led to hypercorrection’. 136F137 This newsroom logic makes the media more 
accessible to right-wing populist parties; after all, these parties also seek to portray 
themselves as representatives of ‘the common people’.  
Thus, in contrast to Wallonia, right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands do not 
receive special treatment and are generally no longer considered pariahs. When 
asked how they deal with right-wing populism in general and Geert Wilders in 
particular, most editors-in-chief in the Netherlands explained that they treat him 
like any other politician – although some newspapers seemed more cautious than 
others. For instance, the deputy Editor-in-Chief of the more ‘elitist’ NRC 
Handelsblad said the following: ‘Should we put him [i.e. Wilders] in the newspaper 
or not? We always have heated debates about this. We often end up doing so, but 
we never do so without prior consideration.’ 137F138 By contrast, the Editor-in-Chief of 
the popular tabloid-style newspaper Telegraaf explained, ‘we approach right-wing 
populism (as far as it translates into political power and parties) just like any other 
parties, that is to say: we approach them critically. I don’t see any difference […]. 
We follow him [i.e. Wilders] and the PVV with great interest, because it’s important 
what is happening there—after all, it’s the second biggest party’. 138F139 
 
137 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of Elsevier Weekblad on 9 August 2017 via phone. 
138 Interview with the deputy Editor-in-Chief of NRC Handelsblad on 16 August 2017. 
139 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of de Telegraaf on 23 March 2017 in Amsterdam. 
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Similarly, the Editor-in-Chief of the AD explained, ‘You always get questions like: 
“Should we give the floor to Wilders?” Well, there are people who feel represented 
by him, so yes, we should do this.’139F140 However, all interviewees drew a clear line 
when it came to the infamous minder, minder Marokkanen (i.e. ‘fewer, fewer 
Moroccans’) incident in 2014, when Wilders asked the crowd at a campaign rally 
if they wanted ‘fewer or more Moroccans’ in their city. When the crowd responded 
with ‘Fewer! Fewer!’ Wilders answered, ‘We are going to take care of that’ (see 
The Guardian 2014). Virtually all editors-in-chief pointed out that Wilders had 
gone too far with this statement because it called into question the rule of law. 
Overall, however, it seems fair to say that the Dutch media landscape has become 
gradually more accessible to the populist radical right. 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has shed light on the ways in which the media deal with the populist 
radical right in the Benelux region, thereby illuminating different motivations 
behind societal responses to right-wing populism. As Ellinas (2018: 269) has noted, 
the ways in which the media choose to treat the populist radical right reflect some 
of the thorniest debates in democratic politics; specifically, ‘[m]edia coverage raises 
questions about the degree of tolerance societies should display when it comes to 
the often intolerant ideas of right-wing radicals and, more generally, questions 
about the limits of freedom of expression democracies grant to groups and 
individuals.’ The evidence presented above suggests that Dutch and Flemish media 
practitioners have gradually become more accommodating towards right-wing 
populist parties, whereas Walloon and Luxembourgish journalists continue to 
adhere to strict demarcation. How, though, do media practitioners justify their 
coverage of right-wing populist parties? 
The willingness of media practitioners to engage with populist radical right actors 
can be linked to the electoral trajectories of these parties. In Flanders and the 
Netherlands, media practitioners justified their strategies by explaining that it would 
simply be ‘bad journalism’ not to give space to an electorally successful party. More 
generally, electoral success can weaken the inhibitions of some media to grant 
access and exposure to right-wing populist parties (Ellinas 2010: 219). Luxembourg 
 
140 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of Algemeen Dagblad on 24 March 2017 in Rotterdam. 
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and Wallonia have yet to witness the rise of a charismatic leader along the lines of 
Marine Le Pen or Geert Wilders, and there is no doubt that the absence of a credible 
right-wing populist contender makes it easy to maintain a media cordon. On the 
other hand, it is worth mentioning that Luxembourgish and Walloon media 
practitioners generally maintained a more politically motivated and normative 
stance than their Dutch-speaking colleagues by arguing that the media should not 
provide any space to far-right movements. In particular Walloon media 
practitioners underscored time and again that they would stick to these principles – 
even if they were to be confronted with an electorally successful far-right 
movement. This suggests that journalists in the Benelux region hold different views 
about their societal role. These views are likely to be influenced by the broader 
media landscape in which journalists operate. 
The structure of the media in Western Europe has changed significantly in the post-
war period (Hallin & Mancini 2004; Mudde 2004: 553). In the past, media outlets 
were often tied to political parties, trade unions, or churches; from the 1960s 
onward, however, the media started to gain political independence. This trend was 
accompanied by the dismantling of public broadcasting monopolies and the 
proliferation of private media outlets. The increased competition launched a 
‘struggle for readers and viewers and, consequently, a focus on the more extreme 
and scandalous aspects of politics’ (Mudde 2004: 553; see also Esser et al. 2017: 
365). At the same time, the expansion of private media outlets has generated a 
tendency to focus on entertainment values (Eatwell 2003: 57).  
These changes can have an impact on media content. Specifically, it ‘changes the 
social function of journalism, as the journalist’s main objective is no longer to 
disseminate ideas and create social consensus around them, but to produce 
entertainment and information that can be sold to individual consumers’ (Hallin & 
Mancini 2004: 277). Market pressures incentivise the media to feature political 
actors with lively personalities, thereby pushing the media ‘into a symbiotic 
relationship with the Far Rightists’ (Ellinas 2010: 211). Indeed, populists seem to 
benefit from the commercial character of the growing popular news media and 
tabloid-press industry, as ‘these media give passionate attention to what happens in 
the usually animated precincts of populist movements’ (Mazzoleni 2008: 50). 
According to Mazzoleni (2008: 62), the media and populists need one another: ‘The 
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media must cover the sensational stories provided by contentious, often flamboyant 
(and in some cases “media darling”) figures while populist leaders must use the 
media to enhance the effectiveness of their messages and build the widest possible 
support.’  
There is tentative evidence that the changes in the media systems have been more 
profound in the Netherlands and Flanders than in Wallonia and Luxembourg. 
Specifically, it appears that the Dutch-speaking media are shifting away from the 
world of politics toward the world of business (as predicted by Hallin & Mancini 
2004). In his 2017 book, the Dutch news correspondent Joris Luyendijk, made the 
following observation: 
In the mid-1990s, the NRC Handelsblad was, like many other newspapers 
in the Netherlands, owned by a foundation. Then, just like all other 
newspapers, it had to be ‘launched on the market’. The NRC was bought by 
investors from London and then sold on. And sold again. My colleagues 
who still work there say: ‘We are no longer a newspaper but a company.’ 
Profit is no longer a means to make a newspaper without government 
subsidies. Profit is now a goal and the newspaper is a means (Luyendijk 
2017: 40-41).  
There is unmistakable evidence of a growing concentration of media ownership 
among the Dutch-speaking media outlets. Indeed, over the past decades, the Dutch-
speaking (newspaper) market has become dominated by two (Flemish) media 
companies: De Persgroep and Mediahuis (see Annex). In addition, throughout the 
interviews, there was straightforward evidence of commercial thinking among 
Dutch and Flemish media representatives. In Flanders, several media practitioners 
maintained that it would not be sensible from a commercial point-of-view to 
alienate a substantial portion of readers and viewers. In the Netherlands, 
interviewees routinely referred to their readers and viewers as ‘clients’. Some 
pointed to sales trends and business models, while others proclaimed their interest 
in becoming ‘the largest newspaper’ – concerns that did not come up in any 
interviews in Luxembourg or Wallonia.  
Unlike in Wallonia and Luxembourg, there is a growing consensus among Dutch-
speaking media practitioners that journalists are to remain ‘neutral’ commentators. 
Indeed, they consistently underlined the importance of maintaining an open mind 
and covering all viewpoints. Crucially, however, the Dutch and Flemish public-
service broadcasters also subscribe to this view. This is interesting given that they 
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are primarily funded by the state and therefore isolated from market mechanisms. 
This suggests that the differences in media strategies cannot simply be attributed to 
commercialisation. The media do not exist in a vacuum; rather, ‘[m]edia 
organisations operate in political environments and their behaviour is also 
determined by their interaction with this environment’ (Ellinas 2018: 278). Thus, 
we cannot fully understand the media without considering the nature of the states, 
party systems, wider social structures in which they are embedded (Hallin & 
Mancini 2004). After all, “[i]n settings where the media have strong ties with the 
political system, it is reasonable to expect that the treatment of radicals is at least 
partly driven by political considerations” (Ellinas 2018: 278). This is particularly 
true for democratic corporatist media systems that are characterized by a high 
degree of political parallelism (see Hallin & Mancini 2004).  
The Dutch-speaking media seem to have transitioned toward the more 
commercialised ‘Liberal Model’, which implies ‘a shift toward the neutral 
journalistic professionalism, of the sort that is particularly strong in the United 
States’ (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 285). This may also be linked to ‘audience 
fragmentation’; over the past decades, listeners and viewers in the Netherlands and 
Flanders have become ‘consumers’ rather than follower of specific political or 
religious segments (see Nieuwenhuis 1992: 207). In other words, just as voters have 
become less loyal to traditional ‘pillar’ parties, media consumers have become less 
loyal to the institutions of the social segments they once belonged to.  
In Luxembourg, the persistence of the partisan press as well as the subsidy system 
have prevented convergence towards the ‘Liberal Model’ (see Hallin & Mancini 
2004: 162). In Wallonia, political concerns simply seem to outweigh commercial 
considerations. More generally, in Luxembourg and Wallonia, the remnants of 
pillarisation continue to play a role in the media landscape. This became evident in 
the interview process. For instance, when asked about their editorial line towards 
immigration, the responses by newspaper editors in Luxembourg and Wallonia 
were often clearly rooted in the ideological pillar that they (used to) belong to. For 
instance, the Editor-in-Chief of the liberal Lëtzebuerger Journal explained, ‘our 
editorial line is liberal, that is to say: relatively open to all opinions’. 140F141 Meanwhile, 
 




the Editor-in-Chief of the conservative (formerly catholic) La Libre in Wallonia 
used terms such as ‘humanist’, ‘tolerant’, and ‘Christian’ to describe his editorial 
line. 141F142  
In Flanders and, above all, the Netherlands, the editorial line was not always as 
obvious. When asked about his editorial line towards immigration, the Editor-in-
Chief of the Algemeen Dagblad responded, ‘The editorial line? You probably mean 
“editorial policy” in English, so the policy… Well, it’s not like our journalists are 
sent out with a specific policy when writing about immigration. […] Journalists just 
need to write.’ 142F143 Likewise, the Editor-in-Chief of the Dutch public broadcaster 
NOS explained, ‘We treat it [i.e. immigration and right-wing populism] like any 
other topic: if it’s newsworthy, we cover it’. 143F144  
Finally, it is possible that media practitioners in Luxembourg and Wallonia have 
‘drawn lessons’ from the experiences of their neighbouring countries. Particularly 
in Wallonia, there was evidence of ‘learning’: after witnessing the rise of the 
Flemish Interest Party, Walloon media practitioners came up with a set of principles 
and practices that were intended to prevent a similar electoral breakthrough in their 
polity. These guidelines were institutionalised over time and eventually formalised 
into a rigid cordon sanitaire. According to a VRT journalist, this helps explain why 
the Flemish media cordon was never implemented as rigidly as in Wallonia: ‘We 
set up the cordon when the VB had already started to gain momentum. Wallonia 
has not yet seen a successful far-right party, so the cordon is applied much more 
strictly: in Wallonia, the populist radical right is nipped in the bud’. 144F145  
There is ample evidence that media behaviour does not simply reflect but also 
shapes the electoral advances of right-wing populist parties (e.g. Czymara & 
Dochow 2018; Damstra et al. 2019; Murphy & Devine 2018). Specifically, the 
media can play an instrumental role in rallying support and disseminating the 
populist message, which can contribute to the legitimisation of their cause by 
‘remov[ing] the stigma of extremism’ (Ellinas 2018: 273). Particularly in the earlier 
phases of a party’s development, the media can be an important asset in the pursuit 
 
142 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of La Libre on 6 April 2017 in Brussels. 
143 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of Algemeen Dagblad on 24 March 2017 in Rotterdam. 
144 Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of NOS on 23 March 2017 in Hilversum. 
145 Interview with a political journalist at VRT on 29 March 2017 in Brussels. 
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of national visibility and legitimacy. In Wallonia and Luxembourg, media 
practitioners have consistently narrowed the opportunity structures available to 
right-wing populist parties. In Flanders and the Netherlands, on the other hand, the 
media did not have any rigid and formal guidelines prior to the rise of the LFP and 
the VB. This flexible stance could help explain why Dutch and Flemish media 
practitioners became gradually more receptive to right-wing populist parties. This 
suggests that the timing of the various responses to right-wing populism plays a 
crucial role in their effectiveness. The importance of timing will be discussed in the 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The main goal of this thesis was to enhance our understanding of the variation in 
the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Previous research has shown 
that the rise of the populist radical right has a ‘contagion effect’ in the sense that 
populist radical right parties can incentivise mainstream parties to shift their policy 
agendas rightwards, for instance by advocating stricter immigration rules (e.g. Bale 
2003; van Spanje 2010). There is also empirical evidence to suggest that the so-
called ‘parroting effect’ (van Spanje & de Graaf 2018) is real; in other words, 
mainstream parties tend to copy the populist radical right when faced with a 
successful right-wing populist challenger (Abou-Chadi & Krause 2018; Han 2015; 
van Spanje 2010). The presence of electorally successful right-wing populist parties 
has pulled European party systems rightwards (Wagner & Meyer 2017). Indeed, 
political campaigns, immigration laws and the entire public discourse have become 
increasingly right-wing (in a cultural sense), as illustrated by the diffusion of radical 
right ideologies and issues into the mainstream political discourse (Pytlas 2015).  
As Rydgren (2005: 429) has noted, however, ‘right-wing populism is not 
contagious (in the sense that epidemics are); it only diffuses if actors want it to 
diffuse’ (emphasis in original). In other words, if there are no actors (i.e. parties) or 
channels (i.e. the media) to diffuse right-wing populist agenda items, right-wing 
populist parties are less likely to break through electorally. Thus, one of the main 
conclusions to be drawn from this thesis is that mainstream parties and the media 
do play a crucial role in the diffusion of right-wing populism. Taken together, they 
act as ‘gatekeepers’ who control the gateway to the electoral arena.  
In line with previous research (Art 2006; Ellinas 2010; Pytlas 2015), the thesis 
shows that, particularly in the earlier phases of a party’s development, the electoral 
performances of right-wing populist parties depend to a large extent on exogenous 
factors, notably the degree of political and social ostracism they face in a given 
polity. More generally, the findings indicate that the reactions of civil society, 
mainstream political parties and the media play a crucial role in the electoral 
trajectories of right-wing populist parties.  
A specific aim of the thesis was to explain why right-wing populist parties have 
been more successful in garnering electoral support in the Netherlands and Flanders 
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than in Wallonia and Luxembourg. To this end, the research set out to explore 
conventional explanatory variables, including socio-economic indicators (i.e. 
demand-side factors) as well as institutional and party organisational features (i.e. 
supply-side explanations). The findings show that demand for right-wing populist 
parties has been relatively constant across the Benelux region, whereas the supply 
of such parties has been comparatively weaker in Wallonia and Luxembourg than 
in Flanders and the Netherlands.  
More precisely, in terms of demand, the thesis indicates that, throughout the 
Benelux region, broad societal changes brought about by post-industrialisation and 
globalisation have generated a sense of dissatisfaction with mainstream politics and 
helped pave the way for partisan dealignment (i.e. the weakening of traditional ties 
between voters and parties). Drawing on a broad range of sources including 
electoral studies, public opinion research and the existing secondary literature, the 
findings shows that although demand for the populist radical right may be slightly 
weaker in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg given the country’s wealth, there is a 
potential breeding ground in all four cases. On the supply side, the thesis confirms 
that some structural features (notably the proportionality of the electoral system in 
the Netherlands and the availability of a pre-existing network in Flanders) have 
made it easier for right-wing populist parties to enter the political arena. Although 
all four polities under consideration have electoral systems based on proportional 
representation, comparatively higher barriers to entry may have weakened the 
supply of the populist radical right in Wallonia and Luxembourg.  
Yet, while conventional demand- and supply-side theories provide a helpful starting 
point, they are insufficient to account fully for the variation in the success of right-
wing populist parties in the Benelux. Specifically, they fall short in explaining the 
timing of the electoral breakthrough of the Vlaams Belang (VB) in Flanders and the 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands. After all, the VB had strong 
organisational capacity long before it managed to break through electorally in the 
late 1980s. Likewise, conventional theoretical models fail to explain why and how 
the LPF managed to mobilise so much support in a relatively short period of time 
in the early 2000s. In other words, demand- and supply-side explanations provide 
little insight into why right-wing populist parties were successful in accessing the 
public discourse and making their voices heard in the first place. 
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To answer these questions, the research then focused on the broader cultural and 
socio-political context in which party competition takes place. The thesis highlights 
the importance of discursive and political opportunity structures created by 
mainstream parties and the media. The findings show that their actions determine 
the ‘openness’ of the electoral market. Historical specificities help explain the 
different reactions that mainstream parties and the media have had towards the far 
right in the Benelux. In the Netherlands and Flanders, mainstream parties and the 
media have generated a relatively ‘open’ electoral market by providing an 
accessible environment in which right-wing populist parties can thrive. The decline 
of mainstream parties created opportunities for right-wing populist parties to 
politicise and monopolise new policy items, in particular issues pertaining to 
immigration and national identity. At the same time, related structural changes in 
the media landscape, including audience fragmentation as well as the twin 
processes of privatisation and commercialisation, have made the media more 
compatible with the ‘populist logic’. Taken together, mainstream parties and the 
media acted as ‘drivers’ on voter demand for, as well as party supply of, the populist 
radical right. Indeed, they contributed to increasing the salience of the immigration 
debate and enabled the radicalisation of the political discourse, thereby creating 
favourable opportunity structures for right-wing populist parties to influence the 
public debate.  
By contrast, Wallonia and Luxembourg have been less affected by these tendencies; 
indeed, the media and mainstream parties have acted as ‘buffers’ by keeping the lid 
on voter demand and party supply. Different historical experiences have given rise 
to a relatively hostile political environment for far-right movements. Traditional 
cleavage structures have stayed comparatively intact, and support for mainstream 
parties has remained relatively stable. Indeed, voters have stayed comparatively 
loyal to established parties, notably the Social Democrats in Wallonia and the 
Christian Democrats in Luxembourg. These parties have successfully used state 
resources to maintain ties to their core electorates. This may have dampened the 
effect of what the late Peter Mair described as the ‘hollowing out of democracy’ 
(Mair 2013). As a result, demand for the populist radical right in Wallonia and 
Luxembourg is less pronounced than in Flanders and the Netherlands. In addition, 
media practitioners in these two polities generally adhere to demarcation, thereby 
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narrowing the discursive opportunity structures for right-wing populist parties to 
influence the public discourse. Although Luxembourg and Wallonia are certainly 
not immune to the ‘rise of the right’, these polities are less likely to witness the rise 
of a successful right-wing populist movement as long as media practitioners and 
mainstream politicians continue to uphold their strict demarcation policy. 
Individually, the various factors listed above cannot explain the success and failure 
of the populist radical right in the Benelux. Taken together, however, they go a long 
way in accounting for variations in the electoral performances of the respective 
parties. As the traditional roles of the press and parties are changing in the sense 
that they are no longer the main ‘transmission belts’ between society and politics 
(Sartori 1976: 20-5), the findings presented in this thesis highlight the need to 
question the ways in which these changes might affect the electoral trajectories of 
right-wing populist parties. The remainder of this chapter therefore discusses the 
broader implications of the findings and identifies avenues for further research. 
6.1. Theoretical Contributions 
This thesis has provided a multifaceted, systematic analysis of potential factors that 
help explain the variation in the electoral fortunes of right-wing populist parties in 
the Benelux countries. By differentiating between electoral breakthrough and 
electoral persistence, and by moving beyond the two-dimensional demand- and 
supply-side framework, the thesis complements existing theoretical explanations. 
From a theoretical point of view, the thesis confirms the argument put forward by 
David Art (2006) that right-wing populist movements are less likely to break 
through electorally when the public sphere in which they operate is universally 
opposed to them. In other words, when mainstream parties and the media 
consistently restrict the discursive and political opportunity structures available to 
right-wing populist parties, these parties are less likely to succeed. Thus, 
mainstream parties and the media are not secondary players but key agents in the 
early stages of development of right-wing populist parties.  
First, the findings indicate that the entry phase into the electoral arena is the most 
important moment in the life cycle of right-wing populist parties. Second, the 
research suggests that the timing and rigidness of the demarcation strategy vis-à-
vis the populist radical right can help determine its effectiveness (see also Heinze 
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2018). In Luxembourg, there is a broad consensus among media practitioners and 
mainstream parties that maintaining an open society is crucial for the country’s 
wealth. While this understanding has not been formalised, it appears to be 
significant in the sense that it is deeply ingrained and reflected in the values and 
decisions of key actors including politicians and media practitioners. In Wallonia, 
a formal political and media cordon was set up prior to the electoral breakthrough 
of a right-wing populist contender. Because the cordon has been formalised and 
institutionalised, it poses clear limits on what is considered politically and socially 
acceptable. This makes it difficult for right-wing populist parties to question these 
limits. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the boundaries of the political discourse were 
shifted by the centre-right. Indeed, the radicalisation of the political discourse was 
initiated by mainstream parties, and the media played an important role in 
perpetuating that discourse. In Flanders, a cordon sanitaire was set up after the VB 
had gained prominence. Although the political cordon persists, it was never fully 
‘watertight’. Given the late implementation and permissiveness of the cordon, it 
was inevitably less effective. 
How far do the arguments presented above travel beyond the Benelux region? 
Specifically, how might the theoretical framework that underpins this thesis help us 
understand the variation in the electoral trajectories of right-wing populist parties 
across Western Europe and beyond? The qualitative research design as well as the 
small number of cases examined here restrict the generalisability of the findings 
beyond the four polities considered in this thesis. However, the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 2 can serve as a useful analytical and conceptual 
tool with which to analyse other cases. In the following paragraphs, I probe the 
utility of the theoretical insights derived in this thesis. I do so by tentatively 
applying them to the two larger neighbouring countries: France and Germany. I 
thereby focus specifically on the role of mainstream parties and the media in the 
electoral trajectories of right-wing populist parties. 
6.1.1. France 
There is hardly a case where the complicity of mainstream parties and the media 
has been more obvious than in France. According to Ellinas (2010), French 
mainstream parties sought to profit from growing public demands for cultural 
protectionism from the 1970s onwards. By politicising issues pertaining to national 
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identity, they created political and discursive opportunity structures for the rise of 
the Front National (FN). Indeed, ‘[t]oward the late 1970s, all mainstream parties 
started taking positions on a new axis of political contestation that was gradually 
supplementing the traditional competition of the Left and the Right over economic 
issues’ (Ellinas 2010: 172). Unlike in most other cases, however, in France, the 
impetus for the right-wing turn came from the Left, following the politicisation of 
the immigration issue by the French Communist Party (PCF). In the 1970s, 
Communist mayors throughout France (who had been concerned about the impact 
of immigration on their constituencies since the 1960s) sought to reduce the number 
of immigrants in their localities by denying them access to housing and benefits 
(Ellinas 2010: 173). This drastic measure led to the radicalisation of the public 
debate, thereby generating new political space. However, the PCF was ill-
positioned to exploit this space; in the early 1980s, the party’s stance on 
immigration led to internal tensions, especially among the intellectuals, who felt 
that an anti-immigrant position would clash with the party’s humanist ideals. This 
ultimately caused the party to withdraw the nationalist card: 
The PCF’s coalition with the Socialist government of François Mitterrand 
[following the 1981 elections] provided an additional impetus for de-
radicalization. As soon as they took office, the Socialists, who prided 
themselves on their liberal social attitudes, sought to regulate the status of 
illegal immigrants and immigrant organizations (Ellinas 2010: 174). 
Under Mitterrand, illicit immigration was regularised, and the death penalty was 
abandoned. These measures incentivised centre-right parties to radicalise their 
discourse (Bornschier 2012: 134). At the same time, the French Socialists actively 
sought to ensure the parliamentary representation of the Front National (Mayer 
1998: 21). By intentionally increasing the opportunity structures of the FN, 
Mitterrand sought to weaken his biggest competitors, namely the centre-right Rally 
for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République or RPR) and Union for French 
Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française or UDF). In 1982, when Jean-
Marie Le Pen complained about a lack of media attention for his movement, 
Mitterrand convinced the leaders of French public television channels to increase 
their coverage of the FN. This had the effect of widening the discursive opportunity 
structures available to Le Pen, thereby allowing him to directly reach out to his 
voters. It also contributed to removing the stigma of extremism attached to the FN 
by granting the party legitimacy. Thus, the behaviour of French mainstream parties 
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and the media enabled the FN to enter the political arena. After entering the arena, 
the FN’s image and discourse have become increasingly normalised, which 
ultimately paved the way for the party’s dédiabolisation (or de-demonisation 
process) under Marine Le Pen since her takeover in 2011 (see Ivaldi 2016). The FN 
has since become firmly entrenched in the French party system. As a result, the 
positioning of mainstream parties and the media have become less influential in 
shaping the party’s electoral success (Bornschier 2012: 122). 
6.1.2. Germany 
While the French case seems to provide illustrative evidence for the validity of the 
theoretical insights put forward in this thesis, the German case appears to oppose 
them. Indeed, the German case is puzzling at first glance. Given the country’s 
history with authoritarianism and National Socialism, the German public sphere 
was particularly averse to the emergence of a new far-right party. Using Germany 
as a ‘non-case’, David Art (2007) argued that the combined efforts of political 
elites, mainstream parties, the media and civil society to combat the far right made 
it extremely difficult for right-wing populist parties to recruit qualified personnel 
and break through electorally. In addition, the marginalisation and social stigma 
associated with the far right narrowed the discursive and political opportunity 
structures of right-wing populist parties. Yet, the 2017 German federal election saw 
the spectacular breakthrough of the right-wing populist ‘Alternative for Germany’ 
(Alternative für Deutschland or AfD). After winning 12.6 percent of the vote, the 
AfD became the third biggest party in Germany and was allocated 94 seats in the 
Bundestag. The rise of the AfD marked a serious break with the past and sent 
shockwaves through the German political establishment. As Lees (2018: 295-6) has 
observed, ‘[f]or the first time since the early 1950s, a political party had unlocked 
viable political space to the right of the CDU/CSU. Not only that, it became the 
third largest party grouping in the Bundestag.’ In light of the particularly hostile 
environment, how then might we explain the success of the AfD? 
First, the political context changed, and with it, the positioning of mainstream 
parties. Since the end of the WWII, the German centre-right (notably the two 
Christian Democratic sister parties, CDU and CSU) had played a key role in 
integrating the entire right-wing spectrum. Indeed, as Arzheimer (2015: 540) has 
noted, ‘German elites stigmatised National Socialism and criminalised the use of 
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its symbols very early on whilst offering nationalists a home in the mainstream 
centre-right.’ At the same time, the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD) had 
consistently downplayed the immigration question (Bornschier 2012: 138). In light 
of events that unfolded in the summer of 2015, however, the positioning of 
mainstream parties shifted. At the height of what became known as ‘the migration 
crisis’, Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to welcome tens of thousands of 
refugees to Germany. The shift of her ruling conservative Christian Democrats 
created political space on the right of Germany’s political spectrum. The AfD 
eventually managed to occupy that space. In light of the general animosity towards 
the far right in Germany, how could the AfD enter the political arena? Crucially, 
the AfD did not emerge as a right-wing populist party. As shown below, it was 
conceived as a moderate Eurosceptic party but then transformed into a right-wing 
populist party over time – after entering the electoral arena. By doing so, the party 
circumvented the ‘gatekeeping’ of mainstream party and media control. 
Right-Wing Populist Parties as ‘Trojan Horses’ 
Founded in 2013 by a group of disaffected CDU members, including Bernd Lucke 
(an economics professor), Konrad Adam and Alexander Gauland (both well-known 
conservative journalists), the AfD was conceived as a single-issue anti-euro party 
with the sole aim to take Germany out of the Eurozone. Routinely portrayed as a 
‘party of professors’ or an ‘economists’ club’, the AfD gained credibility and 
legitimacy through the support of academics and well-established former 
mainstream politicians, ‘which lent it a degree of gravitas unusual for a protest 
party’ (Patton 2017: 164). In its early days, the party could hardly be described as 
a far-right party. Based on an in-depth qualitative and quantitative content-analysis 
of the AfD’s 2014 EP election manifesto, Arzheimer (2015: 551) concluded that 
although the AfD was clearly Eurosceptic, it was neither populist nor radical, let 
alone extremist: 
[T]he AfD is indeed located at the far-right end of Germany’s political 
spectrum because of its nationalism, its stance against state support for 
sexual diversity and gender mainstreaming, and its market liberalism. 
However, it does not qualify as ‘radical’: There is no evidence of nativism 
or populism in the party’s manifesto, which sets it apart from most of the 
other new right parties in Europe. Moreover, its Euroscepticism is of the 
‘soft’ variety.  
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Indeed, the AfD entered the Bundestag in 2013 with a four-page manifesto, calling 
for the orderly dissolution of the Eurozone. At the time, the party ‘espoused a 
commitment to political asylum for the persecuted, did not deploy harsh anti-
immigrant, anti-Islam rhetoric and generally cultivated a bourgeois public image’ 
(Patton 2017: 165). This allowed the party to build a ‘reputational shield’ 
(Ivarsflaten 2006), in other words, a legacy that can be used to deflect social stigma 
and fend off accusations of extremism. The AfD initially clearly sought to 
distinguish itself from right-wing populist parties in neighbouring countries. With 
successive leadership changes between 2015 and 2017, however, the party 
gradually assumed a more hard-line approach, particularly on issues pertaining to 
immigration, Islam and national identity (see Art 2018; Rensmann 2018). By 2016, 
the AfD’s programme had converged with those of right-wing populist parties in 
Western Europe (Patton 2017: 165). Thus, at the time the party entered the political 
arena, it was not a far-right party; instead, it transformed into a right-wing populist 
party after it had managed to break through electorally. In that sense, the party can 
be likened to a Trojan horse.  
A similar observation can be made about UKIP, a far-right party that managed to 
break through in a country with a strong anti-fascist tradition (see Eatwell 2000). 
Just like the AfD, UKIP was founded by a university professor as a single-issue, 
Eurosceptic party with the sole aim of taking the UK out of the European Union 
(Weilandt 2018). Euroscepticism served as a ‘reputational shield’, in the sense that 
it enabled UKIP to mobilise voters on issues other than immigration. Dennison and 
Geddes (2018) have shown how the issue of Europe preceded the politicisation of 
immigration; unresolved tensions in the UK’s migration politics enabled UKIP to 
harness negative attitudes to the increasingly salient issue of immigration.  
Over time, UKIP became increasingly nativist and anti-immigrant, thereby 
transforming into a classical right-wing populist party. In particular following Nigel 
Farage’s decision to step down as party leader in the aftermath of the 2016 Brexit 
referendum, UKIP appears to have tacked to the far right (The Guardian 2019). The 
cases of the AfD and UKIP hence do not contradict the theoretical findings 
presented here; rather, they highlight the importance of parties’ entry into the 
electoral arena. Future studies should examine how public responses to the rise of 
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right-wing populist parties in these polities changed over time, and how this shift 
has impacted their electoral trajectories. 
6.2. The Future of Right-Wing Populism in the Benelux 
While the Parti Populaire in Wallonia is unlikely to break through electorally given 
that mainstream parties and the media have recognised it as a right-wing populist 
party, the ADR in Luxembourg may turn out to be a ‘Trojan horse’. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, the ADR was conceived in the late 1980s as a single-issue party with 
the aim of reforming the Luxembourgish pension system. Over time, the party took 
a rightwards turn and has gradually shifted towards the right end of Luxembourg’s 
political spectrum. The ideological development of the party remains to be seen at 
the time of writing (May 2019) – particularly following the upcoming retirement of 
the party’s moderate veteran ADR-MP, Gast Gibéryen, who announced that he 
hopes to step down from public office in the near future.145F146  
Once parties have been granted media access, and once mainstream parties have 
chosen to engage with the populist radical right, this strategy ‘cannot easily be 
reversed’ (Heinze 2018: 305; see also Bornschier 2018: 228). In other words, after 
they have entered the electoral arena, disengagement strategies will become 
increasingly difficult to justify and hence unsustainable. Having entered the 
political arena, right-wing populist parties proceed to establish ownership over 
issues pertaining to national identity and increase the salience of the cultural axis 
of political competition. This sets into motion what Ruth Wodak (2015: 19) has 
called ‘the right-wing populist perpetuum mobile’.  
In a nutshell, Wodak (2015) has shown that right-wing populist parties use 
rhetorical strategies that give rise to a vicious circle starting with provocations and 
accusations. Right-wing populist parties tend to purposely draw attention through 
scandals or by conveying double-messages (i.e. calculated ambivalence). This 
forces the media as well as mainstream politicians to respond. Right-wing populists 
then deny the offensive meaning of their statements by claiming victimhood. A 
‘quasi-apology’ might follow, notably by referring to other people’s 
misunderstanding, which then gives rise to a new scandal. According to Wodak 
(2015: 20), ‘[t]his pattern illustrates how right-wing populist parties cleverly 
 
146 Interview with Gast Gibéryen on 22 September 2016 in Luxembourg City. 
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manage to set the agenda and frame media debates; other political parties and 
politicians as well as the media are, in turn, forced to react and respond continuously 
to ever new provocations.’ By sending out mixed messages and then denying the 
offensive meaning behind them, right-wing populists constantly transcend and 
extend the limits of what is considered ‘acceptable’. This ultimately leads to the 
normalisation of the far right in the public sphere. 
The Dutch case serves as a perfect illustration of the ‘right-wing populist perpetuum 
mobile’. Prior to the breakthrough of Pim Fortuyn, right-wing populist movements 
were consistently delegitimised by all other actors in the public debate. Indeed, 
Hans Janmaat and his ‘extremist centre movements’ were totally boycotted by 
mainstream politicians and media practitioners alike. Following Fortuyn’s 
breakthrough, right-wing populist actors have successfully been allowed to 
challenge the norms of public contestation. The implosion of the LPF paved the 
way for the rise of Geert Wilders, whose statements about immigration and Islam 
were much more radical than those put forward by Janmaat a decade earlier.  
Since March 2019, Wilders appears to have become overshadowed by a far-right 
newcomer called Thierry Baudet, leader of the Forum for Democracy (FvD). The 
party became the largest in the Dutch upper house after winning nearly 15 percent 
of the vote in Dutch provincial elections. In his victory speech, Baudet made clear 
references to far-right themes. After claiming to be standing ‘amid the debris of 
what was once the greatest and most beautiful civilisation the world has ever 
known’, which he considers to be part of ‘a boreal civilisation’ that has come under 
attack from the inside by journalists, left-wing teachers and corrupted cartel 
politicians, and from the outside by migration, Baudet announced his ambition to 
reconnect the country to its ‘ancient roots and make it blossom again’ (see 
Volkskrant 2019). The word ‘boreal’ in particular raised a lot of discussion. 
Popularised by former FN-leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, the term is commonly used 
by extreme-right politicians as a synonym for the discredited term ‘Aryan’ and has 
since been widely recognised as a dog whistle to white supremacists (Kleinpaste 
2019). After having been accused of extremism, Baudet claimed innocence and 
instead insisted that the media and mainstream parties had conspired against him. 
The electoral breakthrough of Baudet could indicate the start of a new phase in the 
history of right-wing populism in the Netherlands. While the evolution of the party 
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remains to be seen, Baudet’s breakthrough cannot be understood in isolation; 
instead, this research indicates that it can be seen as a continuation of the 
radicalisation of the public discourse that was set into motion by the centre-right, 
and perpetuated by Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders.  
6.3. Avenues for Further Research 
This thesis has focused primarily on the reasons behind the variation in the electoral 
trajectories of right-wing populist parties. The findings raise a host of new 
questions. First, the research indicates that cartelisation and depoliticisation may 
not automatically be conducive to the rise of anti-system parties as predicted by 
Andeweg (2000). Thus, the argument put forward by Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) 
that support for populist parties tends to be higher in consensual than in non-
consensual political systems may need to be revised, in the sense that 
consociationalism may be sustainable if certain conditions are met. Future studies 
should therefore seek to analyse under what circumstances cartelisation and 
depoliticisation are conducive to the rise of populism and anti-system parties.  
Second (and related), further research is needed to examine why and how 
mainstream parties in Wallonia and Luxembourg have (thus far) managed to hold 
on to their core electorates. Their sustained electoral success may carry important 
lessons for Social- and Christian Democrats elsewhere. While these parties may not 
be spared from partisan dealignment and electoral decline in the future, it would be 
interesting to examine why their electoral success persisted at a time when similar 
parties elsewhere were losing support. For instance, it could be that the strategic 
use of state resources in combination with the maintenance of traditional cleavage 
structures and the politics of proximity (i.e. engrained, local political 
representation) provides an antidote to the rise of right-wing populist parties. 
Third, it is unclear how the rise of right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands 
and Flanders and the failure of these movements in Wallonia and Luxembourg have 
affected the overall quality of democracy in these polities. Some scholars have 
argued that populism poses a clear threat to (liberal) democracy (Abts & Rummens 
2007; Pappas 2019). By contrast, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) maintain 
that populism can be both a threat and corrective to democracy. Specifically, the 
authors argue that in unconsolidated (i.e. weak or new) democracies, populism has 
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mainly negative consequences, whereas it may have a limited positive impact in 
consolidated democracies. For instance, right-wing populist parties can mobilise 
disaffected voters and flag up issues that may otherwise not receive much attention. 
In the Netherlands and Flanders, right-wing populist parties managed to put forward 
issues that had not been seriously addressed by mainstream parties, thereby setting 
into motion of process of re-politicisation (Pellikaan et al. 2003). By contrast, in 
Wallonia and Luxembourg, issues pertaining to national identity and immigration 
appear to remain somewhat of a taboo topic. While this thesis has enhanced our 
understanding of the electoral trajectories of right-wing populist parties in the 
Benelux, it has not assessed how these trajectories have affected the overall state of 
democracy in these countries. The ways in which cartelisation and depoliticisation 
have impacted the overall quality of democracy in the Benelux is therefore an 
interesting (albeit complex and normative) question that merits further attention. 
Lastly, given the drastic changes that have occurred throughout Europe over the 
past decades, both in terms of party politics as well as in the media landscapes, 
future studies should seek to determine what the future of ‘gatekeeping’ might look 
like. The changing nature of the media environment has contributed to the 
‘mediatisation of politics’, which favours the personalisation of political leadership, 
thereby facilitating more direct means of communication between party leaders and 
the public (Kriesi 2014: 365). Moreover, the advent of social media has enabled 
politicians to directly communicate with their voters, thus circumventing the 
traditional media. Indeed, right-wing populist parties often resort to new media, 
which entail lower ‘communicative barriers to entry into the political market’ 
(Ellinas 2018: 276). This suggests that mainstream media outlets are losing their 
gatekeeping function; after all, they no longer seem to be the sole agenda setters.  
Yet, as Esser et al. (2017: 377) have noted, while ‘there is much to suggest that 
online media are more receptive to populism, […] it has not been conclusively 
proven with systematic empirical research that they are actually more populist than 
mainstream media.’ It is therefore ‘doubtful [at this point in time] whether the new 
media can match the effects of the mainstream or “old” media’, especially when it 
comes to granting legitimacy to right-wing populist parties (Ellinas 2018: 277). In 
light of changing patterns of (youth) media consumption, however, this is likely to 
change in the following decades. Future studies should therefore seek to analyse the 
215 
 
impact of new media on the success and failure of right-wing populist parties (see 
Gerbaudo 2018; Jacobs & Spierings 2018; van Kessel & Castelein 2016). 
Finally, the societal role of political parties has changed over the past decades. It 
has almost become a cliché to state that political parties are in crisis. In his seminal 
book entitled Ruling the Void, Peter Mair (2013: 1) noted that ‘[t]he age of party 
democracy has passed.’ In an earlier paper, Mair (2003: 1) made the following 
observation: 
Once regarded as a necessary component in the maintenance of 
representative government, and as an essential element in the stabilization 
and continued functioning of modern mass democracy, political parties are 
now often seen to be archaic and outmoded. […] Little more than thirty 
years ago it would have been reasonable to question whether meaningful 
political life existed outside the world of parties. Nowadays, it seems more 
appropriate to ask whether political life still exists inside that world. 
While we have witnessed the decline of traditional ‘mass parties’ (i.e. parties that 
were characterised by large memberships), we have also seen the rise of populist 
parties that criticise mainstream parties precisely for being out of touch with voters. 
This begs the question whether populist parties in general, and right-wing populist 
parties in particular, represent the nail in the coffin for the age of party politics, or 
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Annex I: List of Interviews with Media Practitioners 
 
 Name Title (at the 
time) 












Chief at RTL 
Television 
Luxembourg 




Luxembourg 5.9.16 Luxembourg 
City, LU 










by the socialist 
trade union & 
affiliated with the 
Social Democratic 
party (LSAP) 
Luxembourg 6.9.16 Luxembourg 
City, LU 
4 Guy Kaiser Editor-in-
Chief at RTL 
Radio 
Luxembourg 




Luxembourg 8.9.16 Luxembourg 
City, LU 







Luxembourg 9.9.16 Luxembourg 
City, LU 








with the Green 
Party 










with loose ties to 
the Liberal Party 





















owned by the 
Socialist trade 
union & affiliated 











owned by the 
Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese & 
affiliated with the 
Christian 
Democrats 









owned by the 
Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese & 














Luxembourg 27.9.16 Luxembourg 
City, LU 
13 Pia Oppel Deputy 
Editor-in-

































published in French 














of the Ministry 















formerly linked to 
the Catholic pillar 
Netherlands 21.3.17 Amsterdam, 
NL 









formerly linked to 
the Protestant pillar 





Chief of NOS 
One of the 
organisations that 
make up the Dutch 
public broadcasting 
service (NPO) 
Netherlands 23.3.17 Hilversum, 
NL 







Netherlands 23.3.17 Amsterdam, 
NL 










Netherlands 24.3.17 Rotterdam, 
NL 





























Wallonia 29.3.17 Brussels, BE 


















formerly linked to 
the Socialist pillar 









Flanders 31.3.17 Brussels, BE 































published by IPN, 
formerly linked to 
the Christian 
Democrats 
Wallonia 6.4.17 Brussels, BE 




television station in 
Flanders 











visual media in 
francophone 
Belgium 







television station in 
francophone 
Belgium 






Chief, Le Soir 
Daily newspaper, 
published by Rossel 






One of the 
organisations that 
make up the Dutch 
public broadcasting 
service 








television station in 
francophone 
Belgium 












formerly linked to 
the Catholic pillar 


















Netherlands 9.8.17 Cambridge, 
UK (via 
phone) 
40 Hein Greven Former 
Lobbyist  













formerly linked to 
the Catholic pillar 







television station in 
the Netherlands 
Netherlands 15.5.17 Hilversum, 
NL 
















Wallonia 28.9.17 Brussels, BE 










Netherlands 29.9.17 Rotterdam, 
NL 








formerly linked to 









Annex II: List of Interviews with Politicians & Party Representatives  
 
 Name Title (at the 
time) 










Party or ADR) 




President of the 
Women’s 
Section  


















ADR 28.9.16 Luxembourg City, 
LU 
6 Fred Keup Campaign 









Party Leader  Parti Populaire 
(People’s Party or PP) 
10.5.17 Brussels, BE 
8 Tom Van 
Grieken 
Party Leader  Vlaams Belang 
(Flemish Interest Party 
orVB) 




Annex III: List of Experts Consulted  
 
 Name Title (at the time) Institution (at the time) Date Place  
1 Philippe 
Poirier 
Research Chair in 
Parliamentary 







2 Lucien Blau Historian & Expert 
on the Extreme 
Right in 
Luxembourg 











4 Emilie van 
Haute 
Assistant Professor 
in Political Science 
Université Libre de 
Bruxelles  
16.9.16 Brussels, BE 
5 François Foret Professor in 
Political Science 
Université Libre de 
Bruxelles  





Vrije Universiteit Brussel  16.9.16 Brussels, BE 
7 Jérôme Jamin Professor in Law & 
Political Science 
Université de Liège  23.9.16 Liège, BE 
8 Jean Faniel Managing Director 
& Political Scientist 
Centre de recherche et 
d’information socio-
politiques (CRISP) 
20.10.16 Brussels, BE 













11 Benjamin de 
Cleen 
Assistant Professor 
in Political Science 





in Political Science 




in Political and 
Corporate 
Communication 
University of Amsterdam 23.3.17 Amsterdam, 
NL 
14 Pascal Delwit Professor in 
Political Science 
Université Libre de 
Bruxelles 
31.3.17 Brussels, BE 
15 Teun Pauwels Researcher & 
Political Scientist 
Flemish Ministry of 
Education 





Griffith University 10.5.17 Brussels, BE 
17 Fernand 
Fehlen 








Annex IV: Sample Questionnaire 
 
Léonie de Jonge 
PhD Candidate (POLIS) 
University of Cambridge 
Ld458@cam.ac.uk  
+352 691 714 740 
Nom : Monsieur Simon-Pierre De Coster 
Position : Directeur juridique de la RTBF 
Lieu & date : Bruxelles, le 28 septembre 2017 à 9h30 
 
But de l’entretien : Ma thèse de doctorat porte sur les partis populistes de droite dans les 
pays du Benelux. La question principale est la suivante : Pourquoi les partis populistes de 
droite n'ont-ils pas (encore) connu le même succès électoral au Luxembourg et en Wallonie 
qu'aux Pays-Bas et en Flandre ? 
Comme je m’intéresse au paysage médiatique belge, j'aimerais vous poser quelques 
questions afin de comprendre la façon dont la RTBF a choisi de couvrir le populisme de 
droite et les enjeux qui s’y rapportent. 
Voici une liste de questions que j’aimerais bien vous poser lors de l’entretien. Si vous le 
permettez, l’entretien sera enregistré et le contenu sera utilisé pour mon projet de thèse. 
 
Questionnaire préliminaire pour l’entretien (semi-directif) : 
1) Quel est le rôle de la RTBF dans le paysage médiatique belge ? 
2) Selon vous, quel est le rôle des médias dans la société ? 
3) Est-ce qu’il-y-a des différences entre la VRT et la RTBF ? Si oui, lesquelles ? 
4) Pouvez-vous me parler un peu du « cordon sanitaire médiatique » ? Est-ce qu’il existe 
véritablement ? Si oui, comment fonctionne-t-il ? 
5) Comment la RTBF applique-t-elle ce cordon ? 
6) Quelle est la ligne éditoriale de la RTBF vis-à-vis des partis populistes de droite ? 
7) Quelle est la ligne éditoriale de la RTBF vis-à-vis de l’immigration ? 
8) Est-ce que votre ligne éditoriale a changé dans les années passées, par exemple après 
les attentats, le Brexit, l’élection de Donald Trump ? 
9) Selon vous, est-ce qu’il y a des différences entre les médias flamandes et 
francophones ? 
10) Selon vous, pourquoi les partis populistes de droite n'ont-ils pas (encore) connu le 
même succès électoral en Wallonie qu’en Flandre ? 
11) Est-ce qu’il vous reste des questions à me poser ? 
 
